New York Law Review

Author: The New York Law Review

Henry v. Fischer, 28 N.Y.3d 1136 (2017): Preservation of Claims in Prison Disciplinary Hearings

28 N.Y.3d 1136 (2017)

In prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate adequately preserves a claim regarding the denial of documents or witnesses by requesting them and receiving an adverse ruling, without needing to make repeated specific objections.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions in Henry v. Fischer, clarifying the requirements for preserving claims in prison disciplinary hearings. The case involved an inmate, Henry, who requested documents and witnesses during his disciplinary hearing. When the hearing officer denied some of these requests, Henry was found guilty. The trial court and Appellate Division dismissed Henry’s Article 78 petition, concluding that Henry hadn’t adequately preserved his claims by specifically objecting to the denials. The Court of Appeals found that Henry had preserved his claims by making the requests and receiving unfavorable rulings, without a need for further objections. The Court found this adequate and ordered the case remanded.

Facts

Jevon Henry, an inmate, faced disciplinary charges for a gang-related assault. At the hearing, Henry requested specific documents, including incident reports and logbook entries, and the testimony of several correction officers and inmates. The hearing officer denied some of these requests. Henry was found guilty and given a two-year sentence in the special housing unit. Henry appealed administratively, arguing he was denied access to requested documents and the hearing officer did not provide an explanation for one inmate’s refusal to testify. When the administrative appeal was denied, Henry initiated an Article 78 proceeding, which the trial court dismissed on the ground that Henry had failed to preserve the issues he sought to raise by proper objection at the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed.

Procedural History

The case began with a tier III disciplinary hearing against inmate Jevon Henry, at the Greene Correctional Facility. The hearing officer denied some of Henry’s requests for documents and witnesses. Henry was found guilty, prompting an administrative appeal and, subsequently, an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, a decision upheld by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals then granted leave to appeal and reversed the lower courts.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an inmate, who requested specific documents and witnesses during a prison disciplinary hearing, adequately preserves his claims regarding the denial of those requests for judicial review by making those requests and receiving adverse rulings without further, specific objections at the hearing?

Holding

1. Yes, because the inmate adequately preserved the claims by making the requests and receiving adverse rulings, without needing to make specific objections.

Court’s Reasoning

The court referenced the due process protections afforded to inmates in disciplinary proceedings, as established in Wolff v. McDonnell, and further clarified in Matter of Laureano v Kuhlmann, noting the right to call witnesses and present evidence. The Court of Appeals emphasized that Henry made the requests for documents and witnesses and the hearing officer denied those requests. Thus, the court held that the lower courts erred in concluding that Henry’s failure to make further specific objections at the hearing constituted a failure to preserve those rulings for judicial review. In doing so, the court noted that, “In sum, the record shows that Henry plainly requested access to specific documents and witnesses, and the Hearing Officer denied some of those requests.”

Practical Implications

This decision clarifies how to preserve claims in prison disciplinary hearings in New York. This means attorneys representing inmates should focus on ensuring their clients’ requests for documents and witnesses are clearly made and that they receive adverse rulings. Specific objections to these rulings during the hearing are unnecessary. The ruling has a significant impact on how similar cases are approached by attorneys. It changes the standard for preserving claims in prison disciplinary hearings, thus preventing procedural dismissal based on lack of specific objections. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of clearly documenting requests and rulings during the hearing process. The holding is also important because it reinforces inmates’ due process rights, which are a matter of public policy.

December 15, 2016
People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 (2003): Admissibility of Excited Utterances in Child Sexual Abuse Cases

People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 (2003)

An out-of-court statement made in response to a startling event is admissible as an excited utterance if the circumstances indicate the declarant was under the stress of excitement and lacked the capacity for reflection.

Summary

In People v. Johnson, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a child’s statements as excited utterances in a sexual abuse case. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the child’s initial statements to her parents, made shortly after the alleged abuse, were properly admitted as excited utterances because they were made while the child was still under the stress of the event and lacked the capacity for reflection. The court also determined that even if later statements made at a hospital were improperly admitted, the error was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.

