New York Law Review

Author: The New York Law Review

  • Matter of Oceanview Home for Adults, Inc. v. Zucker, 2025 NY Slip Op 00805: Regulations Limiting Admissions to Adult Homes Not Facially Discriminatory Under the Fair Housing Act

    <strong><em>2025 NY Slip Op 00805</em></strong></p>

    <p class="key-principle">Regulations limiting admission to adult homes for individuals with serious mental illness, based on the proportion of residents with such illnesses, do not facially discriminate under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because they do not deny or make housing unavailable; rather, they reflect a professional judgment on the appropriate settings for providing mental health services.</p>

    <p><strong>Summary</strong></p>
    <p>Oceanview Home for Adults challenged New York State Department of Health (DOH) regulations limiting admissions to adult homes for residents with serious mental illness. The regulations, aimed at large facilities with a high proportion of residents with serious mental illness, were challenged under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) as discriminatory. The Court of Appeals held that the regulations do not facially discriminate because they do not deny or make housing unavailable but, instead, reflect a professional judgment on the appropriate settings for providing mental health services, in line with the state's aim to integrate individuals with disabilities. The court focused on the clinical nature of the regulations, finding no evidence of discrimination based on stereotypes or prejudice.</p>

    <p><strong>Facts</strong></p>
    <p>New York State licenses adult homes to provide care. Following the “Olmstead” decision mandating integration for those with disabilities, the DOH implemented regulations. These regulations, at issue, prevented adult homes with over 80 beds where more than 25% of residents had a serious mental illness from admitting additional residents with such illness. Oceanview Home for Adults sued, claiming these regulations violated the FHA. The regulations stemmed from clinical advisories and were supported by a settlement agreement in a separate federal case, aiming to increase supported housing and improve care for the mentally ill.</p>

    <p><strong>Procedural History</strong></p>
    <p>The trial court ruled in favor of Oceanview, finding the regulations violated the FHA. The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the regulations. The Appellate Division found they were adopted to implement the Olmstead mandate and were narrowly tailored. Oceanview then appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the decision of the Appellate Division was affirmed.</p>

    <p><strong>Issue(s)</strong></p>
    <p>1. Whether the DOH regulations limiting admissions to adult homes for individuals with serious mental illness constitute facial discrimination under the FHA by denying or making housing unavailable based on disability.</p>

    <p><strong>Holding</strong></p>
    <p>1. No, because the regulations do not deny or make housing unavailable within the meaning of the FHA. Rather, they reflect a professional judgment on the appropriate settings for providing mental health services.</p>

    <p><strong>Court's Reasoning</strong></p>
    <p>The court emphasized that the regulations address the type of institutional setting, not whether housing is denied or unavailable. The court cited clinical advisories and DOH's judgment that large adult homes are not clinically appropriate for people with serious mental illness. The court found the regulations reflect a “reasonable modification[] to the State's provision of services” intended to eliminate discrimination. The court noted this clinical determination is not unusual, referencing other regulations that limit admission to all adult homes based on medical needs, and observed that the regulations did not stem from stereotypes or prejudice against those with mental illness.</p>

    <p><strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>
    <p>This decision reinforces the deference given to state agencies in regulating services for individuals with disabilities, particularly when based on professional medical judgment. The case suggests that similar regulations, aimed at improving the quality of care and integration, are likely to be upheld against FHA challenges. It implies that regulations impacting the type of settings, and not just the availability of housing, are less likely to trigger FHA violations. Attorneys and advocates should consider the nature and intent behind regulations, looking at whether they reflect discriminatory intent or, instead, a considered clinical judgment. They should also distinguish cases where there is a clear denial of housing versus those impacting the type of care and services provided.</p>

  • Behler v. Tao, 2025 NY Slip Op 00803: Merger Clause in LLC Agreement Extinguishes Prior Oral Agreement

    2025 NY Slip Op 00803

    A merger clause in a limited liability company (LLC) agreement, governed by Delaware law, can supersede prior oral agreements between the parties if the subject matter of both agreements is the same.

