New York Law Review

Category: New York Court of Appeals

  • Fossella v. Adams, 2025 NY Slip Op 01668: Home Rule and the Power of Local Governments to Determine Voter Eligibility

    2025 NY Slip Op 01668

    The New York State Constitution limits the right to vote in elections to U.S. citizens, but local governments have broad home rule power to manage their affairs. The phrase “People” in Article IX of the Constitution, for voting purposes, includes those eligible under Article II (citizens) and the local government’s right to determine local election rules is limited by these two articles.

    Summary

    In Fossella v. Adams, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a New York City law (Local Law 11) that allowed non-citizen lawful permanent residents and individuals authorized to work in the U.S. to vote in municipal elections. The Court held that Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution, which states “Every citizen shall be entitled to vote,” restricts the right to vote in New York elections to U.S. citizens. Further, the court held that Article IX, the Home Rule provision, does not override this limitation. The Court found that the City Council could not implement Local Law 11, which expanded the electorate, absent a public referendum, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision as modified.

    Facts

    The New York City Council passed Local Law 11 in December 2021, which allowed non-citizen lawful permanent residents and those authorized to work in the United States to vote in municipal elections. After the mayor took no action on the bill, it became effective in January 2022. Plaintiffs, including current and former elected officials and registered voters, sued to declare Local Law 11 unconstitutional, arguing it violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law. The trial court sided with the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division modified the judgment as to the Election Law claim and affirmed the trial court’s other decisions. The City Council and intervenors (non-citizens who would be eligible to vote under Local Law 11) appealed.

    Procedural History

    1. Trial Court: Granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring Local Law 11 unconstitutional. The court held that Local Law 11 violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law.

    2. Appellate Division: Modified the trial court’s judgment regarding the Election Law claim but affirmed the remainder of the lower court’s ruling.

    3. Court of Appeals: Affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision as modified, holding that the New York State Constitution restricts voting rights to citizens and that Article IX did not override that restriction, and Local Law 11 could not be implemented absent a referendum.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution limits voting to citizens?

    2. Whether Article IX of the New York State Constitution, which grants local governments home rule powers, creates an exception to the citizen-only voting requirement of Article II?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the language of Article II, Section 1, states: “Every citizen shall be entitled to vote at every election.” The court interpreted this language to restrict the right to vote to citizens.

    2. No, because Article IX expressly incorporates Article II, Section 1, which limits voting to citizens. Therefore, the home rule powers granted by Article IX do not supersede the citizenship requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. Article II, Section 1: The court emphasized that Article II, Section 1, clearly grants the right to vote to citizens. The court considered that Article II, Section 5, laws “for ascertaining, by proper proofs, the citizens” and Section 7, which dictates “all elections by the citizens” confirmed the limited franchise. The court rejected arguments that the term “citizen” merely provided a minimum qualification, stating that the constitutional language and historical context supported a restriction. The court looked to the history of this provision and relevant case law such as People ex rel. Smith v. Pease and Matter of Hopper v. Britt to support this view.

    2. Article IX and Home Rule: The Court held that Article IX’s incorporation of Article II’s definition of “People” as “Persons entitled to vote as provided in section one of article two of this constitution” maintained the citizen-only voting restriction. The Court found no language in Article IX that directly or indirectly permits municipalities to expand the definition of who may vote in local elections beyond citizens. The Court rejected arguments that the phrase “mean or include” in Article IX, Section 3(d) granted broader discretion. It found that this phrase did not change the fact that the term “people” was defined to align with Article II’s voting rights, which are limited to citizens.

    Practical Implications

    1. Impact on Similar Cases: The decision clarifies that in New York, only citizens may vote in elections, even those at the local level. Any local laws that attempt to grant voting rights to non-citizens are likely unconstitutional. Future cases will likely focus on the precise scope of the definition of “citizen.”

    2. Changes to Legal Practice: This ruling establishes that the home rule power of local governments is limited by the state constitution’s voting requirements. Legal practitioners advising local governments must understand that they cannot unilaterally expand the franchise beyond citizens.

    3. Business and Societal Implications: This decision reinforces the role of citizenship in the electoral process. It will likely affect the political participation of non-citizens. The decision also raises questions about how local governments can best engage with and represent the interests of non-citizen residents, and how local governments’ role will be defined. This decision ensures that, absent a state constitutional amendment, only citizens will have the right to vote in New York elections.

