People v. Graham, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867)

An indictment for forgery is sufficient even if the forged instrument lacks a specific addressee, provided the instrument on its face demonstrates the potential to injure or affect the rights or property of another.

Summary

The defendant was convicted of forgery for uttering a false instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of goods. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person. The defendant argued that the indictment was deficient because the instrument lacked an addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company, the entity defrauded, was improperly identified. The court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute covered any instrument affecting property rights and that the indictment sufficiently identified the intended victim of the fraud.

Facts

The defendant was indicted for forging an instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of certain goods. The instrument was presented to the Meriden Cutlery Company, and the defendant obtained goods using it. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person or entity. The Meriden Cutlery Company was located in Connecticut and had an agency in New York City where the instrument was presented and the goods were obtained. The indictment charged the defendant with intent to defraud the Meriden Cutlery Company.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the indictment was insufficient because the forged instrument lacked a specific addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company was improperly identified. The Supreme Court reviewed the conviction on a writ of error.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an instrument lacking a specific addressee can be the subject of forgery under the statute.

2. Whether the Meriden Cutlery Company could properly be regarded as the subject of an intended fraud.

3. Whether the indictment was defective because it charged the defendant with intent to defraud persons unknown to the jury, when the grand jury and petit jury allegedly knew who was defrauded.

Holding

1. Yes, because the statute covers any instrument that affects property rights and aims to prevent any question of whether the specific paper forged is embraced by or specially enumerated in the statute.

2. Yes, because the evidence showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded, thus making it a capable subject of fraud, or because, even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficiently broad to reach its individual members or agent.

3. No, because the knowledge of the petit jury is irrelevant to the validity of the indictment, and it is not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded if the indictment indicates a real person or entity that was defrauded or intended to be defrauded.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the statute (2 R.S., p. 673, § 33) was broad enough to cover any instrument in writing that purported to be the act of another and by which a pecuniary demand or obligation was created, or by which property rights were transferred, conveyed, discharged, or diminished. The court emphasized the revisers’ intent to create a sweeping provision that embraces every forgery of a writing that could injure an individual or body politic in person or estate. The court distinguished English cases that required a specific addressee, noting that New York’s statute omits the enumeration of specific instruments, instead using the general designation “any instrument.” The court stated, “It is sufficient that the paper or instrument be of such a character that, by its use, another may be deprived of his property, or by which a pecuniary liability might be created.”

Regarding the identity of the defrauded party, the court held that the Meriden Cutlery Company could be the subject of fraud, whether it was a corporation or a copartnership. Even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficient because it charged an intent to defraud “divers other persons to the jury unknown,” which could include the company’s members or agent. The court emphasized that the proof showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded.

Regarding the third exception, the court found no error in the refusal to charge that the indictment must be disregarded if the grand jury and petit jury knew who was defrauded. The court reasoned that the knowledge of the petit jury was irrelevant, and it was not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded. The court cited Lowel’s case (1 Leach, 248; 2 East. P.C., p. 990, § 60) to support the proposition that it is sufficient if any person could be indicated from the words used in the indictment, and whether that person was the meditated object of the fraud is a matter for the jury to consider at trial. The court stated that “it is essential to aver that some real person or existent body was defrauded, or that the intent existed to defraud some such.”