Facts

The defendant, a bus driver, was convicted of sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child for allegedly sexually touching a three-year-old girl on his bus. The prosecution presented testimony from the child’s parents regarding statements the child made to them shortly after the incident, and later at a hospital. The initial statements included the phrase “Señor Bus” and a licking gesture, made within a half hour of the child exiting the bus while crying inconsolably. The later statements, made approximately three hours later at a hospital, included the repetition of the phrase and gesture, and the child pulling her mother’s hand towards her genital area. Forensic testing confirmed the defendant’s DNA on the child’s underwear.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting the child’s statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court properly admitted the child’s initial statements to her parents, made shortly after the alleged abuse, as excited utterances.

2. Whether, if the later statements made at the hospital were improperly admitted, the error was harmless.

Holding

1. Yes, because the initial statements were made while the child was still under the stress of the event and lacked the capacity for reflection.

2. Yes, because any error in admitting the later statements was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, focusing on the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The court reiterated that this exception allows for the admission of out-of-court statements made in response to a startling or upsetting event if the circumstances indicate the declarant was under the stress of excitement and lacked the capacity for reflection. The court held that the trial court’s decision to admit hearsay as an excited utterance is left to its sound judgment, which must consider the nature of the event, the time between the event and the statement, and the declarant’s activities in the interim. The decisive factor is whether the circumstances reasonably justify the conclusion that the remarks were not made under studied reflection. Applying this to the facts, the court found no error in admitting the initial statements, given the child’s emotional state and the close proximity of the statements to the event. The court further held that, even if the later statements were improperly admitted because the stress of excitement had sufficiently abated, any error was harmless considering other evidence, including the forensic evidence and the bus matron’s testimony about the altered bus route. The court also cited evidence of physical trauma, supported by the testimony of the child’s mother, which provided overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt, and there was no significant probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion if the hearsay statements from the hospital had been excluded. The court referenced the harmless error standard, considering whether the proof of guilt was overwhelming and if there was a significant probability the jury would have acquitted without the evidence. The court cited People v. Edwards, which emphasizes that the decisive factor is whether the remarks were made under the impetus of studied reflection, and People v. Crimmins for the standard of harmless error.

Practical Implications

This case provides guidance on the application of the excited utterance exception, especially in cases involving child witnesses. It emphasizes that the admissibility of such statements hinges on the declarant’s state of mind at the time of the statement. Legal practitioners should carefully assess the totality of the circumstances to determine if the declarant was still under the stress of the startling event, considering the nature of the event, the time elapsed, and the declarant’s activities. This case highlights the importance of establishing the child’s emotional state and the spontaneity of the statements to argue for their admissibility. Furthermore, the court’s analysis of harmless error reinforces the need for a thorough presentation of other evidence. This helps ensure a conviction even if some evidence is later deemed inadmissible. This case supports the argument that the timing of the statement in relation to the event is critical, but the child’s emotional state is paramount. This case is distinguished from others because it involves a child’s statements after an alleged sexual assault. The case underscores the application of the excited utterance exception in the context of child abuse cases, particularly with the standards for assessing harmless error.

December 15, 2016
People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021): Consecutive Sentences for Robbery and Attempted Robbery; Concurrent Sentencing for Felony Murder
People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021)

Under New York law, consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery are only permissible if the acts constituting the crimes are separate and distinct; sentencing for felony murder must run concurrently with the underlying felony.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed two consolidated appeals concerning sentencing for robbery and attempted robbery, and for attempted felony murder. In the first appeal, the court considered whether consecutive sentences were permissible where a defendant committed both a completed robbery and several attempted robberies. The court held that because the taking of the victim’s purse was not a separate and distinct act of force, the sentences for robbery and attempted robbery must run concurrently. In the second appeal, the court addressed whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felonies. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that a concurrent sentence was required. The court rejected the People’s argument that the attempted felony murder sentence could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felony.

Facts

In the first appeal, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. During the commission of the crimes, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm and demanded money from the victims. One victim, complying with the defendant’s demands, placed her purse on the ground, which the defendant then directed his accomplice to take. The People sought consecutive sentences for the robbery and the attempted robberies, arguing that the taking of the purse constituted a separate act. In the second appeal, the defendant was also convicted of attempted first-degree felony murder. The People did not specify which underlying felony supported this charge.

Procedural History

The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences for the robbery and attempted robberies. The Appellate Division modified the sentence, ruling that concurrent sentences were required. In the second appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated.