    4. Later Cases: While this decision is relatively recent, it will undoubtedly be cited in future cases dealing with the intersection of voting rights, home rule, and local government powers in New York. Cases regarding the definition of citizenship and the scope of “municipal elections” are probable.

  • Golobe v. Mielnicki, 2025 NY Slip Op 01670: Adverse Possession by Cotenant Despite Mutual Mistake

    2025 NY Slip Op 01670

    A cotenant can obtain full ownership of jointly owned property through adverse possession even when neither cotenant is aware of the other cotenant’s interest, provided the statutory requirements for adverse possession are met, but this does not absolve the administrator of their fiduciary duty of performing a diligent search.

    Summary

    In Golobe v. Mielnicki, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a cotenant could acquire sole ownership of property through adverse possession when a mutual mistake existed regarding the other cotenant’s interest. The court held that adverse possession was established because the party claiming it met all the required elements: the party had hostile possession, a claim of right, and open and notorious possession for the statutory period. Moreover, the Court found no fraud or breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the adverse possessor. Dissenting, Judge Rivera found the lack of diligence of the adverse possessor to be relevant, and would have restarted the clock on the adverse possession claim only when the successor cotenant was made aware of their ownership.

    Facts

    Dorothy Golobe died intestate in 1992, survived by brothers Yale and Zangwill Golobe, who were entitled to equal shares of her estate, including a building (the “Premises”). Mr. Golobe, Zangwill’s son, mistakenly believed Yale had predeceased Dorothy and, as administrator of her estate, represented to the Surrogate’s Court that Zangwill was the sole heir. Zangwill renounced his interest, and Mr. Golobe took possession, managing and renovating the property. Yale actually died in 1993. In 2018, when Mr. Golobe attempted to sell the Premises, a title search revealed Yale’s survivorship and thus the Trust’s interest as Yale’s successor. Mr. Golobe sued to quiet title based on adverse possession. The Trust counterclaimed for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Mr. Golobe had not done a proper investigation, and the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims should not have been dismissed.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted Mr. Golobe’s motion for summary judgment, declaring him the sole owner and dismissing the counterclaims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision in a 5-1 ruling.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mr. Golobe acquired sole ownership of the Premises through adverse possession, notwithstanding the mutual mistake regarding the existence of the co-tenancy.
    2. Whether the Trust’s claim for fraud should have been sustained.
    3. Whether the Trust’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty should have been sustained.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Mr. Golobe met all the elements of adverse possession.
    2. No, because the Trust failed to establish the elements of fraud, specifically scienter and reliance.
    3. No, because Mr. Golobe’s efforts to identify the beneficiaries of Dorothy’s estate were reasonable under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court first addressed the fraud claim, finding no triable issue of fact on either scienter (intent to deceive) or reliance. The court then addressed the breach of fiduciary duty claim, explaining that an administrator must make reasonable efforts to identify heirs, but that Mr. Golobe had, in fact, relied on the attorney friend who swore that Yale was dead when in fact he was not. Finally, the court held that Mr. Golobe had established adverse possession. The court determined Mr. Golobe’s possession was hostile, despite the mutual mistake, as

  • Matter of Dourdounas v. City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 01671: Exhaustion of CBA Grievance Procedures and Article 78 Proceedings

    2025 NY Slip Op 01671

    When a claim arises exclusively from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a mandatory grievance process, an employee must pursue the grievance procedure, and may not bring an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the employer’s actions, unless a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union is alleged.

    Summary

    In Matter of Dourdounas v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the proper method for a unionized public employee to seek judicial review of a claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement. The court held that because the employee’s claim concerned a breach of contract under the CBA, and the CBA contained a mandatory grievance process, an Article 78 proceeding was improper. The employee could not bypass the CBA’s dispute resolution mechanism and bring the action directly, especially since the employee did not allege that the union breached its duty of fair representation. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Article 78 petition, clarifying the distinction between statutory claims, which can proceed under Article 78, and contract claims governed by a CBA, which require a different procedure and cause of action.