    Summary

    In Behler v. Tao, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a merger clause in an amended LLC agreement extinguished a prior oral agreement. The plaintiff, Behler, invested in Digipac LLC based on an oral agreement with the defendant, Tao, who was also the CEO of Remark Holdings. The oral agreement provided Behler an exit strategy for his investment. Later, Tao amended the Digipac LLC agreement, including a merger clause that superseded prior agreements. The court held that the merger clause in the amended LLC agreement, governed by Delaware law, superseded the prior oral agreement because both concerned the same subject matter: Behler’s investment in Digipac and his ability to exit that investment.

    Facts

    Behler and Tao, long-time friends, entered into an oral agreement concerning Behler’s investment in Digipac LLC, a company controlled by Tao. The oral agreement included a provision for how Behler could exit his investment, either through a sale of Remark Holdings stock or after five years. Behler invested $3 million in Digipac. Subsequently, Tao amended the LLC agreement, including a merger clause. When the exit conditions of the oral agreement were not met, Behler sued Tao for breach of contract and promissory estoppel.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted Tao’s motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling that the amended LLC agreement, with its merger clause, superseded the oral agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, applying Delaware law. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the case after Behler appealed as of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the merger clause in the amended LLC agreement superseded the prior oral agreement.
    2. Whether the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims were properly dismissed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the merger clause in the amended LLC agreement, governed by Delaware law, expressly superseded prior oral agreements related to the same subject matter.
    2. Yes, the lower courts correctly dismissed the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied Delaware law, as specified in the LLC agreement. Delaware law prioritizes freedom of contract. The Court held that Behler was bound by the amended LLC agreement. The merger clause explicitly covered the subject matter of the prior oral agreement, and the amended agreement superseded the oral agreement. The court rejected the argument that the oral agreement was made in Tao’s personal capacity and not in his corporate capacity. Further, the promissory estoppel claim failed because the amended LLC agreement constituted a fully integrated contract governing the relevant promise.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of merger clauses in written agreements, particularly in LLC contexts. Investors in LLCs must scrutinize the operating agreements, especially any amendments, to fully understand their rights and obligations. Prior agreements, even those made in good faith, may be superseded by a subsequent agreement containing a merger clause. This impacts how breach of contract claims will be assessed. This decision reinforces the importance of including all critical terms in the final written contract, and legal practitioners should advise clients to ensure that their agreements are comprehensive and reflect the complete understanding of the parties involved. Furthermore, the ruling emphasizes that a claim of promissory estoppel will fail if an enforceable contract already exists.

  • Matter of Oceanview Home for Adults, Inc. v. Zucker, 2025 NY Slip Op 00805: FHAA Does Not Prohibit Regulations on Adult Home Admissions Based on Resident Mental Health

    2025 NY Slip Op 00805

    The Fair Housing Act Amendments (FHAA) do not prohibit state regulations limiting admissions to adult homes based on the proportion of residents with serious mental illness, as these regulations do not deny or make unavailable housing but reflect a professional judgment about appropriate care settings.

    Summary

    Oceanview Home for Adults challenged New York State Department of Health regulations restricting admissions to adult homes based on the percentage of residents with serious mental illness, claiming a violation of the FHAA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the regulations, which aimed to improve care and integration for individuals with mental illness, did not constitute discrimination under the FHAA. The court reasoned that the regulations did not deny housing but rather governed the type of institutional setting, reflecting a professional clinical judgment. The court noted that the regulations were consistent with the goal of integrating individuals with disabilities and did not rest on stereotypes or prejudice.

    Facts

    New York State Department of Health (DOH) regulates adult homes, which provide long-term care to unrelated adults. DOH regulations limited admissions to facilities with 80+ beds where over 25% of residents had a serious mental illness. Oceanview Home for Adults, subject to these regulations, sued, arguing that the restrictions violated the FHAA. The DOH cited the home in 2016 for violating the regulations. The DOH argued that the regulations were based on a professional judgment that large adult homes were not therapeutically effective.

    Procedural History

    Oceanview Home for Adults initiated a combined declaratory judgment action and CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the regulations violated the FHA. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the proceeding, upholding the regulations, finding they were narrowly tailored and implemented Olmstead‘s integration mandate. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the DOH regulations restricting admissions to adult homes based on the proportion of residents with serious mental illness “deny” or “make unavailable” housing on the basis of disability, thereby violating the FHAA.