Issue(s)
1. Whether the defendant’s act of taking a victim’s purse authorized consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery.
2. Whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder should run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.
Holding
1. No, because the taking of the purse was not a separate and distinct act, the sentences must run concurrently.
2. Yes, a sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.
Court’s Reasoning

Regarding the first issue, the court relied on the New York Penal Law § 70.25 (2) which states that sentences imposed for multiple offenses committed through a single act or omission must run concurrently. The court also discussed the two-part test established in People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640 (1996), determining whether consecutive sentences are permissible. The court found that the statutory elements of attempted robbery and robbery overlapped, and there was no separate and distinct act of force to warrant consecutive sentences. The taking of the purse was part of the same act of displaying a firearm to commit the robbery, and thus not a separate act. The court cited the case People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444 (1996) to support its conclusion that the mere taking of property, even through separate movements, did not justify consecutive sentences in this scenario. Regarding the second issue, the court held that, as a matter of law, a sentence imposed for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony. The court cited previous case law and statutory interpretation to support this. As the People could have corrected their failure to specify the underlying felony, the defendant’s plea was deemed rational and valid. The court emphasized that “it is the acts of the defendant, and not the intent with which he or she acted, that control for consecutive sentencing purposes.”

Practical Implications

This case provides guidance for practitioners on when consecutive sentences are permissible in New York. It clarifies the requirements for separate and distinct acts in robbery and attempted robbery cases. Lawyers should be mindful that a single act of force or threat of force that accomplishes the taking of multiple items of property from different individuals, or multiple attempts to rob multiple individuals, does not permit consecutive sentences. This case also affirms the long-standing rule that sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony should run concurrently. It also underscores the importance of properly charging and specifying underlying felonies in indictments, particularly in the context of plea bargains. The failure to specify the underlying felony will result in concurrent sentences for the felony murder and underlying felony charges.
November 22, 2016
People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016): Language Barrier and Equal Protection in DUI Investigations
People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016)

A facially neutral policy that denies physical coordination tests to non-English speakers does not violate equal protection because it is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, and does not violate due process because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speaking suspects violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Jose Aviles, who spoke only Spanish, was arrested for drunk driving and not given a coordination test due to his language barrier. The Court held that the policy did not violate equal protection because it was rationally related to the government’s interests in ensuring test reliability and avoiding administrative burdens. The Court further held that the failure to administer the test did not violate due process because the police have no obligation to provide evidence to assist a defendant.

Facts

Jose Aviles was arrested for drunk driving after an accident. He spoke only Spanish and was observed with signs of intoxication. He consented to a breathalyzer test, which registered below the legal limit. Due to his inability to speak English, he was not given a physical coordination test. Aviles was charged with driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that denying him the coordination test violated his equal protection and due process rights.

Procedural History

The Criminal Court granted Aviles’ motion, finding constitutional violations. The Appellate Term reversed, relying on a prior Appellate Division decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision.

Issue(s)
1. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Holding
1. No, because the policy is rationally related to legitimate government interests.
2. No, because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.
Court’s Reasoning

Regarding Equal Protection, the court found the NYPD policy facially neutral because it applied to anyone unable to understand English, not specifically targeting any suspect class. The Court determined that rational basis review applied because no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated. The court reasoned that the policy was rationally related to ensuring the reliability of coordination tests, which depend on clear instructions, and to avoiding the financial and administrative burden of providing translation services or multilingual officers. The Court noted that the value of coordination tests diminishes with time, making translation impractical. The court also rejected Aviles’ argument that the policy discriminated based on national origin because the policy was based on language ability, not ethnicity.

On the Due Process issue, the Court found that the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence or performing a certain investigative step. The Court distinguished between the right to an interpreter in judicial proceedings and the discretionary, investigative nature of coordination tests. The Court concluded that, even if there were a due process right, it would be outweighed by the state’s interest in efficient and reliable law enforcement.

