New York Law Review

Author: The New York Law Review

  • People v. New York, 27 N.Y.3d 552 (2016): Speedy Trial Rights and Charging Delay During Pre-Readiness Adjournments

    27 N.Y.3d 552 (2016)

    When calculating time excludable from the speedy trial clock under CPL 30.30, a defendant’s ambiguous comment accommodating the court’s schedule is not a “clear expression” of consent to an adjournment, and the delay is chargeable to the prosecution if the adjournment was initially requested by the prosecution and is due to court congestion.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed how delays should be attributed for speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30 when multiple adjournments occur. The case involved a defendant indicted on multiple charges, with several adjournments requested by the prosecution. The Court held that a defendant’s acquiescence to a date set by the court, due to court congestion, is not considered consent for purposes of excluding that time from speedy trial calculations. Consequently, the court found that the prosecution was responsible for the delay caused by court scheduling issues and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment due to a violation of his speedy trial rights. The case clarifies that the People must bear the burden of delays attributable to court congestion when they have not declared readiness.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on identity theft and theft of services charges. The prosecution requested several adjournments, during which time defense counsel requested longer adjournments due to her other commitments. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his speedy trial rights, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The court examined how to allocate the time when the prosecution requested adjournments, the defense sought additional time, and court congestion caused further delays. After the court set a date after defense counsel’s requested date, the defense responded, “That should be fine.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s speedy trial motion. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, dismissing one count but otherwise affirming the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s ambiguous response to the court’s scheduling constituted consent to the adjournment for purposes of CPL 30.30.

    2. Whether the prosecution should be charged with the delay resulting from court congestion when the prosecution had not filed a statement of readiness.

    Holding

    1. No, because an ambiguous response is not a clear expression of consent, and the delay is chargeable to the prosecution when the delay results from court congestion.

    2. Yes, because the prosecution did not file a statement of readiness and the delay was due to court congestion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the language of CPL 30.30 and prior case law (e.g., People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676 (1993)) to determine when delay is excludable. It found that the defendant’s statement “That should be fine” did not represent a “clear expression” of consent to the delay, especially when the court’s calendar was the reason for the additional delay, and the prosecution failed to file a statement of readiness. The court emphasized that the prosecution bears the burden of showing that time should be excluded. Court congestion does not prevent the People from announcing readiness in a written off-calendar statement and is therefore charged to the prosecution. The court found that the prosecution’s failure to file a statement of readiness, and that the additional delay was caused by court congestion, was chargeable to the prosecution. The prosecution exceeded the six-month limit.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides clear guidance on how courts should analyze speedy trial claims when adjournments occur, and the defense consents only to the initial adjournment. Prosecutors must be proactive in declaring readiness or securing clear consent from the defense to avoid having delays charged against them, especially when the court’s schedule is a factor. Defense attorneys should carefully consider their responses to proposed adjournment dates, as ambiguous comments may not be considered consent. The ruling underscores the importance of the prosecution’s ability to control the speedy trial clock by filing a statement of readiness, even when adjournments are needed. Courts must precisely track the reasons for delays and allocate responsibility accordingly. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the indictment.

  • People v. Garcia, 27 N.Y.3d 601 (2016): Preservation of Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Grand Jury Proceedings

    <strong><em>People v. Garcia</em></strong>, 27 N.Y.3d 601 (2016)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review in New York, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection at the trial level; failure to do so generally results in the issue being unpreserved and not reviewable on appeal, unless a mode of proceedings error occurred.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    In <em>People v. Garcia</em>, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether various errors during grand jury proceedings required dismissal of an indictment. The court held that the defendant’s claims, including being shackled, improper questioning, and the failure to present a witness, were unpreserved because his attorney did not make timely objections. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that the attorney’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, particularly given the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. The ruling underscores the importance of preserving legal issues at the trial court level for appellate review and clarifies the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    Defendant was charged with first-degree robbery. During grand jury proceedings, he was represented by counsel and shackled. The prosecutor failed to inform the grand jury about the defense’s request for a witness to testify. Defendant’s counsel raised concerns about the shackling and the missing witness. The defendant then requested to proceed pro se, and the court granted the request. A jury later found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to a 20-year term.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on the insufficiency of evidence, which was denied. After the guilty verdict, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that most of the defendant’s challenges were unpreserved. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether the defendant’s challenges to the grand jury proceedings (shackling, improper questioning, and the failure to present a witness) were preserved for appellate review.

