New York Law Review

Author: The New York Law Review

  • Matter of Cortorreal v. Annucci, 26 N.Y.3d 56 (2015): Duty of Hearing Officer to Investigate Claims of Witness Coercion in Prison Disciplinary Hearings

    26 N.Y.3d 56 (2015)

    A hearing officer presiding at an inmate’s disciplinary hearing violates the inmate’s right to call witnesses by failing to undertake a meaningful inquiry into a requested witness’s allegation that the witness had been coerced into refusing to testify in a related proceeding.

    Summary

    In this case, Cortorreal, an inmate, was charged with a disciplinary violation. During the hearing, several requested inmate witnesses refused to testify. One witness provided an affidavit alleging he was coerced into refusing to testify at a prior hearing. The hearing officer did not adequately investigate this claim of coercion. The New York Court of Appeals held that when a requested witness claims coercion, a hearing officer must conduct a meaningful inquiry into the allegation. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the hearing officer’s failure to investigate violated Cortorreal’s right to call witnesses and ordered the expungement of the disciplinary action from Cortorreal’s record.

    Facts

    Cortorreal, while incarcerated at Sing Sing, was charged with violating prison disciplinary rules after marijuana was found in a waste container near his work area. He requested testimony from ten inmate witnesses, eight of whom refused to testify. One of the refusing witnesses provided an affidavit stating he was coerced by a correction officer into not testifying at a prior hearing regarding the same incident. The hearing officer did not personally interview the witness or the alleged coercing officer. After the disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer found Cortorreal guilty. The lower courts upheld the decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the hearing officer failed to adequately investigate the claim of coercion.

    Procedural History

    Cortorreal was found guilty at the initial Tier III disciplinary hearing, but this was overturned. A rehearing commenced before a different hearing officer at another facility, and Cortorreal was again found guilty. Cortorreal challenged the determination through an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a requested inmate witness who states only that they “do not wish to testify” provides a sufficient “reason” for refusing to testify under the regulations.

    2. Whether the hearing officer conducted a sufficient inquiry into an allegation of coercion by a witness who refused to testify.

    Holding

    1. No, because the court held that a statement of not wishing to testify is a valid reason under the regulations.

    2. Yes, because the hearing officer failed to make a meaningful inquiry into the witness’s claim of coercion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed two issues. First, it held that a simple statement by an inmate witness that they do not wish to testify constitutes a valid reason under 7 NYCRR 254.5(a). The court reasoned that the focus should be on whether the manner of refusal signifies coercion. Second, the court held that when a hearing officer is presented with an affidavit claiming coercion, the officer has a duty to conduct a “meaningful inquiry.” The court emphasized that the failure to adequately investigate the claim of coercion violated the inmate’s right to call witnesses, as the hearing officer did not attempt to verify the claim of coercion by the officer.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the obligations of hearing officers in prison disciplinary proceedings when faced with allegations of witness coercion. Hearing officers must now take affirmative steps to investigate such claims. Legal practitioners should advise their clients that a simple refusal to testify can be valid, and should also understand that an allegation of coercion, if not adequately investigated, can result in the reversal of a guilty finding. Furthermore, this case emphasizes that transferring an inmate does not eliminate the taint of any coercion that occurred previously.

  • People v. Gritzner, 35 N.Y.3d 64 (2020): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Speedy Trial in DNA Testing Cases

    35 N.Y.3d 64 (2020)

    Ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on failure to challenge speedy trial violations will be unsuccessful where the record does not demonstrate the underlying speedy trial claims would have been meritorious.

