282 N.Y. 276 (1940)
When a confession by one defendant in a joint trial powerfully implicates co-defendants, and independent evidence against those co-defendants is weak, the trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion for severance.
Summary
Feolo, Mastrone, Brabson, and Summerfeld were convicted of first-degree murder. The key issue was whether the trial judge erred in denying separate trials to Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the testimony of Funicello, an admitted criminal, and the confessions of Summerfeld, which implicated all four defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson, finding that the denial of separate trials prejudiced them, as Summerfeld’s confession was highly incriminating and the independent evidence against them was weak. Summerfeld’s conviction was affirmed due to his own confessions. This case highlights the critical importance of severance when a co-defendant’s confession substantially prejudices others in a joint trial.
Facts
On September 14, 1931, three men robbed a speakeasy, during which Sergeant Timothy Murphy was fatally shot. Officer Khocke was also shot but survived. Six years later, Emillio Funicello, a repeat offender, provided information leading to the indictment of Feolo, Mastrone, Brabson, and Summerfeld. Funicello testified that Feolo and Brabson admitted to him that they shot a cop after Mastrone provided a “tip” about the speakeasy. Funicello also stated that Summerfeld confessed to him his involvement in the robbery and homicide, corroborating the roles of the four defendants.
Procedural History
The four defendants were jointly indicted for first-degree murder. Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson moved for separate trials, which were denied. All four were convicted. Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson appealed, arguing the denial of severance was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reviewed the convictions.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motions for separate trials made by Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson, given that the evidence against them, absent Summerfeld’s confession, was weak?
Holding
Yes, because without the confessions of Summerfeld, conviction of the other three defendants would have been far from a certainty. The Court of Appeals found that the denial of separate trials prejudiced Feolo, Mastrone, and Brabson.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the decision to grant separate trials is generally within the trial court’s discretion. However, the court emphasized that discretion ends and severance becomes a duty when a confession by one defendant powerfully implicates co-defendants and the independent evidence against them is weak. The court cited People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, stating, “One who makes no confession must be found guilty, if at all, only on proof independent of a confession by a codefendant.” The court found that Funicello’s testimony, standing alone, was not strong enough to ensure a conviction for Feolo, Mastrone and Brabson. The court also noted that the jury was improperly instructed to consider Summerfeld’s confession in evaluating whether Funicello was an accomplice, compounding the prejudice. The court concluded that, without Summerfeld’s confession, a conviction of the other three defendants was not a certainty, and therefore, the denial of separate trials constituted an abuse of discretion. Summerfeld’s conviction was upheld because of his own confessions: “The uniform consistency with which Funicello’s trial testimony tallies in its details with those confessions is cogent proof of its veracity and accuracy.”