    2. Whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve these claims.

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. No, the challenges were not preserved because the defense counsel did not make timely and specific objections.

    2. No, the defense counsel’s performance was not ineffective.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The court emphasized the importance of the preservation rule in New York law. A failure to object at the trial level generally prevents appellate review, unless the error is a mode of proceedings error. The court found that none of the alleged errors (shackling, questioning, and the witness issue) constituted a mode of proceedings error. It reasoned that the shackling issue did not automatically qualify as a mode of proceedings error, and that defendant’s counsel did not preserve the other issues by objecting. Regarding ineffective assistance, the court applied the standard of “meaningful representation” and considered the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the counsel’s actions were reasonable, especially considering the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se. The court noted counsel had attempted to raise certain errors prior to being relieved as counsel.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This case reinforces the necessity of making timely and specific objections during trial proceedings to preserve issues for appeal. For attorneys, this means being vigilant in identifying and objecting to potential errors as they arise. The case also provides guidance on the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, demonstrating that strategic decisions, even if they result in unpreserved arguments, may not constitute ineffective assistance, especially if the defendant’s actions complicate the situation. This case suggests that it is important for trial counsel to create a complete record of objections. Furthermore, this case highlights the significance of a defendant’s decision to represent themselves and its potential effect on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • Aetna Health Plans v. Hanover Insurance Co., 27 N.Y.3d 813 (2016): Health Insurer Reimbursement Under No-Fault Law

    27 N.Y.3d 813 (2016)

    A health insurer cannot seek reimbursement directly from a no-fault automobile insurer for medical expenses paid to treat injuries sustained in an accident, because it is not a “provider of health care services” as defined in the No-Fault Law and its implementing regulations.

    Summary

    Aetna Health Plans, a health insurer, paid medical bills for its insured, Luz Herrera, who was injured in a car accident covered by Hanover Insurance Company under its no-fault policy. Aetna sought reimbursement from Hanover, arguing that Hanover was responsible for the bills under the No-Fault Law. The Court of Appeals held that Aetna could not directly seek reimbursement from Hanover because the No-Fault Law and its regulations only allow payments directly to applicants or providers of health care services (upon assignment from the applicant), and Aetna did not qualify as a health care provider. The court reasoned that allowing health insurers to seek direct reimbursement would be inconsistent with the no-fault statutory scheme.

    Facts

    Luz Herrera was injured in a car accident while insured by Hanover Insurance Company. Herrera also had health insurance through Aetna Health Plans. Medical providers initially submitted bills to Aetna, which paid them. Aetna later sought reimbursement from Hanover for these bills. Hanover did not respond to Aetna or Herrera. Herrera assigned her rights against Hanover to Aetna. Aetna filed suit against Hanover seeking reimbursement for the medical bills paid.

    Procedural History

    Aetna sued Hanover for reimbursement. The trial court granted Hanover’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted Aetna’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a health insurer that pays for medical treatment that should have been covered by an insured’s no-fault automobile insurance carrier can maintain a reimbursement claim against the no-fault insurer.

    Holding

    1. No, because New York’s No-Fault statutory law and regulatory scheme do not contemplate such reimbursement to a health insurer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the No-Fault Law (Article 51 of the New York Insurance Law) and its implementing regulations, specifically 11 NYCRR 65-3.11(a). This regulation states that an insurer should pay benefits for any loss directly to the applicant or, upon assignment by the applicant, to providers of health care services. The court found that Aetna was not a provider of health care services and therefore could not receive direct payment from Hanover. The court rejected Aetna’s argument that the assignment from Herrera gave it the right to reimbursement because Aetna was not a health care provider. The court also noted that the No-Fault Law was designed for prompt resolution of claims and that allowing Aetna’s claim would be inconsistent with this purpose. The court deferred to the New York State Insurance Department’s opinion that an HMO such as Aetna could not subrogate its recovery, because it did not fit the definition of “insurer” under the no-fault insurance law scheme.