    Summary

    In People v. Gritzner, the New York Court of Appeals addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The defendant argued his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge delays in the DNA testing process as a violation of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30. The court held that counsel was not ineffective because the record did not support the defendant’s claim that the prosecution lacked due diligence in securing the DNA testing. The court emphasized that, without evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or procedural errors, the delays were likely excludable as exceptional circumstances.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault. After an initial DNA profile from the sexual assault evidence kit excluded the defendant, additional testing was performed on fingernail screens. The People announced on June 24, 2009, and again on August 13, 2009, that the DNA testing was still pending. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, which was denied by the trial court, which excluded the DNA testing delays as an exceptional circumstance. The defendant then claimed on appeal that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing that certain periods of delay were chargeable to the prosecution, as the prosecution allegedly did not act with due diligence in securing the DNA testing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on CPL 30.30 grounds, excluding the DNA testing periods as exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to challenge the DNA testing delays. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that certain delays in DNA testing should be charged to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record does not support a finding that the prosecution lacked due diligence in the DNA testing process, defense counsel’s failure to make this argument did not constitute ineffective assistance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that the counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different. Here, the court found that there was no evidence in the record to support the defendant’s claim that the prosecution lacked due diligence or that the DNA testing procedures deviated from standard laboratory protocols. The court noted the defendant’s argument depended on assumptions outside the record. The court also pointed out that at the time of the defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, precedent existed to exclude DNA testing delays from the speedy trial calculation as an exceptional circumstance. The court cited People v. Brunner and People v. Turner to establish the high bar for showing ineffective assistance. The court explained that the defendant’s claim was based on matters outside the record and thus, more appropriately the subject of a CPL 440.10 motion. The court emphasized that a single lapse by counsel does not automatically render assistance ineffective. The Court found that “there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the People were not diligent in requesting DNA testing on the evidence or that the manner in which the DNA testing was conducted by OCME was inconsistent with standard laboratory protocols.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of a complete factual record when challenging delays in DNA testing under speedy trial grounds. Attorneys must be prepared to show a lack of prosecutorial diligence or deviation from standard protocols. Without such a showing, courts are likely to view the delays as excludable exceptional circumstances. Moreover, this case highlights that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported by evidence. The case also suggests that claims of ineffective assistance based on tactical decisions are unlikely to succeed. It reinforces that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be brought under CPL 440.10 if the record is insufficient to make the determination. Defense attorneys should carefully review all DNA testing procedures and timelines to ascertain if a valid speedy trial claim exists. This case indicates the courts will give deference to prosecutorial decisions absent strong evidence of malfeasance.

  • Balsam v. Erie County Sheriff, 28 N.Y.3d 77 (2016): Notice of Claim Requirements and Duty of Care for Inmate Safety

    Balsam v. Erie County Sheriff, 28 N.Y.3d 77 (2016)

    A county’s agreement to act as an insurer for its sheriff, without a statutory obligation to indemnify the sheriff, does not trigger the notice of claim requirements under New York General Municipal Law § 50-e(1)(b).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a notice of claim was required before an inmate could sue the Erie County Sheriff for negligence related to a sexual assault. The court held that, because Erie County’s resolution to provide liability insurance for the Sheriff did not create a statutory obligation to indemnify him, the notice of claim requirement did not apply. The Court also determined that the Sheriff had a duty to safeguard inmates, and that the complaint sufficiently stated a negligence claim. Furthermore, the Court held that the question of governmental immunity was not appropriate to resolve at the pleading stage.

    Facts

    An inmate at the Erie County Correctional Facility was sexually assaulted twice. He sued the Erie County Sheriff for negligence, alleging a breach of duty to protect him from reasonably foreseeable harm and disregarded known risks of inmate sexual abuse. The Sheriff moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming a failure to serve a notice of claim and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding a notice of claim was required because the County had a statutory obligation to indemnify the Sheriff based on a 1985 County resolution. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the inmate was required to file a notice of claim. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s decision and reinstated the complaint, holding that a notice of claim was not required. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, answering the certified question in the affirmative.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the County’s 1985 resolution created a statutory obligation to indemnify the Sheriff, thus requiring the inmate to file a notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e(1)(b).