    Holding

    1. No, because the regulations do not deny or make housing unavailable, but reflect a professional judgment about clinically appropriate settings for individuals with serious mental illness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the regulations concerned the type of institutional setting, not the denial of housing. The DOH’s regulations reflected a professional judgment that large adult homes were not clinically appropriate for individuals with serious mental illness. The regulations aimed to give these individuals greater autonomy and improve their interaction with others. The court cited the FHAA’s definition of discrimination, which includes a refusal to make reasonable accommodations, noting the regulations were a reasonable modification to service provision. The court emphasized that the regulations did not rest on stereotypes or prejudice. The court also referenced that other DOH regulations place limits on admissions to adult homes on multiple grounds.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that the FHAA does not necessarily prohibit regulations that govern the nature of services provided to individuals with disabilities, especially when based on professional clinical judgments and aimed at improving care and promoting integration. It suggests that similar regulations, aimed at improving care and promoting integration for individuals with disabilities, may withstand challenges under the FHAA. Attorneys should analyze such cases, focusing on the purpose of the regulations and whether they are based on legitimate professional judgments, or reflect unlawful stereotypes. Also, future cases are likely to address the question of whether the regulation could be more narrowly tailored and still achieve the desired outcomes. It also highlights the importance of expert testimony in establishing the clinical rationale behind regulations that affect individuals with disabilities.

  • People v. Howard, 2025 NY Slip Op 00184: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Right to a Fair Trial

    People v. Howard, 2025 NY Slip Op 00184 (2025)

    Under the New York State Constitution, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when, viewed in totality, the attorney’s performance does not provide meaningful representation, even if the federal standard under Strickland is not met.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, despite several errors by the defense attorney. The dissenting judge argued that the attorney’s performance fell below the standard of meaningful representation guaranteed by the New York State Constitution, pointing to a series of failures, including a deficient pre-trial motion, failure to show the defendant key evidence, eliciting damaging testimony about the defendant’s prior criminal history, and failure to object to an ambiguous jury instruction. The dissent emphasized the importance of a fair trial and meaningful representation even for seemingly guilty defendants.

    Facts

    Donkavius D. Howard was charged with burglary in the first degree, assault in the second degree, aggravated criminal contempt, and resisting arrest. The charges stemmed from allegations that Howard broke into his spouse’s home, attacked her despite a restraining order, and fought with a responding officer. His court-appointed attorney filed an omnibus motion that miscited the law, referred to irrelevant matters, and contained no factual support. The attorney failed to show Howard crucial body camera video footage until shortly before trial. During cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, counsel elicited testimony about Howard’s prior criminal history. Furthermore, the attorney failed to object to an ambiguous jury instruction regarding the burglary charge. The trial court denied Howard’s request for new counsel, and Howard was ultimately convicted on all counts.

    Procedural History

    Howard was convicted in the trial court of burglary, assault, aggravated criminal contempt, and resisting arrest. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction in a 3-2 decision. The dissenting justices argued that defense counsel was ineffective. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, with a dissenting opinion arguing for reversal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel under the New York State Constitution because his attorney’s performance fell below the standard of meaningful representation.

    2. Whether the attorney’s failures, including the deficient pre-trial motion, the failure to show the defendant crucial video evidence, the eliciting of damaging testimony, and the failure to object to the jury instruction, individually or collectively constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    1. No, because the majority found that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

    2. No, because the court found that even considering the attorney’s errors cumulatively, the defendant still received a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority, without extensive explanation, found that the defendant had failed to meet the high bar for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissent, however, argued that the counsel’s errors were numerous and significant, falling below the constitutional standard of meaningful representation. The dissent emphasized that counsel’s performance was deficient in several respects, including the filing of a boilerplate motion that was not tailored to the case, the failure to show the defendant exculpatory video evidence, and the eliciting of damaging testimony about Howard’s prior bad acts. The dissent found no plausible strategic reason for these failings. The dissenting judge analyzed the trial counsel’s errors separately and cumulatively, concluding that the errors resulted in a trial that was not fair and thus violated the State constitution’s guarantee of effective counsel.