    Practical Implications

    This decision confirms that health insurers in New York cannot directly sue no-fault insurers for reimbursement of medical expenses paid. Health insurers should ensure that healthcare providers properly bill the correct insurer initially. Health insurers may have contractual remedies against the health care providers to recover funds if the providers were initially paid by the health insurer by mistake. This case underscores the importance of understanding the specific requirements of the No-Fault Law and the distinctions between different types of insurance providers. The ruling reinforces the established regulatory scheme for no-fault insurance and limits the circumstances under which a health insurer can recover payments made on behalf of an insured. Future cases in this area will likely continue to center on the technical requirements and the proper application of the No-Fault Law, with health insurers unable to seek direct reimbursement from automobile insurers.

  • Wally G. v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 24 N.Y.3d 674 (2015): Medical Records and Timely Notice of Claim in Municipal Malpractice Cases

    <strong><em>Wally G. v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.</em>, 24 N.Y.3d 674 (2015)</em></strong>

    In medical malpractice cases against municipal entities, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, as evidenced by medical records, is required within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter to justify late service of a notice of claim.

    <p><strong>Summary</strong></p>

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to serve a late notice of claim against New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). The plaintiff, born prematurely, sought damages for alleged malpractice. The court held that HHC did not have actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the statutory period, despite the existence of medical records. The court clarified that the records must "evince" injury due to the medical staff’s actions or omissions, not merely "suggest" malpractice. This decision underscores the importance of timely notice and sufficient evidence to establish a municipal entity’s actual knowledge in medical malpractice cases.

    <p><strong>Facts</strong></p>

    The plaintiff was born prematurely by emergency cesarean section on June 15, 2005, and was discharged from the hospital on August 10, 2005. On January 16, 2007, more than 90 days after the claim arose, the plaintiff served a notice of claim on HHC alleging negligence and malpractice. The plaintiff brought suit against HHC in August 2008, but did not move for permission to serve a late notice of claim until December 2010, over five years after the claim arose. In support of the motion, the plaintiff submitted extensive medical records and expert affidavits. HHC cross-moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e (5).

    <p><strong>Procedural History</strong></p>

    The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim and granted HHC’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiff’s appeal as of right.

    <p><strong>Issue(s)</strong></p>

    1. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in affirming the denial of the plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

    <p><strong>Holding</strong></p>

    1. No, because the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the plaintiff’s motion.

    <p><strong>Court's Reasoning</strong></p>

    The court applied General Municipal Law § 50-e, which requires a notice of claim be served within 90 days. A court may extend the time to serve a late notice of claim, considering whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter. The court found that HHC did not have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within the required time period. The court referenced its prior ruling in <em>Williams v. Nassau County Medical Center</em> to clarify that the medical records must "evince" that the medical staff, by their acts or omissions, inflicted an injury. It also held that mere suggestions of injury are insufficient. The court emphasized that determining “actual knowledge” and whether records “evince” injury rests in the court’s discretion.

    <p><strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>

    This case reinforces the strict requirements for serving a timely notice of claim against a municipal entity in New York. Attorneys must ensure that a notice of claim is filed within the statutory timeframe unless a strong argument can be made that the municipality had actual knowledge of the claim. The medical records need to demonstrate more than a mere suggestion of negligence; they must provide evidence of an injury caused by the actions or omissions of the medical staff. This case will likely inform the analysis of similar cases involving late notice of claim, reinforcing the need to demonstrate that the municipality possessed knowledge sufficient to permit it to defend the case.

  • People v. Cass, 34 N.Y.3d 1115 (2020): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts Under *Molineux*

    People v. Cass, 34 N.Y.3d 1115 (2020)