    Facts

    George Dourdounas, a high school math teacher, was assigned to the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) pool as per the CBA between the NYC Department of Education (DOE) and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). The CBA allowed for a severance package for ATR teachers who retired by a certain date. Dourdounas was temporarily assigned to Bronx International High School. He requested the severance incentive, but was denied because he was considered permanently assigned to Bronx International. Dourdounas initiated a grievance process through the CBA. The grievance was denied at the school and Chancellor levels, and the UFT denied arbitration. Dourdounas then brought an Article 78 proceeding against the City.

    Procedural History

    Dourdounas initiated the grievance process under the CBA, which was denied at each step including a denial of arbitration by the UFT. Dourdounas then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which was dismissed as time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed, also holding the claim was time-barred. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Article 78 proceeding is the proper mechanism for judicial review of a claim arising exclusively under a collective bargaining agreement, which has a mandatory grievance process, when the employee has exhausted the grievance procedure.
    2. Whether the statute of limitations for a claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement, and subject to a mandatory grievance process, begins to run when the employee is informed of the action, or when the grievance process is exhausted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the claim arose solely under the CBA, and the CBA included a mandatory grievance process, an Article 78 proceeding was not proper.
    2. The statute of limitations begins to run when the employee has exhausted the mandatory grievance process and is aware of the final decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Ambach v. Board of Education, which established that when a claim arises under a CBA with a mandatory grievance process, an employee may not sue the employer directly for breach of that agreement but must proceed through the union in accordance with the contract. Only if the union fails in its duty of fair representation can the employee go beyond the agreed procedure and litigate a contract issue directly against the employer. The court emphasized that claims arising exclusively from an alleged breach of a term in a CBA must be brought through a civil action for breach of contract. The court distinguished this case from claims based on statutory or constitutional violations, which are properly brought in an Article 78 proceeding.

    The court explained that disrupting the contract’s settlement procedures threatens the union’s authority as representative and weakens the individual employee’s protection. Therefore, since Dourdounas’s claim was based solely on a contract right, and he did not allege a breach of the duty of fair representation by the UFT, the Article 78 proceeding was improper, and his claim should be dismissed.

    The court clarified that even if the claim could have been properly brought under Article 78, the Appellate Division’s application of the exhaustion rules would have been incorrect because the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the grievance process was exhausted.

    Practical Implications

    This decision highlights several key considerations for attorneys dealing with public sector employees in New York. First, it underscores the importance of identifying the source of the legal claim. If the claim is solely based on the CBA, the employee must exhaust the CBA’s grievance process before any judicial review can be sought. Second, it clarifies that an Article 78 proceeding is not the proper mechanism for a breach of contract claim arising from a CBA with a mandatory grievance process; a breach of contract action is required. Third, to bring a claim against the employer, the employee must allege both breach of contract by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Fourth, the statute of limitations for a claim arising under a CBA with a mandatory grievance process starts to run once the grievance process is exhausted. This case should inform how attorneys analyze cases involving public employees and their rights under a collective bargaining agreement, as the decision makes clear the path that must be taken to pursue a legal action. Finally, it underscores that the failure to allege a breach of the duty of fair representation will result in the dismissal of the claim.

    This case, especially concerning the analysis of when the statute of limitations begins to run, distinguishes claims involving mandatory versus optional grievance processes, and its emphasis on the Ambach rule, are crucial for attorneys practicing in employment law in New York.

    The decision reinforces the importance of adhering to established procedures and the limits on individual employees’ rights when collective bargaining agreements are in place. The ruling is consistent with prior cases concerning the need for exhaustion of remedies and the scope of Article 78 proceedings.

  • Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v. Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 2025 NY Slip Op 01672: DHCR’s Deference in Interpreting Rent Stabilization Code Amendment Rules

    Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 2025 NY Slip Op 01672 (2025)

    DHCR’s interpretation of its own regulations governing the amendment of rent registration statements is entitled to substantial deference, and limitations on the types of amendments accepted are permissible if rationally exercised.

    Summary

    The case involves a landlord’s attempt to amend prior rent registration statements to reflect an apartment’s change in regulatory status, arguing it was incorrectly listed as rent-stabilized. DHCR denied the amendment, citing a policy allowing only ministerial corrections. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that DHCR’s interpretation of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC), which allows restrictions on registration amendments to protect tenants and preserve agency resources, was rational. The court deferred to DHCR’s expertise in interpreting its own regulations, finding the agency’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious. The dissenting opinion argued the restrictions were not supported by the RSC’s text and that DHCR’s application of the rule was inconsistent and arbitrary.