    2. Whether the complaint adequately stated a negligence claim to survive a motion to dismiss.

    3. Whether the Sheriff was entitled to governmental immunity.

    Holding

    1. No, because the resolution did not create a statutory obligation to indemnify the Sheriff; it only provided insurance coverage.

    2. Yes, the complaint sufficiently stated a negligence claim, and the Sheriff owed a duty of care.

    3. No, the issue of governmental immunity could not be resolved at the pleading stage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the County’s 1985 resolution was an agreement to act as an insurer rather than a statutory obligation to indemnify. The resolution provided “Liability Insurance” because the law enforcement liability insurance the County had purchased in the past had become too expensive. Therefore, the notice of claim requirement under General Municipal Law § 50-e(1)(b) did not apply. The Court also determined that the Sheriff, like the State with its prisons, has a duty to safeguard inmates. The court referenced New York Correction Law § 500-c to support this ruling and stated that, like in Sanchez v. State of New York, the Sheriff could not be shielded at the motion to dismiss stage.

    The court determined that the Sheriff has a duty, as prescribed by law, to safely keep inmates. The court applied the standard of accepting all facts alleged in the complaint as true, granting the plaintiff the benefit of every inference.

    The issue of governmental immunity was not appropriate to resolve at this early stage, because the Sheriff would bear the burden of proof on that affirmative defense.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the critical distinction between a county providing insurance coverage and a statutory obligation to indemnify an official. If the county merely insures an official, without an explicit statutory obligation to indemnify, a notice of claim may not be required before a lawsuit against the official can proceed. Also, the Court reaffirms that the Sheriff, like the State, has a duty of care to protect inmates from foreseeable harm. The ruling suggests that, in cases of inmate assaults, the focus will be on the reasonableness of the Sheriff’s actions in light of the known risks, and dismissals based on a lack of duty are less likely. The court’s holding on governmental immunity further highlights that the sheriff’s potential defense of immunity is to be resolved with evidence at trial, not on a motion to dismiss. Subsequent cases should be analyzed for explicit statutory obligations to indemnify, and the distinction drawn between discretionary and ministerial acts of officials.

  • People v. Allard, 28 N.Y.3d 43 (2016): Preservation of Speedy Trial Claims When a Hearing is Granted

    People v. Allard, 28 N.Y.3d 43 (2016)

    When a trial court grants a hearing on a defendant’s speedy trial claim, the defendant preserves their arguments by raising them at the hearing, even if they did not specifically address the People’s claimed exclusions in a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to the motion to dismiss.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of preserving speedy trial claims under CPL 30.30 when a hearing is granted. The court held that a defendant’s failure to file a reply brief addressing the People’s exclusions to the speedy trial calculation does not automatically forfeit their right to challenge those exclusions, provided the defendant raises those challenges during a hearing on the motion. This ruling clarifies the interplay between CPL 210.45, which governs motions to dismiss indictments and requires a hearing if the People don’t conclusively refute a motion with documentary evidence, and the established procedure for preserving speedy trial arguments outlined in prior case law. The court reasoned that the purpose of preservation is met when the defendant’s arguments are presented to the trial court at a hearing.

    Facts

    Dru Allard moved to dismiss his indictment, claiming a violation of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30. The People opposed the motion, arguing that a portion of the delay was excludable because a key witness was out of the country. Allard did not file a reply. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the defendant was entitled to a hearing because the People failed to conclusively refute the motion with unquestionable documentary proof as required by CPL 210.45 (5). After the hearing, the trial court granted Allard’s motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The People appealed, arguing that Allard’s CPL 30.30 arguments were unpreserved for appellate review because he failed to comply with the established procedure for preserving such claims, by not filing a reply to the People’s opposition.