    The dissent specifically noted that the counsel’s cross-examination of the victim was particularly damaging, as it elicited testimony about the defendant’s past behavior, which the prosecution would have been barred from introducing. The failure to object to the ambiguous jury instruction on the burglary count was another significant error, as the instruction did not require the jury to find that the defendant caused physical injury to his spouse to convict him. In addition, the dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s determination that the defendant needed to demonstrate prejudice beyond the fact that counsel’s performance was deficient.

    The dissent cited New York precedent emphasizing that the right to effective counsel aims to protect the integrity of the judicial process, ensuring that even those defendants who appear guilty are afforded the same chance to be heard as blameless members of society. The dissent determined that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that counsel’s performance was not meaningful and, thus, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The majority seemed to require a showing that the defendant would have been acquitted in the absence of counsel’s errors, while the dissent took the view that it need only be shown that counsel’s performance was not meaningful.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of providing meaningful representation to criminal defendants. Attorneys must take the time to investigate the facts and the law, prepare appropriate motions, and avoid eliciting prejudicial testimony, even when a defendant appears guilty. The New York State Constitution provides a higher level of protection than the federal standard, which is more favorable to the defendant. Attorneys should be aware that even if the evidence of guilt is strong, their errors can still result in a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel if those errors undermine the integrity of the process and deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

    This case highlights that defense attorneys should not file boilerplate motions, or rely on one-size-fits-all strategies; instead, they should tailor their approach to the specific facts and issues of each case. Attorneys must also ensure that their clients have the opportunity to review relevant evidence, such as video footage. Finally, the decision emphasizes the need to carefully review jury instructions and to object to any instructions that are ambiguous or that misstate the law. The case also serves as a warning that eliciting testimony about prior bad acts, even if the prosecution would have been barred from doing so, can be particularly damaging.

    Later cases may cite this decision to support the standard of meaningful representation under the New York Constitution or to emphasize the types of errors that constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. It is also likely to be cited in cases where the court must determine whether there was a reasonable strategic justification for an attorney’s actions or inactions. Further, this case could be used to distinguish the differing standards applied by federal courts versus those in New York in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • Hobish v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 2025 NY Slip Op 00183: Limits on Damages and Punitive Awards in Insurance Contract Disputes

    2025 NY Slip Op 00183

    When an insurance policy provides for a surrender option upon breach, the insured cannot claim as damages the full value of the policy’s death benefit, and punitive damages under General Business Law § 349 (h) are limited to the treble damages provided by the statute.

    Summary

    In Hobish v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., the New York Court of Appeals addressed a dispute over a universal life insurance policy and upheld the lower courts’ decisions on damages and punitive awards. The court held that where policyholders chose to surrender their policy after the insurer increased the cost of insurance (COI) charges, they were not entitled to the full death benefit as damages. Additionally, the court clarified that punitive damages under General Business Law § 349 (h) are limited to the treble damages provision within the statute, rejecting claims for additional punitive damages. The court also found the contractual term “a given class” ambiguous regarding COI increases, and dismissed claims for punitive damages under breach of contract. This case provides guidance on calculating damages when an insured chooses to surrender a policy and underscores the statutory limits on punitive damages in actions under General Business Law § 349.

    Facts

    The Hobish Irrevocable Trust purchased a universal life insurance policy from AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company (AXA) in 2007. The policy allowed the policyholder to make flexible premium payments, with monthly COI charges deducted from the account. The policy allowed AXA to alter the COI Rate Scale, but the increases must be “equitable to all policyholders of a given class.” In 2015, AXA announced plans to change the COI Rate Scale, which plaintiffs claimed would drastically increase premiums. The Trust chose to surrender the policy and received the remaining account balance, less a surrender fee. The plaintiffs sued AXA, alleging breach of contract and a violation of General Business Law § 349, claiming damages based on the policy’s death benefit and seeking punitive damages. The trial court and the Appellate Division rejected their theories of damages and the request for punitive damages, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs initiated the action in New York Supreme Court, alleging breach of contract and violation of General Business Law § 349. The Supreme Court denied both parties’ summary judgment motions and rejected the plaintiffs’ damages theories. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s rulings. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, and upheld the Appellate Division’s decision, agreeing that plaintiffs were not entitled to the full death benefit after surrendering their policy and finding punitive damages unavailable beyond those provided in the statute.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the full death benefit of the policy as compensatory damages after choosing to surrender the policy following the COI rate increase.
    2. Whether the plaintiffs could recover punitive damages under their breach of contract claim.
    3. Whether the punitive damages recoverable under General Business Law § 349 (h) were limited to the statutory treble damages, or whether additional punitive damages could be awarded.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiffs chose to surrender the policy and receive its surrender value.
    2. No, because the defendant’s conduct did not meet the high standard of egregious behavior required for punitive damages in contract claims.
    3. Yes, the court held that punitive damages for section 349 (h) claims are limited to the treble damages provided by the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that because the plaintiffs chose to surrender the policy, they were no longer entitled to the death benefit. The court noted the plaintiffs could have maintained the policy and pursued other remedies to prevent COI charges, but they did not. The court then found that the language