Practical Implications

This case clarifies that facially neutral policies, even if they have a disparate impact, do not automatically trigger heightened scrutiny. The ruling supports law enforcement’s ability to make practical decisions during investigations, even if those decisions might disadvantage some individuals. Lawyers should anticipate courts applying rational basis review when challenging similar policies. Further, this decision reinforces that the police have no affirmative duty to assist defendants. It also highlights the importance of how the government’s articulated interests are directly linked to the challenged policy. Later cases involving language access may attempt to distinguish this case by arguing intentional discrimination based on national origin if a policy is shown to be a pretext for racial discrimination.
November 22, 2016
Rasheed Al Rushaid, et al. v. Pictet & Cie, et al., No. 180 (N.Y. 2016): Personal Jurisdiction Based on Correspondent Bank Account Use
Rasheed Al Rushaid, et al. v. Pictet & Cie, et al., No. 180 (N.Y. 2016)

A foreign bank purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York, subjecting it to personal jurisdiction, when it repeatedly uses a New York correspondent bank account to facilitate transactions substantially related to the plaintiff’s claims.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals held that it had personal jurisdiction over Pictet & Cie (Pictet), a Swiss bank, because of its repeated use of New York correspondent bank accounts to launder funds related to a bribery and kickback scheme. Pictet’s vice president, Chambaz, assisted ARPD employees in setting up accounts to receive funds in a scheme that harmed the plaintiffs. The court distinguished this from cases where the use of the correspondent account was passive or incidental. The court found that the defendant’s repeated and purposeful use of the New York accounts demonstrated a sufficient nexus to New York to establish personal jurisdiction, as the New York accounts were used to further the money laundering scheme. This decision clarifies the standard for establishing personal jurisdiction based on the use of correspondent accounts in New York, emphasizing purposeful availment.

Facts

Plaintiff Rasheed Al Rushaid, co-owner of Al Rushaid Petroleum Investment Corporation (ARPIC), sued Pictet, a Swiss bank, along with its Vice President Chambaz, alleging that Pictet knowingly laundered funds related to a bribery and kickback scheme involving employees of Al Rushaid Parker Drilling, Ltd. (ARPD), a subsidiary of ARPIC. ARPD employees accepted bribes and kickbacks from vendors in exchange for purchasing goods and services at inflated prices. Chambaz, a Pictet executive, assisted the employees by setting up a shell company, TSJ Engineering Consulting Co., Ltd., in the British Virgin Islands to receive the bribes. Pictet then used its New York correspondent bank accounts to transfer the funds to the shell company’s Geneva-based Pictet account and the employees' individual accounts. Documents showed numerous wire transfers totaling over $4 million through Pictet's New York correspondent accounts. The plaintiffs sought over $350 million in damages.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs sued the defendants in New York state court. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the use of correspondent accounts was passive. The Appellate Division affirmed, distinguishing the case from Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, and holding that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of New York. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)
1. Whether the use of New York correspondent bank accounts by a foreign bank, in connection with a money-laundering scheme, constitutes transacting business within the state, thus satisfying the first prong of CPLR 302(a)(1).
2. Whether the plaintiffs' claims, based on the foreign bank's role in the money-laundering scheme, arose from the bank's transactions in New York, satisfying the second prong of CPLR 302(a)(1).
Holding
1. Yes, because Pictet's repeated use of New York correspondent accounts, as a central component of a money-laundering scheme, constituted the transaction of business within the state.
2. Yes, because the plaintiffs' claims of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy were substantially related to Pictet's transactions in New York via its correspondent accounts.
Court’s Reasoning

The court applied CPLR 302(a)(1), New York's long-arm statute, which requires that the non-domiciliary transact business within the state and that the claim arise from that transaction. The court focused on whether Pictet's activities demonstrated "purposeful availment." The court distinguished the case from Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-NY, where the use of the correspondent account was passive and unilateral. Here, Pictet's use of the New York correspondent accounts was a deliberate and integral part of the money-laundering scheme. The court held that Pictet's repeated use of New York correspondent accounts to transfer funds for its client's benefit constituted "purposeful availment" of the New York banking system and thus satisfied the first prong of CPLR 302(a)(1). "Repeated, deliberate use that is approved by the foreign bank on behalf and for the benefit of a customer — as in Licci — demonstrates volitional activity constituting transaction of business." The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims, which included aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy, had a "substantial relationship" with Pictet's banking transactions in New York, thus satisfying the second prong of CPLR 302(a)(1).