    Procedural History

    Allard moved to dismiss the indictment. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division remitted to the Supreme Court for a hearing. The Supreme Court conducted a hearing and granted the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant preserves their speedy trial arguments for appellate review, when a hearing on the motion to dismiss is granted, even if they did not file a reply addressing the People’s claimed exclusions.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant raised their challenges to the People’s claimed exclusions at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, thus providing the trial court with an opportunity to address them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized the tension between CPL 210.45, which provides the general procedure for motions to dismiss and requires a hearing in the absence of conclusive documentary proof, and the established procedures for preserving a CPL 30.30 argument. The People argued that Allard’s failure to file a reply meant his arguments were unpreserved. However, the Court of Appeals held that such a rigid interpretation was not mandated by case law or consistent with the functional approach to preservation. The court emphasized that the purpose of preservation is to alert the trial court to the claims at a time when it can remedy any potential error.

  • People v. Garneau, 34 N.Y.3d 984 (2020): Admissibility of Electronic Records and the Scope of CPLR 4539(b)

    People v. Garneau, 34 N.Y.3d 984 (2020)

    CPLR 4539(b) does not apply to electronic records originally created in that format, and such records are governed by CPLR 4518(a).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of electronic records, specifically in the context of a breathalyzer test in a DWI case. The court held that CPLR 4539(b), which requires specific authentication for reproductions of documents, does not apply to records initially created in an electronic format. Instead, such records are governed by CPLR 4518(a), which provides for the admissibility of electronic records and allows the court to consider the method of storage when determining their accuracy. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit records of simulator solution testing based on state agency certifications.

    Facts

    During a trial for driving while intoxicated, the defendant objected to the admission of records related to the simulator solution used during the breath test. The defendant argued that the certifications accompanying the records did not comply with CPLR 4539(b), as they lacked verification that the records could not be tampered with. The trial court admitted the exhibit into evidence. The County Court agreed that CPLR 4539 (b) does not apply to documents, such as the record of simulator solution testing, that were originally created in electronic form.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the challenged evidence. The County Court upheld the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPLR 4539(b) applies to electronic records originally created in that format, specifically the record of simulator solution testing.

    2. Whether the applicable statute for the record of simulator solution testing and other related records is CPLR 4518(a).

    Holding

    1. No, CPLR 4539(b) does not apply to electronic records that were originally created electronically.

    2. Yes, CPLR 4518(a) is the applicable statute for electronic records and the attached state agency certifications are admissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR 4539(b) pertains to reproductions of hard-copy documents that have been scanned to create a digital image, and then a “reproduction” of the digital image. Since the records in question were created electronically, CPLR 4539(b) does not apply. The court cited that CPLR 4539(b) requires an authentication “by competent testimony or affidavit” to include information about “the manner or method by which tampering or degradation of the reproduction is prevented” when “[a] reproduction [is] created by any process which stores an image.”

    The court held that CPLR 4518(a) governs the admissibility of electronic records. CPLR 4518(a) states that “an electronic record . . . shall be admissible in a tangible exhibit that is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record.” The court emphasized that the Legislature amended CPLR 4518(a) specifically because CPLR 4539(b) was deemed inapplicable to documents created electronically. The court relied on the 2002 amendment to CPLR 4518(a), noting that it provides that the court “may consider the method or manner by which the electronic record was stored, maintained or retrieved in determining whether the exhibit is a true and accurate representation of such electronic record,” but “[a]ll other circumstances of the making of the memorandum or record . . . may be proved to affect its weight,” and “shall not affect its admissibility.”

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the distinction between the admissibility of scanned images of paper documents and records that originate in electronic form. Attorneys should be prepared to differentiate between the two types of records and understand which statutes govern their admissibility. For electronic records, CPLR 4518(a) is the controlling authority, and its requirements, including the consideration of storage methods, must be met. This decision reinforces the trend of recognizing the validity and reliability of electronic records in legal proceedings, aligning with contemporary business practices. When dealing with electronic evidence, attorneys should focus on establishing the accuracy and authenticity of the electronic record, including the manner of its creation, storage, and maintenance. The ruling also emphasizes the importance of state agency certifications in establishing the reliability of technical records.