    Evidence of prior bad acts (uncharged crimes) is admissible if it is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, and if its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts under the *Molineux* rule, which governs the admission of such evidence. The trial court admitted testimony of a prior assault in a domestic violence case to explain the relationship between the defendant and the victim, as well as to prove the defendant’s intent and motive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the evidence was properly admitted because it was relevant to issues other than the defendant’s propensity to commit a crime, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice, especially considering the trial court’s limiting instructions to the jury. The concurrence focused on the volume of evidence admitted, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple counts of assault and related crimes against the victim, his former girlfriend. At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of a prior assault, where the victim was held against her will for over two days, to explain the relationship between the defendant and the victim and to show the defendant’s intent and motive. The trial court admitted this evidence and provided limiting instructions to the jury, advising them that this testimony was to be considered only for the aforementioned purposes.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, specifically addressing the admissibility of the prior assault evidence under the *Molineux* rule.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the prior assault under *Molineux*.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was relevant to issues other than the defendant’s criminal disposition, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the *Molineux* rule, which provides an exception to the general rule that evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible if it is offered solely to show a defendant’s criminal propensity. The court recognized that evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if it is relevant to some material fact at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. The court also acknowledged that the probative value of such evidence must outweigh its potential for prejudice. The court found that the evidence of the prior assault was relevant to explain the relationship between the defendant and the victim and to demonstrate the defendant’s intent and motive. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the trial court gave thorough limiting instructions to the jury, reducing any risk of unfair prejudice. The concurring opinion by Judge Fahey focused on the volume of evidence admitted, but determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of the *Molineux* rule in the admissibility of prior bad acts. This case is a reminder that the court will apply a balancing test and that the admissibility of this evidence is fact specific. The case suggests that when admitting prior bad acts, a trial court must carefully weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential for prejudice. Additionally, this case underscores the importance of limiting instructions in mitigating the prejudicial effect of such evidence. Attorneys should be prepared to argue the relevance of prior bad acts evidence to specific issues in the case and to propose appropriate limiting instructions to the court. Later cases will likely cite this decision for its discussion of the *Molineux* rule and its application in a domestic violence context. The case also has implications for how courts analyze the volume of *Molineux* evidence and its impact on the potential for prejudice.

  • People v. Wright, 27 N.Y.3d 517 (2016): CPL 440.10 Motions and Establishing Attorney Conflicts of Interest

    27 N.Y.3d 517 (2016)

    To vacate a conviction based on an attorney conflict of interest, a defendant must substantiate allegations of simultaneous representation constituting an actual conflict or demonstrate that a potential conflict, such as successive representation, operated on the defense, and the motion may be summarily denied without a hearing if these requirements are not met.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed the denial of his CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction, arguing that his attorney had a conflict of interest. He claimed the attorney simultaneously represented the District Attorney’s office and later, the District Attorney in other matters. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts, holding that the defendant failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to support an actual conflict of interest or show that any potential conflict operated on his defense. The court found that the defendant’s claims of simultaneous representation were unsubstantiated, and the successive representation did not impair the defense because the attorney’s work for the District Attorney was not concurrent with the defendant’s trial. The Court emphasized the importance of providing sworn factual allegations to support claims of attorney conflict in CPL 440.10 motions.

    Facts

    • Defendant was charged with attempted rape and represented by three attorneys throughout the proceedings.
    • The second attorney, James Long, represented the defendant during pre-trial proceedings.
    • Defendant fired Long and retained a third attorney who represented him during the trial.
    • Defendant was convicted of attempted rape and sexual abuse.
    • Defendant filed a CPL 440.10 motion, claiming Long had a conflict of interest because he allegedly represented the District Attorney, P. David Soares, four months before representing the defendant. The motion cited a letter Long wrote on behalf of Soares’s campaign and subsequent representation of Soares in unrelated legal matters.
    • The District Attorney’s office denied any simultaneous representation.

    Procedural History

    • Defendant made successive CPL 440.10 motions, which were denied.
    • County Court denied the defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing, finding insufficient evidence of a conflict and no demonstration of prejudice.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed.
    • The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the County Court abused its discretion by summarily denying the defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing.
    2. Whether the defendant sufficiently substantiated the allegations of a conflict of interest.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court was within its discretion to summarily deny the motion.
    2. No, because the defendant failed to substantiate the allegations of simultaneous representation constituting an actual conflict, or that the potential conflict operated on the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied CPL 440.30, which requires sworn allegations to substantiate factual claims in CPL 440.10 motions. The court distinguished between actual and potential conflicts. An actual conflict requires reversal even if no prejudice is shown, while a potential conflict requires the defendant to show the conflict operated on the defense. The court found that the defendant’s claim of simultaneous representation was not substantiated because it was based on an unsubstantiated claim that Long’s 2008 work for Soares extended beyond its apparent scope or overlapped with Long’s representation of the defendant. The court emphasized that “A lawyer simultaneously representing two clients whose interests actually conflict cannot give either client undivided loyalty.” Furthermore, the court stated: “ ‘[A] defendant is denied the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment when, absent inquiry by the court and the informed consent of defendant, defense counsel represents interests which are actually in conflict with those of defendant.’ ” Because the defendant did not carry his burden of substantiating an actual conflict or showing the impact of a potential conflict, the court upheld the denial of the motion. The court emphasized the importance of providing sworn factual allegations to support claims of attorney conflict in CPL 440.10 motions.

