New York Law Review

Author: The New York Law Review

  • Drumm Family Farm, Inc. v. Jamison, 27 N.Y.3d 526 (2016): Proximate Cause and Foreseeable Intervening Acts

    Drumm Family Farm, Inc. v. Jamison, 27 N.Y.3d 526 (2016)

    A defendant’s negligence is a proximate cause of an injury when the intervening act is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a farm’s negligence in allowing a calf to escape could be considered the proximate cause of a motorist’s death. The motorist was killed after exiting her vehicle to assist the calf that was loose in the road. The Court held that the motorist’s actions were a foreseeable consequence of the farm’s negligence and, therefore, the issue of proximate cause should be decided by the fact-finder. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision which had granted summary judgment to the farm. The Court emphasized the fact-specific nature of proximate cause, particularly when considering intervening acts.

    Facts

    A calf owned by Drumm Family Farm escaped its enclosure and entered a rural road. A motorist, later identified as the decedent, encountered the calf while driving. She pulled over to the side of the road, and then exited her vehicle. While she was attempting to assist the calf, she was struck and killed by another vehicle driven by one of the Jamison defendants. The decedent’s estate sued the Farm, alleging negligence in failing to maintain the fence and retrieve the calf. The Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that the decedent’s intervening actions and the other driver’s negligence were the sole proximate causes of her death.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the Farm’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the decedent’s conduct was not so extraordinary as to break the chain of causation. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the Farm’s negligence was not the proximate cause. The Jamison defendants sought leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and subsequently reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Farm’s negligence in allowing its calf to escape and wander into the roadway was a proximate cause of the decedent’s death.

    2. Whether the decedent’s act of exiting her vehicle and entering the roadway to assist the calf was a foreseeable intervening act that did not sever the chain of causation.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the decedent’s actions in exiting her vehicle were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Farm’s negligence.

    2. Yes, because the Court found that the intervening act was not extraordinary and, therefore, did not break the chain of causation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reiterated the principles of proximate cause, emphasizing that it requires a “substantial cause” of the injury and involves considerations of foreseeability. The Court explained that intervening acts do not automatically sever the causal connection; instead, liability depends on whether the intervening act is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. The Court cited previous cases which outlined instances where a defendant’s negligence was found to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, even with an intervening act. The Court distinguished those cases where the intervening act was deemed extraordinary and, as a matter of law, severed the chain of causation. The Court concluded that the risk created by the Farm—a wandering calf on a roadway—corresponded to the actual harm, and the decedent’s actions were a foreseeable response. The Court held that the determination of proximate cause was for the fact-finder.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of foreseeability in assessing proximate cause, especially when dealing with intervening acts. Attorneys should analyze whether an intervening act was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. If the risk created by the defendant’s conduct is the same risk that resulted in harm, and the intervening act is not extraordinary, proximate cause will likely be a question for the jury. This ruling may affect how cases involving animals on roadways, and other situations where the defendant’s negligence creates a risk of subsequent events or actions, are litigated. The case reinforces that summary judgment on proximate cause grounds is less likely when the intervening act is a foreseeable response to the defendant’s negligence.

  • People v. Bridgeforth, 34 N.Y.3d 570 (2020): Batson Challenges and Discrimination Based on Skin Color

    People v. Bridgeforth, 34 N.Y.3d 570 (2020)

    A prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on their skin color violates the Equal Protection Clause under the New York State Constitution and Civil Rights Law, and is subject to a Batson challenge.