  • Matter of Simon, 40 N.Y.3d 36 (2023): Grounds for Removal of a Judge for Misconduct

    Matter of Simon, 40 N.Y.3d 36 (2023)

    A judge can be removed from office for egregious misconduct that demonstrates a pattern of injudicious behavior and damages public confidence in the integrity of the court, even if the judge acknowledges their actions were wrong.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation to remove Judge Alan M. Simon from his judicial positions. Simon conceded to multiple charges of misconduct, including violating rules regarding judicial integrity, impartiality, and appropriate conduct. The court found that Simon’s actions, which included using his position to bully, intimidate, and engage in political activity, constituted “truly egregious circumstances” that warranted removal. The court emphasized that even though Simon admitted his misconduct, his pattern of behavior, lack of remorse, and attempts to minimize his actions undermined public trust and demonstrated unfitness for judicial office.

    Facts

    Alan M. Simon served as a Justice in Spring Valley Village Court, Ramapo Town Court, and Acting Justice in Hillburn Village Court. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct brought six charges of misconduct against him. Simon conceded to the charges, which included violating various rules of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, such as upholding the integrity and independence of the judiciary, acting impartially, refraining from lending the prestige of the office to advance private interests, maintaining professional competence, and avoiding political activity. Specifically, Simon used sanctions improperly, bullied and intimidated various individuals, engaged in ethnic smearing and name-calling, threatened officials, and injected himself into the political process of an election other than his own.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Simon’s conduct and sustained six charges against him, recommending his removal from office. Simon sought review of the Commission’s determination from the New York Court of Appeals. Simon conceded his misconduct but argued for a lesser sanction than removal, such as censure. The Court of Appeals reviewed the record and the Commission’s findings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals should accept the recommendation of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct and remove Judge Simon from his judicial offices.

    Holding

    Yes, because Simon’s misconduct met the standard of “truly egregious circumstances” justifying removal from office, due to the pattern of misconduct, lack of remorse, and damage to public confidence in the judiciary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court cited its broad authority to determine appropriate sanctions in judicial misconduct cases, emphasizing that the goal is to safeguard the bench from unfit incumbents. The court differentiated between a judge’s poor judgment and misconduct that qualifies as “truly egregious circumstances” and thus justifies removal. The court found that the actions demonstrated a pattern of injudicious behavior, as well as an abuse of power that had damaged public confidence in the court. The court highlighted Simon’s use of sanctions inappropriately, his bullying and intimidating behavior, and his involvement in political activity, which all demonstrated a pattern of misconduct. The court noted the lack of remorse and evasiveness by Simon as additional justification for removal.

    The court quoted prior precedent, stating that the ultimate sanction of removal is “reserved for ‘truly egregious circumstances’ that extend beyond the limits of ‘even extremely poor judgment’”, and that removal is warranted when a judge exhibits “a pattern of injudicious behavior…which cannot be viewed as acceptable conduct by one holding judicial office.”

    Practical Implications

    This case serves as a clear warning to judges about the standard of conduct expected of them. It underscores that judges must not only act within the bounds of the law but also uphold the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The case is a reminder that the courts take seriously any actions that undermine public trust. The practical implication for attorneys and judges is that even if a judge believes their motives are pure, actions perceived as bullying, intimidation, or the abuse of power can lead to severe disciplinary action, including removal from office. Future judicial conduct cases will likely refer to Simon’s actions as examples of the types of misconduct that justify the ultimate sanction of removal.

  • Rivera v. Montefiore Medical Center, 29 N.Y.3d 999 (2017): Timeliness of Objections to Expert Witness Disclosure

    29 N.Y.3d 999 (2017)

    The timeliness of an objection to the sufficiency of an expert witness disclosure is within the trial court’s discretion, particularly where the basis of the objection was readily apparent from the disclosure and could have been raised before trial.

