Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N.Y. 538 (1894)
A person who actively instigates an arrest based on a warrant issued pursuant to a fatally defective information can be held liable for false imprisonment because the warrant is void ab initio.
Summary
Hewitt sued Newburger for false imprisonment, arguing he was arrested based on a warrant issued without legal authority. Newburger swore out an information alleging Hewitt threatened to damage property. The warrant led to Hewitt’s arrest, but the proceedings were later dismissed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of Hewitt’s claim, holding that because the information and warrant failed to allege the requisite unlawful and criminal intent, the warrant was void. As Newburger actively procured the arrest, he was liable for false imprisonment.
Facts
Newburger swore out an information against Hewitt, alleging that Hewitt threatened to tear down a wall being erected by City Mills. A warrant was issued based on this information, and Hewitt was arrested. Hewitt was detained for a few hours and released, and the proceedings were dismissed shortly after.
Procedural History
The Montgomery County Circuit dismissed Hewitt’s complaint for false imprisonment. The General Term of the Supreme Court, Third Department, affirmed the dismissal. Hewitt appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether Newburger was liable for false imprisonment when he instigated Hewitt’s arrest based on a warrant issued pursuant to an information that failed to allege the necessary elements of a crime.
Holding
Yes, because the information and warrant were fatally defective as they failed to allege unlawful and criminal intent, rendering the warrant void and Newburger liable for false imprisonment as he actively procured the arrest.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the information and warrant were deficient because they did not allege that Hewitt acted “willfully or maliciously” (as required by Penal Code § 639) or “unlawfully and willfully” (as required by Penal Code § 654) when he allegedly threatened to damage the wall. The court stated that “the fatal vice of the information and warrant is that they utterly fail to aver the unlawful and criminal intent which constitutes crime.” Citing People v. Stevens, 109 N.Y. 159, 163, the court emphasized that a criminal intent is crucial for transforming a trespass into an indictable offense. Because the information lacked these essential elements, the recorder’s act was without jurisdiction, rendering the warrant void. The court also emphasized Newburger’s active role in procuring the arrest, stating he was “active and officious” in ensuring Hewitt’s arrest, thus establishing his liability. The court highlighted the distinction between civil injury and criminal action, emphasizing that the presence of criminal intent dictates the classification. “But the word ‘willfully’ in the statute means something more than a voluntary act, and more also than an intentional act which in fact is wrongful. It includes the idea of an act intentionally done with a wrongful purpose, or with a design to injure another, or one committed out of mere wantonness or lawlessness.” (Wass v. Stephens, 128 N.Y. 123, 128). As there was no evidence of such intent, the process was void, and the defendant was liable.