    Facts

    LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC (Petitioner) owned an apartment building in Manhattan. Petitioner sought to amend its 2016 and 2017 annual registration statements, claiming unit 1B, occupied by the building’s superintendent, was erroneously listed as temporarily rent-stabilized due to owner/employee occupancy. Petitioner asserted unit 1B should have been listed as permanently exempt due to high-rent vacancy decontrol in 2002. DHCR’s Rent Administrator denied the application, allowing amendments only for ministerial errors, not those changing the unit’s rent history or status. The Deputy Commissioner upheld this decision. Petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The Rent Administrator denied Petitioner’s application. The Deputy Commissioner of DHCR denied administrative review. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s CPLR Article 78 petition, upholding DHCR’s determination. The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether DHCR’s interpretation of the RSC, which allows limitations on amending registration statements, is permissible.

    2. Whether DHCR’s denial of Petitioner’s amendment application was arbitrary and capricious.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because DHCR has discretion over the types of amendments to accept, and its interpretation, designed to protect tenants and conserve resources, is rational.

    2. No, because DHCR’s denial of the application was based on a rational interpretation of its regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the deference given to DHCR’s interpretation of its own regulations. It noted that the RSC provides for registration of rent-stabilized accommodations but is silent on the amendment process. DHCR’s 2014 regulation (RSC § 2528.3[c]) allows amendments but gives DHCR discretion to determine their “propriety.” The court found that DHCR’s limiting principle—allowing only

  • People v. Moss, 2025 NY Slip Op 01673: Effect of Prior Unchallenged Conviction on Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) Risk Level

    People v. Moss, 2025 NY Slip Op 01673 (2025)

    The Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) guidelines’ override for a prior felony sex crime conviction applies if the conviction has not been vacated or overturned, even if a subsequent court finds the conviction constitutionally infirm for sentencing purposes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the application of a SORA risk level override, mandating a presumptive risk level three classification for Dwight Moss because he had a prior felony conviction for a sex crime. Although a later court determined that Moss’s 2006 guilty plea was likely coerced and could not be used as a sentencing predicate in a subsequent case, the Court of Appeals held that the prior conviction remained valid for SORA purposes because it had not been directly vacated or overturned. The court emphasized that the SORA guidelines should be applied when a prior felony sex crime conviction exists on a defendant’s record and has not been successfully challenged through the proper legal channels.

    Facts

    Dwight Moss had a history of sex crime convictions, including a 2006 felony conviction for course of sexual conduct against a child. In 2016, he was convicted of additional sex crimes. During sentencing for the 2016 conviction, Moss argued that the 2006 conviction was unconstitutionally obtained due to coercion. The sentencing court agreed and determined the 2006 conviction could not be used as a predicate offense for sentencing in that case. However, the 2006 conviction was never vacated. Following Moss’s release from prison, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (Board) prepared a risk assessment, applying the SORA guidelines. The Board applied the override for prior felony sex crime convictions, resulting in a presumptive risk level three classification. Moss contested this determination, arguing that the 2006 conviction should not trigger the override due to the finding of coercion in his later sentencing. The SORA court upheld the override because the conviction had not been vacated or overturned.