Practical Implications

This case provides important guidance on establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign banks based on their use of New York correspondent accounts. It is vital for cases involving claims against foreign banks for financial misconduct. The ruling clarifies that a foreign bank can be subject to jurisdiction even if it does not directly direct deposits into a New York account; its active involvement in a scheme that uses such accounts is sufficient. This ruling impacts how attorneys analyze and litigate cases involving international financial transactions and potential liability for aiding and abetting illegal activities. Courts may be more willing to assert jurisdiction over foreign financial institutions that use New York's banking infrastructure to further financial schemes. It reaffirms that the quality and quantity of a foreign bank's contacts with the correspondent bank matter more than whether another bank could have been used. Later cases may cite this case to assert jurisdiction over financial institutions implicated in illicit transactions.
November 22, 2016
Ace Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. v. New York State Special Disability Fund, 31 N.Y.3d 1014 (2018): Workers’ Compensation Carrier’s Right to Reimbursement from Special Disability Fund After Third-Party Settlement

31 N.Y.3d 1014 (2018)

A workers’ compensation carrier may seek nunc pro tunc approval from a court to a third-party settlement, even if the Special Disability Fund’s consent was not initially obtained, provided the Fund’s consent is required under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1).

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a workers’ compensation carrier, Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, could retroactively obtain the Special Disability Fund’s consent to a third-party settlement under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5). The employee sustained a work-related injury, and the Special Disability Fund was responsible for reimbursing the carrier for benefits after a certain period due to the employee’s pre-existing condition. The carrier approved the employee’s third-party personal injury settlement without the Special Disability Fund’s prior written consent. The Court of Appeals held that the carrier could seek court approval nunc pro tunc because Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) allows court approval for settlements even if the required consent of the lienor was not initially obtained, aligning the carrier’s actions with the statute’s intent.

Facts

An employee of Coca-Cola Bottling Company suffered a work-related injury in March 2007. Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, Coca-Cola’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, paid benefits to the injured employee. The employee was classified as having a permanent partial disability. Due to a pre-existing condition, the Workers’ Compensation Board held that the claim was subject to Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (8), and the Special Disability Fund was responsible for reimbursement after a certain period. The employee also initiated a third-party personal injury action, subject to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1). Ace Fire approved the settlement of the third-party action. However, Ace Fire did not seek the Special Disability Fund’s written approval before the settlement.

Procedural History

The Workers’ Compensation Board determined the employee’s benefits were reimbursable by the Special Disability Fund. The employee filed a third-party personal injury action. Ace Fire approved the settlement of the third-party action. Ace Fire sought retroactive consent from the Special Disability Fund, which was denied. Ace Fire commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court, seeking to compel the Special Disability Fund’s consent nunc pro tunc. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed, and the matter was remitted to Supreme Court.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a workers’ compensation carrier can obtain court approval nunc pro tunc under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) to a third-party settlement if the carrier did not obtain the prior consent of the Special Disability Fund, assuming the Fund is a lienor.

Holding

1. Yes, because Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) permits a carrier to seek nunc pro tunc approval for a third-party settlement, even without prior consent from a lienor, aligning with the statute’s provisions.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court relied on the principle of statutory interpretation that a statute should be construed as a whole, and that the various sections should be considered together and with reference to each other. The court noted that the language in Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1), establishing who may be deemed lienors, is essentially identical to the language in § 29 (5), which refers to entities whose consent to settlement is required. The court reasoned that there was no basis to distinguish the Special Disability Fund, as it is subject to the same rules as other lienors and that the failure to obtain the Fund’s consent can be cured by court order. The court emphasized that the legislature intended for employers to be encouraged to hire disabled employees, and the Special Disability Fund’s purpose is connected to this goal. The court highlighted, “We have repeatedly recognized ‘that a statute . . . must be construed as a whole and that its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other.’”

Practical Implications

This ruling clarifies that workers’ compensation carriers, when settling third-party claims, have a potential remedy if they fail to obtain the Special Disability Fund’s consent initially. This allows the carrier to seek court approval after the fact to protect their right to reimbursement from the Fund. This reduces the risk for carriers by providing a mechanism to cure procedural errors and recover funds. The decision reinforces the importance of complying with all requirements under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 and highlights the need for workers’ compensation carriers to consider the interplay between the various provisions of the law when settling third-party actions. Failure to adhere to procedures could impact the recovery of funds. Furthermore, this case impacts how the Special Disability Fund will handle these situations in the future.