    Practical Implications

    • This case reinforces the necessity for defendants to provide concrete, factual allegations, supported by sworn statements, when claiming an attorney conflict of interest in CPL 440.10 motions.
    • It clarifies the difference between actual and potential conflicts, with different standards of proof.
    • Attorneys and law students should be mindful of the court’s reluctance to infer conflicts, even when a successive representation exists.
    • Future defendants must clearly identify the nature of the alleged conflict and demonstrate how it affected the defense to succeed on a motion to vacate.
    • The case suggests that failing to obtain relevant information from former counsel can be detrimental to a claim of conflict.

  • Westchester Joint Water Works v. Assessor of City of Rye, 26 N.Y.3d 569 (2015): Recommencement of Tax Certiorari Proceedings After Dismissal for Non-Compliance with RPTL 708(3)

    26 N.Y.3d 569 (2015)

    A proceeding dismissed for failure to comply with Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) 708(3)’s mailing requirements cannot be recommenced under CPLR 205(a).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a tax certiorari proceeding dismissed due to the petitioner’s failure to properly notify the relevant school district, as mandated by RPTL 708(3), cannot be revived by invoking CPLR 205(a). The court reasoned that RPTL 708(3) provides a comprehensive framework for dealing with non-compliance, allowing dismissal unless “good cause” is shown. Allowing CPLR 205(a) to override this would undermine the statute’s intent to provide certainty and efficiency in tax proceedings, especially concerning school district involvement and financial planning. The court emphasized that when the RPTL specifically addresses an issue, the CPLR should not be applied.

    Facts

    Westchester Joint Water Works initiated multiple tax certiorari proceedings challenging property tax assessments on two parcels. The petitioner failed to comply with RPTL 708(3), which requires petitioners to mail a copy of the petition to the superintendent of schools of any school district where the property is located. The petitioner sent the notice to the wrong school district. The correct district intervened and moved to dismiss the petitions due to the lack of proper notice. The trial court granted the dismissal, and the petitioner sought to recommence the proceedings under CPLR 205(a), which was denied by the trial court.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the school district’s motion to intervene and dismiss the petitions for non-compliance with RPTL 708(3) and denied the petitioner’s cross-motion to recommence the proceedings. The Appellate Division modified the lower court’s decision by dismissing the petitions only regarding the parcel within the correct school district. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal from the Appellate Division decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tax certiorari proceeding dismissed for failing to comply with RPTL 708(3) can be recommenced under CPLR 205(a).

    Holding

    No, because RPTL 708(3) provides a specific and comprehensive remedy for dismissals due to non-compliance, precluding the application of CPLR 205(a).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on three primary arguments. First, RPTL 708(3) provides an explicit remedy for non-compliance—dismissal unless good cause is shown. Thus, the court held that the RPTL, not the CPLR, governs the outcome in such instances. The court cited W.T. Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496 (1981) as precedent, saying “[a]s a general rule, there should be no resort to the provisions of the CPLR in instances where the [RPTL] expressly covers the point in issue.” Second, the court determined that allowing CPLR 205(a) to permit recommencement would render the “good cause” exception in RPTL 708(3) meaningless, violating the rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must have meaning. Finally, the court cited the legislative history of RPTL 708(3) to explain the statute’s purpose in allowing school districts to avoid the costs of participating in all tax certiorari proceedings. The notification requirements enable school districts to make informed decisions about intervention and reserve funds for potential tax liabilities. Allowing CPLR 205(a) to circumvent this framework would frustrate the legislative intent.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the interplay between the RPTL and the CPLR in tax certiorari proceedings. Attorneys must strictly adhere to the notice requirements of RPTL 708(3). Failure to do so, absent a showing of good cause, will result in the dismissal of the proceeding, and CPLR 205(a) cannot be used to revive the claim. This decision underscores the importance of carefully following statutory procedures in property tax litigation and highlights how the court prioritizes the specific provisions of the RPTL over general procedural rules. School districts now have more certainty that if they don’t receive proper notice, they do not have to participate in the proceeding and can plan their finances accordingly. This case is a significant precedent in New York tax law, particularly for those who handle property tax litigation and municipal law.

  • Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 17 (2016): Common Interest Doctrine and the Litigation Requirement

    <strong><em>Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 17 (2016)</em></strong></p>

    <p class="key-principle">The common interest doctrine, which protects attorney-client communications shared with a third party, applies only if the communication is in furtherance of a common legal interest in pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.</p>

    <p><strong>Summary</strong></p>
    <p>In a dispute over attorney-client privilege in a merger context, the New York Court of Appeals held that the common interest doctrine requires a reasonable anticipation of litigation. The case involved a monoline insurer, Ambac, suing Countrywide (and later Bank of America after its merger with Countrywide) over mortgage-backed securities. Ambac sought discovery of communications between Bank of America and Countrywide before the merger closed. Bank of America claimed attorney-client privilege, arguing the communications related to common legal issues in the merger. The court, reversing the Appellate Division, found that for the common interest doctrine to apply, the shared legal interest must relate to pending or anticipated litigation, not just the transactional aspects of a merger.</p>

    <p><strong>Facts</strong></p>
    <p>Ambac insured mortgage-backed securities issued by Countrywide. When the securities failed during the financial crisis, Ambac sued Countrywide and Bank of America (due to its merger with Countrywide) alleging breach of contract and fraud. During discovery, Ambac sought approximately 400 communications between Bank of America and Countrywide before their merger closed. Bank of America asserted attorney-client privilege, arguing that the communications related to legal issues the companies needed to resolve for the merger. The merger agreement directed them to share privileged information related to pre-closing legal issues, aiming to keep the information confidential. Ambac moved to compel production, claiming waiver of privilege because the entities weren't affiliated when sharing the confidential material and didn't have a common legal interest in litigation.</p>

    <p><strong>Procedural History</strong></p>
    <p>A Special Referee, appointed to handle privilege disputes, ordered the parties to review documents and produce those remaining in dispute for in camera review. Bank of America moved to vacate, arguing that communications were privileged even without pending litigation. Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that New York law required a reasonable anticipation of litigation. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the litigation requirement unnecessary, and remanded the case to the Special Referee. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstated the Supreme Court's order, and answered the certified question in the negative.</p>

    1. Whether the common interest doctrine applies to protect attorney-client communications shared between parties with a common legal interest, even if litigation is not pending or reasonably anticipated.
    1. No, because the common interest doctrine applies only when the shared legal interest relates to pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.

    <p>This case reinforces the narrow construction of the common interest doctrine in New York. Attorneys in New York must advise clients that sharing privileged communications with another party (or its counsel) will waive the privilege, unless that other party shares a common legal interest in current or reasonably anticipated litigation. This has practical effects on merger negotiations, where parties will need to be mindful of the potential loss of privilege when sharing communications with the other side. Clients should carefully consider whether the benefits of sharing confidential information outweigh the risk of future disclosure, especially if litigation is not on the immediate horizon. The court's distinction between mergers and litigation emphasizes the importance of documenting the anticipation of litigation in order to ensure that the common interest privilege applies. The ruling also suggests that parties may need to consider using separate counsel to ensure that their communications remain privileged.</p>

  • S.L. v. J.R., 27 N.Y.3d 560 (2016): Necessity of Evidentiary Hearing Before Custody Determination

    S.L. v. J.R., 27 N.Y.3d 560 (2016)

    Custody determinations generally require a full evidentiary hearing, especially where material facts are in dispute, to ensure the best interests of the child are served.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that a custody determination must be based on a full and plenary hearing when material facts are in dispute. The trial court had awarded the father sole custody based on affidavits, a forensic evaluator’s report, and the attorney for the child’s opinion, without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals found this insufficient because it relied on untested evidence and failed to properly address disputed facts. The Court emphasized the importance of a comprehensive evaluation, especially regarding the credibility and temperament of the parents, to ensure that the child’s best interests are the paramount consideration.