    Procedural History

    Moss was convicted of multiple sex offenses spanning several years, including a 2006 conviction for a felony sex crime. In 2016, he was convicted of additional sex crimes, and during sentencing, argued that the 2006 conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. The sentencing court agreed and determined the 2006 conviction could not be used as a predicate offense for sentencing in that case. A SORA hearing followed, with the Board applying the SORA guidelines and the override for prior felony sex crime convictions, resulting in a presumptive risk level three classification. The SORA court upheld the override, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the SORA guidelines’ override for a prior felony sex crime conviction applies where a subsequent court determines the conviction was likely coerced and cannot be used as a sentencing predicate, but the conviction itself has not been vacated or overturned?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the SORA guidelines’ override for a prior felony sex crime conviction applies when the conviction remains on the defendant’s record, even if a court later determines it was unconstitutionally obtained for the purposes of sentencing, as long as it has not been vacated or overturned.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the purpose of SORA: to protect the public from sex offenders. The court deferred to the Board’s interpretation of the guidelines, recognizing its expertise. The court distinguished between a conviction being deemed unconstitutional in a sentencing context and a conviction being directly challenged and vacated or overturned. The court reasoned that while a subsequent court found the 2006 guilty plea constitutionally infirm and thus unusable for sentencing, Moss had never taken steps to directly challenge the 2006 conviction, therefore it remained on his record. The court emphasized the higher evidentiary burden Moss would have faced had he directly challenged the constitutionality of the 2006 conviction. Since Moss failed to pursue the proper procedural avenues to vacate the conviction, the court found no basis to depart from the guideline’s clear language mandating the override.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the critical importance of challenging a prior conviction directly and using the proper legal channels. Legal practitioners should advise clients to challenge all prior convictions directly, rather than collaterally, if such challenges are available and could affect a future SORA determination. When representing a client in a SORA proceeding, counsel must carefully examine the client’s prior convictions and determine whether any challenges have been made. Even if a conviction has been deemed constitutionally infirm in a subsequent case, it may still trigger SORA consequences if it has not been vacated. This ruling also underscores the need for a defendant seeking to avoid the SORA override to meet the higher evidentiary burden required to vacate or overturn a conviction. The decision also underscores the importance of the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders’ interpretation of the guidelines and their expertise in applying them.

  • Burrows v. 75-25 153rd St., LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 01669: Fraud Exception to Rent Overcharge Statute of Limitations Doesn’t Require Tenant Reliance

    2025 NY Slip Op 01669

    The fraud exception to the statute of limitations in rent overcharge cases does not require a tenant to demonstrate reasonable reliance on a landlord’s fraudulent misrepresentation; sufficient indicia of fraud are sufficient.

    Summary

    In a rent overcharge case, the New York Court of Appeals clarified the requirements for invoking the fraud exception to the four-year statute of limitations and rent history “lookback” period. The Court held that tenants do not need to prove reasonable reliance on a landlord’s fraudulent actions to trigger the exception. Instead, a complaint must allege sufficient “indicia of fraud” to withstand a motion to dismiss. The decision addressed how the fraud exception functions in the context of rent stabilization laws and how it applies to the burden of proof on the tenants. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting the integrity of the rent regulation system against dishonest landlords.

    Facts

    Tenants sued their landlord alleging a fraudulent scheme to inflate rents in violation of rent stabilization laws. The landlord registered a preferential rent and a higher legal regulated rent to calculate excessive increases. The landlord attempted to conceal the scheme by registering a legal regulated rent matching the preferential rent. The landlord moved to dismiss the suit, citing the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, requiring proof of reasonable reliance on the misrepresentations, which the tenants did not provide. The court considered the case of a tenant whose rent was based on a two-month rent concession that the landlord removed.

    Procedural History

    The tenants initiated a rent overcharge claim in the trial court, which the trial court denied the landlord’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s ruling, granting the landlord’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, to invoke the fraud exception to the statute of limitations in a rent overcharge case, must a tenant demonstrate reasonable reliance on a landlord’s fraudulent actions?

    2. Whether the Appellate Division properly granted the landlord’s motion to dismiss the overcharge claim based on the two-month rent concession?

    Holding

    1. No, because a tenant is not required to prove reasonable reliance on a landlord’s fraudulent actions to invoke the fraud exception to the statute of limitations in a rent overcharge case; sufficient indicia of fraud are enough.

    2. Yes, because the documentary evidence refuted the tenant’s claim about the rent concession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed its precedents on the fraud exception to the statute of limitations in rent overcharge cases, particularly Thornton v. Baron, Matter of Grimm v State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., and Conason v Megan Holdings, LLC. It clarified that the fraud exception aims to prevent dishonest landlords from circumventing rent stabilization laws and protects both current and future tenants. The Court emphasized that its precedents require

  • Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v. Koukis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01565: Factual Disputes Regarding Attorney Authority and Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction

    2025 NY Slip Op 01565

    When the record reveals a material factual dispute regarding an attorney’s authority to act on a client’s behalf, a court must hold a hearing to resolve the dispute before determining issues such as the validity of a waiver of personal jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the lower court erred by deciding without a hearing whether an attorney, Mr. Santamarina, was authorized to waive a client’s (Mr. Koukis) personal jurisdiction defenses. The court found that a factual dispute existed as to whether Mr. Koukis had authorized Mr. Santamarina to represent him or subsequently ratified Mr. Santamarina’s actions, necessitating a hearing to determine the validity of the waiver. This ruling emphasizes the importance of resolving factual disputes regarding attorney authority before making legal determinations that affect a party’s rights.