November 22, 2016
Matter of ACME Bus Corp. v. Orange County, 27 N.Y.3d 421 (2016): Municipalities Must Adhere to Evaluation Criteria in RFPs

Matter of ACME Bus Corp. v. Orange County, 27 N.Y.3d 421 (2016)

A municipality awarding contracts under General Municipal Law § 104-b acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it deviates from the evaluation criteria specified in its Request for Proposals (RFP).

Summary

ACME Bus Corp. challenged Orange County’s award of transportation contracts, arguing the county changed the cost evaluation formula outlined in the RFP after bids were submitted, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious decision. The New York Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the county’s deviation from its stated evaluation criteria violated its own procurement policy and undermined fairness, potentially suggesting favoritism. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling, emphasizing that municipalities must adhere to the rules established in their RFPs to ensure transparency and prevent the appearance of impropriety in the procurement process, even if no actual misconduct is demonstrated.

Facts

Orange County issued an RFP for preschool special education transportation services. The RFP detailed a point-based evaluation system, including a cost category. The RFP specified a percentage-to-points ratio for cost evaluation (e.g., a 10% cost difference would result in a 2-point deduction). ACME submitted a proposal with the lowest cost for some zones but was not awarded the contracts. After bids were received, the county deviated from the RFP’s cost evaluation formula. ACME argued that applying the original formula would have resulted in a higher score for ACME in at least one zone. The county defended its actions as an attempt to ensure the lowest cost was chosen.

Procedural History

ACME initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court challenging the contract awards. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no arbitrariness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted ACME leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Orange County’s deviation from the cost evaluation formula stated in its RFP rendered its contract award arbitrary and capricious.

Holding

1. Yes, because the county failed to adhere to its own procurement policy and deviated from the RFP’s stated evaluation criteria, rendering the award arbitrary and capricious.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals found that Orange County acted arbitrarily and capriciously for two reasons: (1) the county violated its own procurement policy, which required adherence to RFP evaluation criteria; and (2) the deviation gave rise to the appearance of impropriety and potentially favored one bidder. The court reasoned that changing the rules after bids were submitted undermined fairness, contradicted the goals of General Municipal Law § 104-b (ensuring prudent use of public funds and preventing favoritism), and opened the process to the appearance of corruption. The court emphasized that, even absent evidence of bad faith, a municipality must comply with its own rules. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the bidding statute (General Municipal Law § 103) applies, but noted the overarching legislative purposes – protecting public funds and preventing fraud or corruption – were the same under both statutes.

Practical Implications

Municipalities must strictly adhere to the evaluation criteria outlined in their RFPs to avoid arbitrary and capricious challenges. Any changes to evaluation methods after bid submission can lead to court challenges and potential reversal of the contract award, even absent evidence of actual corruption. This case emphasizes the importance of clear, unambiguous language in RFPs and following established procedures. Legal practitioners advising municipalities should ensure their clients understand that they cannot change the rules mid-process. Any desire to alter an evaluation process must be addressed by rejecting all bids and reissuing the RFP, not by changing the rules after proposals have been submitted.

November 22, 2016
Matter of Diegelman v. City of Buffalo, 28 N.Y.3d 1011 (2016): Police Officer’s Right to Sue Employer for Duty-Related Injuries Despite Receiving GML 207-c Benefits

Matter of Diegelman v. City of Buffalo, 28 N.Y.3d 1011 (2016)

A police officer who receives benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) § 207-c for a duty-related injury is not barred from bringing a claim against their employer under GML § 205-e, particularly when the municipality does not provide workers’ compensation benefits.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals held that a police officer, injured on the job and receiving benefits under GML § 207-c, could sue the City of Buffalo under GML § 205-e for injuries allegedly caused by the City’s negligence. The Court determined that the GML § 205-e proviso, which bars workers’ compensation recipients from suing their employers, does not extend to officers receiving § 207-c benefits. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended to create a broad right of action for police officers under § 205-e and that the two statutory schemes, § 205-e and § 207-c, are independent, each with distinct purposes and eligibility standards. The ruling clarifies that municipalities that do not provide workers’ compensation are subject to § 205-e claims from officers receiving § 207-c benefits.