  • People v. Howard, 2025 NY Slip Op 00184: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Right to a Fair Trial

    People v. Howard, 2025 NY Slip Op 00184 (2025)

    Under the New York Constitution, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when, viewed in totality, the attorney did not provide “meaningful representation,” even if the federal standard under Strickland is not met.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of burglary, assault, aggravated criminal contempt, and resisting arrest. The dissenting judge argued that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because the attorney’s actions, including failing to adequately prepare, eliciting damaging testimony about the defendant’s prior criminal history, and failing to object to a potentially ambiguous jury instruction, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The dissent emphasized that under New York’s constitution, the focus is on whether the defendant received meaningful representation and a fair process, regardless of the apparent strength of the evidence against the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple crimes, including burglary, assault, and aggravated criminal contempt, stemming from an incident involving his spouse. The defendant’s attorney filed a boilerplate motion, which was deemed inadequate. The attorney failed to show the defendant crucial video evidence until shortly before trial. During trial, the defense counsel elicited testimony about the defendant’s prior criminal history. The court denied the prosecution’s Sandoval motion, to explore defendant’s prior bad acts, including a prior conviction for criminal mischief; however, the defense counsel failed to request redaction of a reference to that conviction from the order of protection. The defense counsel also failed to object to an ambiguous jury instruction. The defendant repeatedly complained about his counsel’s performance to the court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction in a 3-2 decision. One of the dissenting judges granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel under the New York Constitution, even if the federal standard was not met.

    Holding

    1. No, because on this record, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the defendant did not prove ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissent argued that the attorney’s performance fell below the standard of meaningful representation, particularly in light of several specific failures. The dissenting judge emphasized that counsel’s actions, such as the boilerplate motion, the delayed viewing of crucial video evidence, eliciting prejudicial testimony, and failing to object to an ambiguous jury instruction, collectively undermined the fairness of the trial. The dissent cited the New York State Constitution’s broader protections of the right to counsel, which emphasize the fairness of the process. The dissent highlighted the attorney’s failure to investigate the case adequately, which led to detrimental actions during the trial. The dissent’s position was that these actions, which were not part of any reasonable trial strategy, prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The dissent referenced: “We do not require effective counsel merely to shield the seemingly innocent, but to protect the ‘integrity of the judicial process’ by affording the ‘[t]he worst criminal, the most culpable individual’ the same chance to be heard as ‘[t]he most blameless member of society.’”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the distinction between the federal and New York standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly the importance of “meaningful representation” under the New York Constitution. Attorneys in New York must prioritize thorough investigation and preparation, tailoring legal arguments to the specifics of the case. Failing to prepare adequately, and making prejudicial errors at trial that are not strategically motivated, can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the evidence of guilt is strong. Counsel must be mindful of the potential impact of their actions on the fairness of the process as a whole, including the eliciting of damaging evidence or failing to make necessary objections. The case also suggests that repeated errors by counsel, even if individually minor, can cumulatively undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Cases such as People v. Debellis, People v. Donovan and People v. Turner, provide additional legal support for the outcome.