    Summary

    In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff moved to preclude the defendant’s expert witness testimony regarding the cause of death, arguing that the expert disclosure statement was deficient for not detailing the specific cause of death the expert would testify to. The trial court denied the motion as untimely, and the appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion, as the deficiency of the disclosure statement, if any, was readily apparent from the face of the statement. The court emphasized the importance of timely objections to expert disclosures to allow for potential clarification or amendment.

    Facts

    A patient died in a hospital after being admitted with pneumonia. The autopsy report listed the cause of death as bronchopneumonia complicated by diabetes. The defendant timely served a CPLR 3101(d) expert disclosure statement. The statement informed the plaintiff that the expert would testify on causation. At trial, the defendant’s expert testified that the cause of death was sudden, lethal cardiac arrhythmia. The plaintiff moved to preclude the testimony on the grounds that the expert disclosure statement failed to provide details on potential causes of death. The trial court denied the motion as untimely.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to preclude the expert testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the objection to the disclosure statement was untimely. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal from the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s motion to preclude the defendant’s expert testimony as untimely.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely, given that the deficiency in the expert disclosure was apparent before trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the trial court’s broad discretion in supervising expert disclosure under CPLR 3101(d). The court reasoned that the timeliness of the motion was crucial. Although the disclosure statement was not specific, the court determined that because the lack of specificity could have been challenged prior to trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion during trial. The court highlighted that the issue was insufficiency, not misleading information, therefore it could have been raised and cured prior to trial. The court pointed out, “…the time to challenge the statement’s content had passed because the basis of the objection was readily apparent from the face of the disclosure statement and could have been raised—and potentially cured—before trial.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of timely objections to expert disclosures. Attorneys must carefully review expert disclosures and raise any concerns about sufficiency, particularly in cases where the disclosed information is vague or incomplete. This case emphasizes that parties should not wait until the middle of a trial to raise an objection to an expert’s testimony if the basis of the objection was apparent from the expert disclosure. Failure to raise a timely objection can result in the waiver of the right to challenge the expert’s testimony. The decision provides guidance for trial courts on how to manage expert disclosures in a way that promotes efficiency and fairness in the litigation process. Attorneys need to be mindful that it will be difficult to successfully challenge an expert’s testimony if the information needed to prepare a challenge was available prior to trial, and no motion was filed.

  • Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 32 N.Y.3d 1 (2018): Redefining “Parent” for Custody and Visitation Rights

    32 N.Y.3d 1 (2018)

    A non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing to seek visitation and custody under Domestic Relations Law § 70 if they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a child and raise the child together.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals overruled its prior decision in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., which held that only biological or adoptive parents had standing to seek custody or visitation rights. The court consolidated two cases, Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C. and Matter of Estrellita A. v. Jennifer L.D., where same-sex partners sought custody or visitation of children to whom they were not biologically related. The Court of Appeals held that the definition of “parent” in Domestic Relations Law § 70 should be expanded. Now a non-biological or non-adoptive parent can obtain standing if they can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of an agreement with the biological parent to conceive and raise a child as co-parents.

    Facts

    Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.: The parties, a same-sex couple, jointly decided to have a child. The respondent became pregnant through artificial insemination. The petitioner was actively involved during the pregnancy, birth, and subsequent upbringing of the child. After the relationship ended, the respondent terminated the petitioner’s contact with the child. The petitioner sought joint custody and visitation. The Family Court dismissed the petition, citing Alison D.

    Matter of Estrellita A. v. Jennifer L.D.: The parties, a same-sex couple, agreed to have a child. The respondent bore the child through artificial insemination. The petitioner participated actively in the child’s life. After the relationship ended, the petitioner sought visitation. The respondent initially obtained child support from the petitioner, arguing that the petitioner was a parent. Then, the respondent moved to dismiss the visitation petition, citing Alison D. The Family Court denied the motion, applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on the prior child support determination.