Facts

James R. Diegelman, a former police officer for the City of Buffalo, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, allegedly due to asbestos exposure during his employment. He and his wife sought permission to file a late notice of claim against the City, claiming the City’s negligence caused his illness. The City opposed, arguing that GML § 207-c provided the exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court granted the application; the Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with the City that the claim was meritless due to § 207-c’s exclusivity. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Procedural History

1. Supreme Court: Granted claimants’ application for permission to serve a late notice of claim.

2. Appellate Division, Fourth Department: Reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, holding that the claim was barred by GML § 207-c and denying the application.

3. Court of Appeals: Granted claimants’ motion for leave to appeal, resulting in the current decision reversing the Appellate Division.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a police officer receiving benefits under GML § 207-c is barred from bringing a claim against their employer under GML § 205-e.

Holding

1. No, because the proviso in GML § 205-e, which restricts claims by recipients of workers’ compensation, does not extend to those receiving benefits under GML § 207-c.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court focused on the interplay between GML §§ 205-e and 207-c, as well as the Workers’ Compensation Law. It recognized that GML § 205-e allows police officers to sue for injuries caused by statutory or regulatory violations. It contrasted this with GML § 207-c, which provides salary and medical benefits for duty-related injuries. The Court emphasized that while workers’ compensation benefits are generally the exclusive remedy against an employer, the proviso in § 205-e prohibiting such claims does not apply to officers receiving § 207-c benefits. The Court argued that the two statutory schemes are distinct, with different eligibility criteria and purposes. Specifically, it noted that workers’ compensation benefits require an injury “arising out of and in the course of employment” while § 207-c benefits require an injury sustained “in the performance of his or her duties.” The Court observed that since the City of Buffalo did not provide workers’ compensation, the proviso in § 205-e did not preclude Diegelman’s claim. The Court also pointed out the legislative history of § 205-e, which demonstrated an intent to expand the rights of police officers to sue for injuries caused by employer negligence and concluded that the City’s interpretation would undermine the statute’s remedial purpose.

The Court quoted the statute’s language: “In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law” (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1]).

Practical Implications

This case clarifies the availability of GML § 205-e claims for police officers, particularly in municipalities that do not provide workers’ compensation coverage. It establishes that receiving GML § 207-c benefits does not automatically bar a police officer from suing the employer under § 205-e for injuries caused by the employer’s violations. This means attorneys should advise their clients of this right and must carefully consider the specific statutory violations which are at the heart of a potential GML § 205-e action. Municipalities, especially those without workers’ compensation coverage, face greater potential liability for duty-related injuries to their police officers. Later cases have cited this case to reinforce that the receipt of GML § 207-c benefits does not preclude a police officer from pursuing a claim under GML § 205-e.

November 21, 2016
People v. Street, 27 N.Y.3d 309 (2016): Constitutionality of Noise Ordinances and the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
People v. Street, 27 N.Y.3d 309 (2016)

A noise ordinance that defines “unnecessary noise” using an objective standard of “a reasonable person of normal sensibilities” is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Syracuse’s noise ordinance, prohibiting “unnecessary noise” from motor vehicles, was unconstitutionally vague. The court held the ordinance constitutional, distinguishing it from a previously invalidated ordinance. The Syracuse ordinance defined “unnecessary noise” using an objective “reasonable person” standard, providing sufficient clarity to give fair notice of prohibited conduct and to guide law enforcement. The court emphasized that noise regulations often require broadly stated definitions but must still meet constitutional standards. The decision reaffirmed that such regulations are constitutional if they define noise by an objective standard and are tailored to a specific context.

Facts

Police stopped the defendant’s vehicle because they believed the car stereo was creating noise heard beyond 50 feet, violating Syracuse Noise Ordinance § 40-16(b). During the stop, police discovered crack cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which the trial court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of violating the noise ordinance. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague because it used an objective standard, and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Procedural History

The defendant was charged in a local court with violating the Syracuse Noise Ordinance, as well as drug possession. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, and convicted the defendant of violating the ordinance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the ordinance constitutional. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)
1. Whether Syracuse Noise Ordinance § 40-16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Holding
1. No, because the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague.
Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals applied a two-part test to determine if the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, examining whether the statute gives fair notice that the conduct is forbidden and provides clear standards for enforcement. The court found that the Syracuse ordinance, unlike the one in People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., used an objective standard—what a “reasonable person of normal sensibilities” would find disturbing—when defining “unnecessary noise.” The court noted that this objective standard distinguishes the ordinance from the subjective, vague standards that were found unconstitutional in Trap Rock, thereby providing sufficient notice and standards for enforcement. The court emphasized that the ordinance was tailored to the specific context of noise from motor vehicles on public highways. The court also noted that the ordinance did not contain the problematic “without limiting the above language” clause found in the prior case that had led to the ordinance being declared unconstitutional.

