Patterson v. Brown, 4 N.Y. 146 (1860): Judgments by Default and the Right to Appeal

Patterson v. Brown, 4 N.Y. 146 (1860)

A judgment entered by default, where the defendant fails to appear in court, is generally not appealable to a higher court; the proper remedy is a motion to the original court for relief.

Summary

This case addresses whether a judgment entered by default in a lower court can be appealed. Patterson sued Brown under the mechanics’ lien law, and Brown failed to appear in the county court. Judgment was entered against her by default. She appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal. Brown then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that a judgment by default is not appealable. The aggrieved party must first seek relief from the court where the action is pending.

Facts

Patterson sued Brown to enforce a mechanic’s lien. He served Brown with a notice to appear in Erie County Court and submit to an accounting.
Brown did not appear, and her default was noted.
A writ of inquiry was issued, damages were assessed, and a judgment was entered against Brown.

Procedural History

The Erie County Court entered a judgment against Brown by default.
Brown appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.
Brown then appealed the Supreme Court’s dismissal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a judgment entered by default in a county court is appealable to an appellate court.

Holding

No, because in cases of judgment by default, the aggrieved party must first seek relief from the court in which the action is pending.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that allowing appeals from default judgments would undermine the role of the trial court and convert the appellate court into a court of original jurisdiction. It emphasized that defendants have a duty to appear and defend themselves in the primary court. The court cited precedent establishing that under both the old system of practice and the Code, a writ of error (or appeal) does not lie from a judgment obtained by default.

The court stated, “When the law allows a defendant the privilege of being summoned, it imposes on him a corresponding duty, which is, if he has any ground of defense, he shall appear and prove it in the primary court having cognizance of the matter. To allow him to pass by the inferior tribunal unnoticed, would be to convert the appellate court into one of an original jurisdiction. A judgment by default is, for this purpose, equivalent to a judgment by confession.”

The court further noted that if there were errors in the service of process or defects in the pleadings, Brown’s remedy was to seek correction from the county court through a motion or demurrer, not by directly appealing the default judgment.