    Facts

    Gibson Dunn sought to enforce a judgment against Be In, Inc., and its investors, including Mr. Koukis, who resided in Switzerland. An attorney, Mr. Santamarina, entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Koukis and other defendants, and subsequently signed a stipulation that waived the defendants’ defenses based on personal jurisdiction and service of process. Later, Mr. Koukis claimed Mr. Santamarina lacked authority to represent him and moved to vacate the default judgment. He submitted evidence, including his own emails, to that effect. The lower courts addressed the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding that personal jurisdiction existed pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(2). The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that there was no basis to conclude that Koukis authorized Santamarina to appear and waive all jurisdictional defenses on his behalf.

    Procedural History

    1. Gibson Dunn sued to enforce a judgment. Mr. Santamarina entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Koukis and others.

    2. The trial court granted Gibson Dunn’s motion for a default judgment against Mr. Koukis.

    3. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court, concluding that Mr. Koukis had not authorized Mr. Santamarina to represent him and lacked personal jurisdiction.

    4. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in concluding there was no basis to conclude that Koukis authorized Santamarina to appear and waive all jurisdictional defenses on his behalf without a factual hearing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court found that there was a material factual dispute as to whether Mr. Koukis authorized or ratified the waiver of personal jurisdiction by his attorney, Mr. Santamarina, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a hearing is required when the record reveals a material factual dispute. The court found that evidence, including emails, suggested Mr. Koukis may have given Joseph D’Anna apparent authority to retain Mr. Santamarina. Further, the Court noted that Mr. Koukis may have ratified Mr. Santamarina’s actions by his acquiescence and retaining the benefit of that representation. The court cited agency law principles, stating that an attorney-client relationship is subject to these laws. Specifically, an attorney needs specific authorization to “compromise or settle a claim.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the significance of resolving factual disputes before determining legal issues, especially those concerning attorney authority and waivers of jurisdictional defenses. Attorneys must ensure they have clear authorization from their clients, preferably in writing, for critical actions like waiving personal jurisdiction. Businesses and individuals facing lawsuits should promptly verify the authority of any attorney claiming to represent them and provide an express statement as to whether or not the attorney is authorized to represent them.

  • People v. Scott, 2025 NY Slip Op 01562: Plea Voluntariness when Sentencing Information is Erroneous

    2025 NY Slip Op 01562

    A guilty plea is involuntary if a court provides inaccurate information about a defendant’s sentencing exposure, especially when the misinformation is significantly higher than the statutorily permitted maximum.

    Summary

    Marquese Scott pleaded guilty to three counts of burglary, but the trial court repeatedly and incorrectly informed him that he faced a maximum sentence of 45 years if convicted at trial, when the statutory maximum was 20 years. The New York Court of Appeals held that Scott’s guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the court’s misinformation about his potential sentence created an unduly coercive environment. The court emphasized that a plea must be a free and informed choice, considering the totality of the circumstances. Due to the significant disparity between the court’s stated potential sentence and the actual maximum, the plea was deemed invalid, and the case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Marquese Scott, aged 23, was charged with three counts of burglary in the second degree. The prosecution initially indicated Scott faced up to 15 years on each count with a potential 45-year consecutive sentence. A plea deal was offered: if Scott pleaded guilty, he would be sentenced to 6 to 8 years. The court, however, misinformed Scott several times, stating he faced a maximum of 45 years if convicted. Scott pleaded guilty, stating he understood the potential 15-year sentences per count. At sentencing, the court imposed an enhanced sentence of 5 years on each count, for a total of 15 years, followed by 5 years of post-release supervision, despite the original agreement. The court’s misstatement of the maximum potential sentence was in error because Penal Law 70.30(1)(e)(i) capped Scott’s aggregate sentence at 20 years.