  • People v. Brisman, 2025 NY Slip Op 00123: Appellate Division Standard of Review for Excessive Sentence Claims

    2025 NY Slip Op 00123

    The Appellate Division, when reviewing a challenge to the severity of a sentence, must determine whether the sentence is “unduly harsh or severe,” without requiring the defendant to show extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion by the sentencing court.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the proper standard the Appellate Division must apply when reviewing a challenge to the severity of a sentence. The Court held that the Appellate Division erred by applying a standard that required the defendant to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the correct standard is whether the sentence is “unduly harsh or severe,” a determination made in the interest of justice and without deference to the sentencing court. The case underscores the Appellate Division’s broad authority to modify sentences it deems excessive.

    Facts

    While incarcerated for manslaughter, Jason Brisman was involved in a fight with another inmate. During the fight, Brisman cut his finger, and his opponent sustained a facial wound. Correction officers discovered a sharpened porcelain shard near Brisman. Brisman was convicted of promoting prison contraband and sentenced as a second felony offender to 3½ to 7 years in prison. The Appellate Division rejected Brisman’s challenge to the sentence’s severity, stating that there were “no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice.”

    Procedural History

    Brisman was convicted in the trial court and sentenced to 3½ to 7 years. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence, applying an “extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion” standard. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the case, focusing on the standard of review employed by the Appellate Division, and reversed, remitting the matter back to the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division applied the correct legal standard when reviewing the severity of Brisman’s sentence.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division applied an incorrect standard, requiring a showing of extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion instead of determining whether the sentence was unduly harsh or severe.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by acknowledging the Appellate Division’s “broad, plenary power” to modify a sentence that is “unduly harsh or severe.” The Court clarified that the standard for such review is purely based on the interest of justice. The Court found that the Appellate Division’s use of the “extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion” standard was incorrect. The Court pointed to the plain language of CPL 470.15(6)(b), which empowers the Appellate Division to modify a sentence “though legal, was unduly harsh or severe.” The Court also reviewed the historical context, highlighting that the Appellate Division has long held the power to reduce sentences deemed “excessive.” The Court distinguished cases where abuse of discretion is the correct standard, such as in the admission of evidence, from cases involving sentence severity, where the standard is purely the interest of justice. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division’s determination should be made without deference to the sentencing court, contrary to the standard applied by the Appellate Division in this case. The Court highlighted how, after this case, the Third Department abandoned the “extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion” standard, further supporting its holding. The Court found the dissent’s interpretation of precedent, specifically People v Delgado, to be flawed and inconsistent with the Appellate Division’s jurisprudence. As the Court stated, “a criminal defendant need not show extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court in order to obtain a sentence reduction under CPL 470.15 (6) (b).”

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the standard of review for excessive sentence claims in New York. It reinforces that the Appellate Division must independently determine whether a sentence is unduly harsh or severe. Attorneys should advise their clients that they do not need to show extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion to seek a sentence reduction on appeal. This case likely changes the way attorneys argue excessive sentence claims. It confirms the Appellate Division’s broad power to review sentences and can lead to more frequent successful sentence reductions in cases where the Appellate Division finds the original sentence excessive. Later cases will likely cite Brisman when challenging the Appellate Division’s standard of review in excessive sentencing cases.

  • Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 2024 NY Slip Op 06377: Prospective Application of HSTPA’s Luxury Deregulation Repeal

    2024 NY Slip Op 06377

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA), which repealed luxury deregulation, applied prospectively to apartments where the existing leases had not expired before the effective date of the repeal, even if deregulation orders had been issued prior to the repeal.

    Summary

    The case involved a dispute over the application of the HSTPA to apartments that had previously received luxury deregulation orders under prior law but whose leases had not yet expired when the HSTPA took effect. The landlord argued that because deregulation orders were issued before the HSTPA’s effective date, the apartments should be exempt from rent stabilization. However, DHCR argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the HSTPA’s repeal of luxury deregulation applied to apartments where the lease expiration fell after the effective date of the repeal, thus those apartments remained rent stabilized. The Court reasoned that the deregulation was not complete until the lease expired.

    Facts

    The landlord owned apartment buildings in Manhattan that had obtained luxury deregulation orders prior to the passage of the HSTPA. However, the tenants’ leases in those apartments extended beyond the June 14, 2019 effective date of the HSTPA, which repealed luxury deregulation. DHCR issued an addenda stating apartments would only deregulate if their leases expired before the HSTPA’s effective date. The landlord sued, arguing that this constituted an improper retroactive application of the HSTPA and that the delay in processing the application should have entitled the landlord to deregulation before the repeal. The Supreme Court and Appellate Division sided with DHCR.