    Procedural History

    Brooke S.B.: The Family Court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, relying on Alison D. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Estrellita A.: The Family Court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding judicial estoppel. The Appellate Division affirmed, also finding judicial estoppel. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a non-biological, non-adoptive parent has standing to seek custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70.

    2. Whether the ruling in Alison D. should be overruled.

    Holding

    1. Yes, a non-biological, non-adoptive parent can obtain standing if there was a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise the child as co-parents.

    2. Yes, the court overruled Alison D.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that its prior decision in Alison D., which limited standing to biological or adoptive parents, was no longer workable due to evolving family structures and legal recognition of same-sex relationships. The court cited the need to consider the best interests of the child, who could suffer from being separated from a primary attachment figure, and the inequity created by Alison D., especially in light of the enactment of same-sex marriage. The Court emphasized the historic use of equity powers. The Court reasoned that the narrow definition of “parent” in Alison D. was inconsistent with the state’s broader equitable powers to ensure that custody and visitation matters served the best interests of the child. The court found that Alison D.’s “bright-line” rule had led to unfair outcomes for children in non-traditional families. The court also held that the right to marry provides benefits not only for same-sex couples, but also the children being raised by those couples.

    The Court held that a non-biological, non-adoptive parent may obtain standing to petition for custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70 (a) if they prove by clear and convincing evidence an agreement with the biological parent to conceive and raise the child as co-parents. This is a “narrow” and carefully constructed approach. The court declined to adopt a functional test for all situations.

    Practical Implications

    Attorneys handling custody and visitation cases should now assess whether the parties had a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise the child. This case broadens the class of individuals who can seek custody or visitation, particularly in same-sex and unmarried couple situations. Legal practice in this area must now consider these factors, in determining standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70. The real-world impact of this decision is to make access to courts more equitable and to provide increased stability and potential parental figures to children.

    This ruling creates a significant shift in the approach to standing in custody and visitation cases and underscores the importance of pre-conception planning and agreements for prospective parents.

  • Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1 (2016): Standing for Non-Biological Parents in Custody and Visitation Disputes

    <strong><em>Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.</em>, 28 N.Y.3d 1 (2016)</em></strong>

    A non-biological, non-adoptive parent has standing to seek custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70 if they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that they agreed with the biological parent to conceive a child and raise the child together as co-parents.

    <p><strong>Summary</strong></p>

    The New York Court of Appeals overruled its prior decision in <em>Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.</em> to address the evolving definition of “parent” in custody and visitation cases. The Court held that a non-biological parent can establish standing to seek custody or visitation if they can demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was an agreement with the biological parent to conceive and raise the child as co-parents. The Court emphasized the importance of the child’s best interests and the need to adapt legal principles to reflect contemporary family structures. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision in one case and affirmed in another based on this new standard and the application of judicial estoppel.

    <p><strong>Facts</strong></p>

    In <em>Brooke S.B.</em>, a same-sex couple decided to have a child through artificial insemination. The non-biological partner, Brooke, was actively involved in the pregnancy and the child’s upbringing. The couple later separated, and Elizabeth, the biological mother, denied Brooke visitation. In <em>Estrellita A.</em>, another same-sex couple also decided to have a child through artificial insemination. After the couple separated, Estrellita sought visitation. In a prior child support proceeding, Jennifer, the biological mother, successfully argued that Estrellita was a parent, thus estopping her from later denying Estrellita’s parental status for visitation.

    <p><strong>Procedural History</strong></p>

    In <em>Brooke S.B.</em>, the Family Court dismissed Brooke’s petition for lack of standing based on <em>Alison D.</em>. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. In <em>Estrellita A.</em>, Family Court initially dismissed Estrellita’s visitation petition based on <em>Alison D.</em>. Then, Family Court granted visitation, finding judicial estoppel. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    <p><strong>Issue(s)</strong></p>

    1. Whether a non-biological, non-adoptive parent has standing to seek custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70.
    2. Whether the principle of <em>stare decisis</em> warranted the continued application of <em>Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.</em>