    Procedural History

    Scott was indicted on three counts of burglary. He subsequently appeared with counsel to discuss a plea agreement. After the trial court made several erroneous statements regarding his potential sentence, Scott pleaded guilty. He was later sentenced to an enhanced sentence. Scott appealed, claiming his plea was involuntary due to the court’s misstatements, but the Appellate Division deemed the claim unpreserved, reducing the sentence but not addressing the plea’s voluntariness. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scott’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, given the court’s erroneous statements about his potential maximum sentence.
    2. Whether Scott was required to preserve the challenge to his guilty plea by moving to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court’s misinformation about the potential sentence created an environment where the plea was not a free and informed choice.
    2. No, because when a court provides the defendant with erroneous information concerning their maximum sentencing exposure, that is contrary to the undisputed text of the Penal Law, fails to correct its error on the record, and the defendant has no apparent reason to question the accuracy of that information, the defendant need not preserve a challenge to the voluntariness of the guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and must represent an informed choice. This depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the agreement, the reasonableness of the bargain, and the age and experience of the accused. The court found that the trial court’s error in misinforming Scott that he faced 45 years (versus the actual 20-year maximum) rendered the plea involuntary, due to a severe misrepresentation of the risks. The court distinguished the case from People v. Williams, where the court had expressed uncertainty about the sentencing options. The court determined that the defendant did not need to preserve the issue, as the error was clear from the record.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes that trial courts must accurately inform defendants about their potential sentencing exposure during plea proceedings. This case significantly reinforces the requirement for accurate information in plea bargains. Attorneys must thoroughly review the statutes to ensure accuracy, especially in cases involving multiple charges or consecutive sentencing. The case also supports the need for a thorough plea colloquy, and for the court to correct its own errors. The ruling suggests a careful review of the plea colloquy is critical, as any misstatements could invalidate a guilty plea and lead to a retrial. Moreover, this case potentially eliminates the need for a CPL 440 motion and allows a direct appeal.

  • Wright v. State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 01564: Child Victims Act Claims Must Meet Court of Claims Act Pleading Specificity Requirements

    2025 NY Slip Op 01564

    Claims brought under the Child Victims Act (CVA) must adhere to the substantive pleading requirements outlined in the Court of Claims Act (Act), including providing sufficient detail to enable the State to investigate the claim and assess its potential liability, even if the abuse occurred decades prior.

    Summary

    In Wright v. State of New York, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Child Victims Act (CVA) did not relax the pleading requirements of the Court of Claims Act (Act). The claimant, who alleged child sexual abuse, failed to provide sufficient detail about the time, place, and nature of the abuse, as well as the State’s negligence, to allow the State to investigate the claim. The court emphasized that the CVA’s purpose was to extend the statute of limitations, not to modify the Act’s jurisdictional pleading requirements. Consequently, the claim was dismissed due to a lack of specificity.

    Facts

    Chi Bartram Wright brought a claim against the State under the CVA, alleging he was repeatedly sexually assaulted between 1986 and 1990 at The Egg, a State-owned performing arts center. He accused various individuals, including State employees and members of the public, of committing the abuse. The claim stated that a “majority of the incidents occurred at the premises” without specifying exact dates or providing details about the perpetrators or the State’s alleged negligence in supervising these individuals. The State moved to dismiss, arguing the claim lacked the specificity required by Section 11(b) of the Court of Claims Act.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that the CVA did not relax the pleading requirements of Section 11(b) of the Court of Claims Act. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the four-year period provided was sufficient given the passage of time. The Court of Appeals granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal, certifying the following question: “Did this Court err, as a matter of law, in reversing, on the law, the order of the Court of Claims which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim, denying the motion and remitting the matter to the Court of Claims for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision?”

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the CVA modified the substantive pleading requirements of Section 11(b) of the Court of Claims Act.

    2. Whether Wright’s claim provided sufficient detail about the time, place, and nature of the claim to satisfy Section 11(b) of the Court of Claims Act.