    Procedural History

    The landlord commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court seeking to reinstate a deregulation order and annul DHCR’s addenda. The Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal from the portion of the Appellate Division’s order affirming the dismissal of the proceeding.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether DHCR properly interpreted the HSTPA as prospectively repealing luxury deregulation for apartments where the lease had not yet expired when the HSTPA took effect.

    2. Whether DHCR’s alleged delay in adjudicating the landlord’s luxury deregulation applications justified the application of pre-HSTPA law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the HSTPA’s repeal of luxury deregulation applied to any unit where the lease had not expired before the HSTPA’s effective date.

    2. No, because the landlord did not demonstrate willful or negligent delay by DHCR, nor did the statutory timeframes for processing the application compel a different result.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on statutory interpretation, finding that the HSTPA repealed the statutory basis for luxury deregulation. The Court determined that the language of the HSTPA unambiguously indicated that deregulation would cease and the apartments needed to be deregulated before the act became effective, which was not the case for the landlord’s properties. The Court emphasized that the HSTPA explicitly stated that

  • People v. Mero, 2024 NY Slip Op 06385: Severance of Unrelated Murder Charges

    2024 NY Slip Op 06385

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying severance of unrelated criminal charges where the jury is properly instructed and the evidence on each charge is presented separately, provided there is no substantial likelihood the jury could not segregate the evidence.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and related charges in New York. The charges involved the deaths of two different individuals, occurring years apart under dissimilar circumstances. The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment, and the defendant’s motion to sever the charges was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered, among other things, whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever the charges related to each murder and whether the undisclosed business relationship between the defendant’s trial counsel and an Assistant District Attorney constituted a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever and that no conflict of interest requiring vacatur of the conviction occurred. The Court found that the jury was properly instructed and able to consider the evidence separately for each charge.

    Facts

    • The defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence, concerning the deaths of two separate victims.
    • The first victim, the defendant’s roommate, was found dead in their shared apartment in 2013 after a fire.
    • The second victim, a woman the defendant hired for a date, was found in a shallow grave in May 2015.
    • The defendant was arrested in 2017, and the charges were joined in a single indictment.
    • The defendant moved to sever the charges, arguing the cases were distinct and joinder would be prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion.
    • A jury convicted the defendant on all charges.
    • During trial, defense counsel disclosed a potentially prejudicial incident involving a juror’s comments about the defendant.
    • After trial, the defendant moved to vacate his convictions under CPL 440.10, alleging a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship between his trial counsel and the prosecuting ADA.
    • The trial court denied the motion, finding no prejudice.

    Procedural History

    • Trial court denied the defendant’s motion to sever charges.
    • Trial court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction due to conflict of interest.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and the order.
    • The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever the charges related to the two murders.
    2. Whether an improper business relationship between the defendant’s trial counsel and a prosecutor created a conflict of interest that required vacatur of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the evidence separately for each charge, and the defendant did not show a substantial likelihood that the jury could not do so.
    2. No, because the undisclosed business relationship did not operate on the defense and there was no actual conflict of interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the denial of the severance motion by applying CPL 200.20 (3), which allows severance when “in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.” The court found that the defendant failed to meet the burden of demonstrating “good cause” for severance. Specifically, the court found that the defendant did not establish that “substantially more proof” existed for one offense or that the jury was unable to consider each charge separately. The trial court provided the jury with clear instructions to consider each case separately, and the court presumed that jurors followed these instructions. The Court differentiated the case from People v. Shapiro, which mandated severance in a case with “aberrant sexual practices,” a request by the defendant to testify regarding one set of offenses, but not the other, and an aggregation of counts. Moreover, the court noted the Appellate Division departments have permitted joinder of homicides on numerous occasions. Regarding the conflict of interest claim, the court determined that the business relationship between defense counsel and the prosecutor did not rise to the level of an actual conflict of interest. Furthermore, the court found that the potential conflict did not operate on the defense. The court noted that the defendant presented no evidence that the relationship affected counsel’s performance and found counsel’s advocacy as “zealous and effective.”

