Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863): Enforceability of a Lease Despite Landlord’s Lack of Title

Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863)

A tenant’s obligation to pay rent under a lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title to the property, especially where the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the tenant has not been evicted.

Summary

This case addresses whether a tenant can avoid paying rent by claiming the landlord had no valid title to the property. Smith (landlord) sued Wait (tenant) for unpaid rent under a two-year lease. Wait argued Smith lacked title and that a third party, Williams, had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The court held that Wait was obligated to pay rent because the lease implied a covenant of quiet enjoyment, which served as sufficient consideration, and because Wait had not alleged actual eviction from the premises. The court emphasized that the agreements for quiet enjoyment and rent payment were independent.

Facts

The key facts are:

  1. Smith leased property to Wait for a two-year term in a written agreement, reserving rent payable quarterly.
  2. The written lease was not an indenture (a deed executed by both parties) but a parol demise (oral or simple written lease).
  3. Wait allegedly promised to pay the rent.
  4. Wait claimed Smith lacked any interest or estate in the property.
  5. A third party, Williams, obtained a judgment against Wait in a separate action to recover possession of the property.
  6. Wait did not allege that he had been evicted or deprived of possession as a result of Williams’ judgment.

Procedural History

The case originated from a suit by Smith against Wait for unpaid rent. Wait presented a defense claiming Smith lacked title and that Williams had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The lower court’s ruling on the demurrer is not specified, but the Court of Appeals reviewed the case on appeal from that ruling.

Issue(s)

  1. Whether a tenant can refuse to pay rent based on the landlord’s alleged lack of title to the property when the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
  2. Whether a judgment obtained by a third party to recover possession constitutes a valid defense against rent payment when the tenant has not alleged actual eviction.

Holding

  1. Yes, because the agreement for quiet enjoyment implied in the lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title and serves as sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent.
  2. No, because the tenant must plead and prove actual eviction from the premises to assert a valid defense against rent payment based on a third party’s claim.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the agreement to pay rent and the agreement for quiet enjoyment are independent covenants. The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment acts as a sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent, regardless of the landlord’s actual title. The court referenced The Mayor of New-York v. Mabie and Tone v. Brace to support the existence of an implied agreement for quiet enjoyment. Drawing on Whitney v. Lewis, the court highlighted that a covenant for quiet enjoyment is sufficient consideration even if the grantor lacks title.

Furthermore, the court stated that to properly plead an eviction as a defense, the tenant must allege an actual eviction or expulsion from the premises and being kept out of possession until after the rent became due. Simply stating that a third party obtained a judgment to recover possession is insufficient. As the court noted, “In pleading an eviction, the plea must state an eviction or expulsion of the tenant from the demised premises, and the keeping him out of possession until after the rent became due; otherwise it is bad.”

The court underscored the principle that without a deed executed by both parties or an actual entry, the strict landlord-tenant relationship might not exist, but the independent agreement for quiet enjoyment remains enforceable.