    Holding

    1. No, because the CVA did not exempt claims from section 11(b)’s conditions.

    2. No, because the claim lacked the required specificity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity in the Court of Claims Act must be strictly construed. Section 11(b) of the Act requires claims to specify the time and place the claim arose, the nature of the claim, damages, and the total sum claimed. The court reasoned that the guiding principle of Section 11(b) is to ensure that the State can investigate the claim promptly to ascertain liability. It emphasized that it is the claimant’s responsibility to provide this information, not the State’s. The court noted that the CVA addressed statute of limitations issues but did not amend Section 11(b). Because Wright’s claim did not identify the abusers or provide details enabling investigation, the claim was found to have a jurisdictional defect and was thus dismissed.

    The court stated, “The ‘guiding principle informing section 11 (b)’ is that a claim must be ‘sufficiently definite ‘to enable the State . . . to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances’”

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of precise and detailed pleading, even under the CVA. Attorneys must ensure that CVA claims provide specific information about the alleged abuse, including as much detail about the actors, the locations, and the State’s alleged negligence as possible, even if the events happened decades ago. Failing to do so risks dismissal. Legal practitioners should focus on identifying as many details as possible, because the court will not

  • Matter of Rosbaugh v. Town of Lodi, 2025 NY Slip Op 01406 (2025): Treble Damages Under RPAPL 861 Are Punitive and Not Recoverable Against Municipalities

    2025 NY Slip Op 01406

    Treble damages under RPAPL 861 are punitive in nature, thus unavailable in a suit against a municipality due to the state’s immunity from punitive damages.

    Summary

    The Town of Lodi, acting under the belief that trees on Rosbaugh’s property posed a hazard, hired a tree service to trim or remove them, resulting in the removal of fifty-five trees. The Rosbaughs sued, seeking treble damages under RPAPL 861. The arbitrator awarded treble damages, which was upheld by the lower courts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that treble damages under RPAPL 861 are punitive. Because municipalities are immune from punitive damages, the award against the Town was improper. The court found that the good faith exception in the statute and the legislative history confirmed the punitive nature of the damages.

    Facts

    The Town of Lodi determined that trees on Rosbaugh’s property, bordering an unpaved road, presented a hazard. The Town hired a tree service to cut or trim the trees. Rosbaugh disagreed with the Town’s assessment, however fifty-five trees were cut or trimmed. Rosbaugh sued, seeking treble damages under RPAPL 861. The parties went to arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded damages, including treble the stumpage value of the damaged trees. Supreme Court confirmed the award, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Town appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The Rosbaughs initiated an action against the Town of Lodi seeking damages, including treble damages under RPAPL 861. The case proceeded to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded damages, and Supreme Court confirmed the arbitrator’s award. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal from the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether treble damages awarded under RPAPL 861 are punitive in nature.

    2. Whether punitive damages can be awarded against a municipality.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the structure and history of RPAPL 861 indicate that the treble damages authorized are intended to punish those who do not act in good faith.

    2. No, because municipalities are immune from punitive damages under established New York law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that the state and its political subdivisions are generally not subject to punitive damages. The court examined RPAPL 861 to determine whether the treble damages it provided were intended to be punitive. The court noted that the statute defines “stumpage value” and allows for treble damages, unless the defendant can establish by clear and convincing evidence that they acted in good faith. The court found this “good faith” provision demonstrated the punitive nature of the damages: “In contrast to compensatory damages, which are intended to redress the concrete loss that a plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, punitive damages are essentially private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct, and deter its future occurrence.” The court reasoned that the good-faith exception indicated that the treble damages were intended to punish culpable behavior, not merely compensate for loss. The court also reviewed the statute’s legislative history, finding that the damages were intended to deter illegal timber harvesting, and the damages had historically been punitive in nature. The court cited Sharapata v. Town of Islip, reiterating that public funds should not be used for punitive damages as it does not advance the purposes of punishment and deterrence. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling, concluding that the arbitrator lacked authority to award treble damages against the Town.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies that treble damages under RPAPL 861 cannot be recovered against municipalities. Attorneys must be aware that governmental entities are immune from punitive damages. When representing clients pursuing claims under RPAPL 861, the defendant’s status (private individual or municipality) will be critical in determining the potential remedies. This decision reinforces the importance of carefully considering the potential for punitive damages against governmental entities, as public funds are not available for these types of damages. Cases involving tree cutting or damage on public property will require thorough legal research to determine the availability of remedies against the governmental entity. This case reaffirms New York’s general prohibition against punitive damages against municipalities and sets precedent for similar statutory damage schemes.