    Facts

    After nearly 15 years of marriage, the mother initiated divorce proceedings, seeking custody of the children. The father filed an order to show cause, alleging the mother’s actions put the children at risk and sought temporary custody. The court granted the father temporary custody and supervised visitation. A court-appointed forensic evaluator concluded the father was more stable. The court later awarded the father sole custody without a hearing, citing the parties’ submissions and reports. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that a hearing was not necessary, which the Court of Appeals then reversed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court awarded the father sole custody without an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a custody determination can be made without a full evidentiary hearing, based on the “adequate relevant information” standard, when material facts are in dispute.

    Holding

    1. No, because custody determinations generally require a full and plenary hearing, especially where material facts are in dispute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that custody determinations should generally be made after a full and plenary hearing. The Court underscored the importance of the best interests of the child as paramount and found the “adequate relevant information” standard applied by the lower courts insufficient. The court expressed concern about the reliance on hearsay statements and untested opinions. The Court also noted that the mother’s affidavit raised questions about the events, indicating disputed facts. The Court refused to create a rigid rule requiring a hearing in every case but ruled that, when material facts and the circumstances surrounding them remain disputed, a hearing is necessary. “Custody determinations therefore require a careful and comprehensive evaluation of the material facts and circumstances in order to permit the court to ascertain the optimal result for the child.”

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of conducting a full evidentiary hearing in contested child custody cases. Attorneys must be prepared to present and challenge evidence, including witness testimony, to establish material facts. The decision clarifies the limitations of relying solely on documents, reports, and opinions. Courts must carefully consider the need for a hearing if facts are disputed, as the “adequate relevant information” standard is too vague. The court’s emphasis on the reliability of evidence has implications for family law practitioners, highlighting the need to present admissible evidence and fully develop the factual record.

  • People v. Carver, 27 N.Y.3d 420 (2016): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Requires Demonstrable Prejudice

    People v. Carver, 27 N.Y.3d 420 (2016)

    To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his attorney failed to pursue suppression motions and provide adequate representation at sentencing. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that any alleged errors prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The court emphasized the need for a showing that counsel’s actions were not strategic and that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the alleged errors. The court declined to second-guess strategic decisions made by counsel, particularly where the record did not support a suppression motion or where the defendant’s own statements at sentencing limited counsel’s options.

    Facts

    Police stopped a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, observing items obstructing the windshield, a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The defendant and the driver provided false identification and information, and appeared nervous. The officer found duffel bags in the car containing a laptop and gloves. After the driver fled, the officer found the defendant attempting to exit the car. A subsequent search revealed a stolen camera on the defendant and other stolen items in the vehicle. The defendant was charged with burglary, and a jury found him guilty.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, rejecting the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression of evidence due to the legality of the traffic stop and the subsequent “pat down.”
    2. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during sentencing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record did not support a colorable argument to suppress evidence and the failure to pursue suppression could have been a strategic decision by counsel.
    2. No, because counsel provided reasonable representation at sentencing, given the defendant’s own statements and the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring the defendant to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. The court found no basis to conclude that a suppression motion would have succeeded, as the traffic stop was based on a valid Vehicle and Traffic Law violation. The court noted that “[t]here can be no denial of effective assistance of trial counsel arising from counsel’s failure to ‘make a motion . . . that has little or no chance of success.’” Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if a colorable challenge existed, counsel may have made a legitimate strategic decision not to pursue the motion. Regarding the sentencing claim, the court held that counsel’s actions were reasonable, considering the information available and the defendant’s own statements denying involvement, limiting defense counsel’s options.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the high bar for proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Attorneys should be aware that they are not required to make every possible motion, especially those with little chance of success. Strategic decisions, even if they appear questionable in hindsight, are generally protected unless they are clearly unreasonable. When assessing potential ineffective assistance claims, courts will evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s actions under the circumstances and the likelihood that a different outcome would have resulted. Clients should be advised that strategic decisions by counsel will not be second-guessed, and to provide counsel with all relevant information to make appropriate decisions.