    <p><strong>Holding</strong></p>

    1. Yes, because a non-biological, non-adoptive parent can establish standing to seek custody or visitation if they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that they agreed with the biological parent to conceive a child and raise the child together as co-parents.
    2. No, because the Court overruled <em>Alison D.</em>

    <p><strong>Court's Reasoning</strong></p>

    The Court began by acknowledging that Domestic Relations Law § 70 does not define “parent,” leaving the definition to the courts. The Court reviewed its prior holding in <em>Matter of Alison D.</em>, which had limited standing to biological or adoptive parents to protect the rights of biological parents. However, the Court found that <em>Alison D.</em> was unworkable given evolving family structures and the enactment of same-sex marriage. The Court emphasized that its equitable powers have historically exercised their “inherent equity powers and authority” in order to determine “who is a parent and what will serve a child’s best interests.” The Court found that <em>Alison D.</em> created an inconsistency in the rights and obligations attendant to parenthood, and its foundational premise of heterosexual parenting and non-recognition of same-sex couples was unsustainable. The Court noted, “In the rarest of cases, we may overrule a prior decision if an extraordinary combination of factors undermines the reasoning and practical viability of our prior decision.” The Court then overruled <em>Alison D.</em> and held that a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise a child as co-parents, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, is sufficient to establish standing. However, the Court declined to establish a test that would apply to every situation, particularly those that did not involve pre-conception agreements.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>

    This decision significantly alters the landscape of custody and visitation disputes involving non-biological parents in New York. Attorneys must now analyze these cases under the newly established standard. The ruling broadens the definition of “parent” and grants standing to individuals who were previously excluded. This will require a review of existing family law practices and may lead to increased litigation in this area. Lawyers should advise clients to document pre-conception agreements, which is crucial for establishing standing. The Court’s emphasis on the child’s best interests underscores the continued relevance of this factor in custody and visitation cases.

  • Glickman v. Laffin, No. 187 (N.Y. 2016): Voter Registration as Determinative of Constitutional Residency for Election Purposes

    Glickman v. Laffin, No. 187 (N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016)

    Registering to vote in another jurisdiction, thereby attesting to its status as one’s sole electoral residence, precludes a finding of continuous residency in New York for constitutional purposes, even if other factors suggest attachment to the state.

    Summary

    In a dispute over a New York State Senate candidate’s residency, the New York Court of Appeals held that the candidate’s registration to vote in Washington, D.C., precluded him from establishing the required five-year continuous residency in New York. The court emphasized that voter registration requires an attestation of sole electoral residence, which severed the candidate’s claim to New York residency. Despite evidence of ties to New York, the court found that the act of registering in D.C. broke the chain of New York residency. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the trial court’s invalidation of the candidate’s petitions.

    Facts

    Steven Glickman, a candidate for the New York State Senate, sought to validate his designating petitions. Objectors challenged his petitions, arguing he failed to meet the five-year New York State residency requirement and the one-year Senate District residency requirement. Glickman had resided in New York before attending college and graduate school in Maryland. He returned to New York frequently, maintained ties to his father’s home, and continued to use the New York address on his driver’s license. In 2013, Glickman moved to Washington, D.C. and registered to vote there in November 2014. He moved back to his father’s home in New York in March 2015 and registered to vote there in May 2015. He subsequently moved to Rochester, within the Senate District, in October 2015.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court invalidated the designating petitions, holding that Glickman’s D.C. voter registration prevented him from meeting the residency requirement. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the voter registration did not preclude Glickman from selecting New York as his electoral residence, finding he had legitimate and continuing attachments to New York. The objectors appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Glickman’s voter registration in Washington, D.C. precluded him from establishing the continuous five-year New York residency required by the State Constitution.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because his voter registration in Washington, D.C., including his attestation that it was his sole electoral residence, broke the chain of New York residency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals examined New York’s constitutional residency requirement for legislative office, which requires five years of residency in the state. The court emphasized that