    Practical Implications

    • When facing similar cases, attorneys should note that courts have discretion in deciding whether to sever charges based on the facts of each case.
    • Thorough jury instructions on separating the evidence for each count are crucial to prevent appellate reversal.
    • Evidence that shows potential conflicts of interest should be evaluated to determine whether a conflict affected the counsel’s performance.
    • Defense counsel should be aware of the limitations on the admissibility of prior crimes or bad acts as propensity evidence to avoid undue prejudice to the defendant, which may require separate trials.
    • It is important to weigh the balance of judicial economy against the defendant’s right to a fair trial free of undue prejudice to ensure fairness.

  • People v. Rufus, 2024 NY Slip Op 06384 (2024): Probable Cause for Traffic Stop Based on Repeated Lane Violations

    People v. Rufus, 2024 NY Slip Op 06384 (2024)

    Repeatedly crossing the fog line in a vehicle provides probable cause for a traffic stop under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a), even without evidence of erratic driving, because such actions demonstrate a failure to drive within a single lane as nearly as practicable.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) after determining that a traffic stop was justified based on troopers’ observations of the defendant’s vehicle repeatedly crossing the fog line. The court held that the repeated lane departures, occurring three times within a short distance, provided the troopers with probable cause to believe the defendant was violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a). The court emphasized that whether a driver has violated this section is fact-specific, and under the circumstances, the repeated crossings demonstrated a failure to drive as nearly as practicable within a single lane, justifying the stop regardless of the absence of other signs of unsafe driving.

    Facts

    At approximately 2 AM on a Sunday, two state troopers observed the defendant’s vehicle cross the solid white fog line onto the right shoulder of the road three times within a tenth of a mile. The defendant was driving within the speed limit. Based on this observation, the troopers stopped the vehicle. Upon approaching the car, the trooper smelled alcohol, noticed slurred speech, and observed bloodshot, glassy eyes. The defendant initially provided a plastic air freshener backing instead of his registration. The defendant admitted to swerving, claiming he did so because he saw the patrol car. Further investigation, including field sobriety tests, led to the defendant’s arrest for DWI.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing lack of probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant was subsequently convicted of felony DWI in a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with a dissenting opinion arguing for reversal due to the lack of probable cause. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the troopers had probable cause to stop the defendant’s vehicle, given that the stop was based on alleged violations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a).
    2. Whether the trial evidence was legally sufficient to support the guilty verdict.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the troopers had probable cause to stop the defendant’s vehicle.
    2. Yes, because the trial evidence was legally sufficient to support the guilty verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the troopers’ observation of the defendant crossing the fog line three times within a short distance and time established probable cause for the traffic stop under VTL § 1128(a). The court reasoned that the statute required a vehicle to be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane. The court found the defendant’s repeated crossings constituted a violation of this statute, negating the defendant’s assertion that it was a “de minimis diversion.” The Court relied on Trooper Tiwana’s credible testimony that the defendant had swerved over the fog line. Further, the Court noted that defendant’s claim that he was swerving because he saw the patrol car was a mischaracterization of the record. The Court also cited several cases where similar conduct provided the basis for a lawful stop.

    With respect to the legal sufficiency of the trial evidence, the court noted the Trooper’s testimony regarding the defendant’s physical signs of intoxication, and his admission of drinking. The court found that this evidence supported the guilty verdict under VTL § 1192 (3).

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the standard for probable cause in traffic stops based on lane violations. Specifically, it establishes that repeated crossing of the fog line, even without other signs of erratic driving, can provide sufficient grounds for a stop under VTL § 1128(a). This case reinforces that multiple instances of crossing the fog line, in quick succession over a short distance, can be used to establish a violation of VTL § 1128 (a). The decision underscores the importance of documenting the frequency and nature of lane departures when justifying a traffic stop. This case also implies that a driver’s own admission to swerving, combined with observations of lane departures, strengthens the basis for a stop. For legal practitioners, this case emphasizes that the specific facts of each situation matter, and that multiple factors may be taken into account when determining probable cause in traffic stops.