Practical Implications

This case provides guidance on drafting and analyzing noise ordinances. It confirms that noise ordinances, while needing to be broadly defined, must employ objective standards to avoid being found unconstitutionally vague. The ruling underscores the importance of using a “reasonable person” standard and limiting the scope of the ordinance to a specific context. This decision helps law enforcement, municipalities, and practitioners understand the parameters of constitutionally permissible noise regulations and how to avoid the vagueness challenges that can arise in this area. The case emphasizes the importance of careful drafting to avoid the pitfalls identified in earlier cases such as Trap Rock.
November 21, 2016
People v. Cabrera, 27 N.Y.3d 295 (2016): Causation in Felony Murder – Foreseeability and Preexisting Conditions

<strong><em>People v. Cabrera</em>, 27 N.Y.3d 295 (2016)</em></strong>

For felony murder, the prosecution must prove the defendant’s actions were a direct cause of death and that the fatal result was reasonably foreseeable, even if the victim had a preexisting condition that contributed to their death.

<strong>Summary</strong>

The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting a felony murder conviction. The defendant, along with accomplices, committed a home invasion robbery, during which the victim was assaulted and suffered injuries, including blunt force trauma. The victim, who had pre-existing hypertensive cardiovascular disease, died from stress related to the assault. The court found the defendant’s actions were a direct, foreseeable cause of death, even considering the victim’s health issues, and upheld the conviction. The court emphasized the distinction between the cause and the manner of death, stating the jury was not bound by the autopsy’s “undetermined” manner of death determination.

<strong>Facts</strong>

The defendant, along with two accomplices, planned a robbery at the victim’s apartment. The accomplices, after gaining entry and assessing the premises, let the defendant into the building. The defendant, wearing a disguise, then violently assaulted the victim during the robbery. The victim suffered injuries including lacerations, jaw fractures, and eye hemorrhaging. The victim was found dead in the apartment a few days later. An autopsy determined the cause of death was hypertensive cardiovascular disease, with the contributing factor of obesity, and the manner of death as undetermined. The medical examiner testified that the stress of the assault accelerated the victim’s death.

<strong>Procedural History</strong>

The defendant was convicted of felony murder in the second degree and other charges. The Appellate Division reversed the felony murder conviction, finding that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s death was reasonably foreseeable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

<strong>Issue(s)</strong>

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s felony murder conviction, specifically regarding causation and foreseeability?

2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for burglary and robbery, given the accomplice testimony?

<strong>Holding</strong>

1. Yes, because the evidence established a direct causal link between the assault and the victim’s death and that the death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence.

2. Yes, because the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes.

<strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

The court applied a two-pronged test to determine causation: (1) the defendant’s actions must be a direct contributory cause of the death; and (2) the fatal result must be reasonably foreseeable. The court emphasized that the defendant’s actions were a direct cause, even though the victim had a pre-existing condition that contributed to the death. “[S]o long as ‘the necessary causative link is established, other causes, such as a victim’s preexisting condition, will not relieve the defendant of responsibility for homicide’” The court found that the evidence of the violent assault and the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the stress-induced cardiac event were sufficient to establish both direct causation and foreseeability. The court distinguished the cause of death, which was a medical finding, from the manner of death, which the jury was free to determine based on all the evidence of the circumstances. The court also found sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony through video surveillance and phone records.

<strong>Practical Implications</strong>

This case clarifies the standards for causation and foreseeability in felony murder cases. Attorneys should be prepared to show that the defendant’s actions were a direct, contributory cause of death and that the type of harm was reasonably foreseeable. The case illustrates that a victim’s pre-existing health conditions do not absolve a defendant of responsibility, so long as the defendant’s actions accelerated or contributed to the victim’s death. Expert testimony about the cause of death and the impact of stress on the victim is crucial. The court’s emphasis on the distinction between the cause and manner of death and the jury’s role in assessing foreseeability is a key takeaway. This case also offers guidance on what constitutes sufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony.

November 21, 2016