    Summary

    In a criminal case, the defendant, a dark-complexioned African-American male, challenged the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to exclude potential jurors, claiming discrimination against dark-skinned women. The trial court initially did not find that the defendant met his initial burden of showing discrimination. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of jurors based on skin color is a form of discrimination that triggers the protections of Batson v. Kentucky. The Court found that skin color is a cognizable basis for a Batson challenge under the New York State Constitution and Civil Rights Law, separate from race. Because the prosecutor failed to provide a non-discriminatory reason for excluding a dark-skinned female juror, the Court held that the trial court erred and ordered a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, a dark-complexioned African-American male, was charged with robbery. During jury selection (voir dire), the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude a number of potential jurors, including dark-skinned women. Defense counsel made a Batson challenge, arguing that the prosecutor was systematically excluding black or dark-colored female jurors, including Guyanese women. The prosecutor provided reasons for excluding some jurors but failed to provide a reason for excluding one particular dark-skinned Indian-American woman. The trial court did not seat the juror at issue and did not explicitly rule on whether the defendant had made a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson.

    Procedural History

    At trial, defense counsel made a Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes. The trial court did not make a step one finding, but the prosecutor provided reasons for some of the strikes. The trial court found that the prosecutor had valid reasons for the strikes, and did not seat the juror at issue. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether skin color is a cognizable basis for a Batson challenge under the New York State Constitution and Civil Rights Law.

    2. Whether the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination when challenging the exclusion of jurors based on skin color.

    3. Whether the prosecutor’s failure to provide a non-discriminatory reason for excluding a potential juror violated Batson.

    Holding

    1. Yes, skin color is a cognizable basis for a Batson challenge because it is a protected characteristic under New York’s Constitution and Civil Rights Law.

    2. Yes, the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination by alleging that the prosecutor was excluding dark-skinned women.

    3. Yes, the prosecutor’s failure to provide a non-discriminatory reason violated Batson.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the Batson framework, which prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race or other protected characteristics. The Court found that the New York State Constitution and Civil Rights Law explicitly recognize color as a classification distinct from race, indicating that discrimination based on skin color is prohibited. “The Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution provides: ‘No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state’ (NY Const, art I, § 11 [emphasis added]).” The Court distinguished this case from prior cases involving challenges to peremptory strikes based on broad classifications like

  • People v. Harris, 28 N.Y.3d 1117 (2017): When a Juror’s Assurances of Impartiality are Sufficient

    People v. Harris, 28 N.Y.3d 1117 (2017)

    A prospective juror’s unequivocal assurances of impartiality, despite prior statements suggesting bias, can be sufficient to deny a challenge for cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, which had found that the trial court erred in not excusing a prospective juror for cause. During voir dire, the prospective juror initially expressed concerns about impartiality due to the nature of the case (involving the death of a child). However, after the trial court’s thorough questioning, the juror provided unequivocal assurances that they could be impartial and follow the law. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defense’s for-cause challenge because the juror’s responses, when viewed in context, sufficiently demonstrated impartiality. The case underscores the importance of the juror’s explicit statements of impartiality.

    Facts

    During voir dire in a criminal trial concerning the death of a five-year-old child, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors if any of them had a problem with the case involving the death of a five-year-old child. One prospective juror stated that they could not be impartial, which led defense counsel to inquire if other jurors had similar feelings. Prospective juror No. 383 stated, “It’s a five year old. I feel the same. Adult [defendant]. I can’t do it.” Despite this initial statement, the juror later responded affirmatively that the burden was on the People to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court then questioned the prospective juror, and the juror provided unequivocal assurances that they would follow the law and be impartial. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the juror for cause, but the court denied the application.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s for-cause challenge. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in not excusing the juror for cause. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who initially expressed bias but later provided assurances of impartiality.

    Holding

    1. No, because the juror unequivocally stated that they would be impartial and follow the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision under CPL 270.20 (1)(b), which allows a challenge for cause if a juror has a state of mind likely to prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict. The court reiterated that a prospective juror raising serious doubts about their impartiality must be excused unless they unequivocally state on the record that they can be fair and impartial. The court emphasized that a prospective juror must “expressly state that his [or her] prior state of mind concerning either the case or either of the parties will not influence [the] verdict.” The court found that the trial court’s questioning of juror No. 383, taking place after her initial statements, sufficiently elicited unequivocal assurances of impartiality. The court emphasized that the juror’s statements, taken in totality and context, reflected their ability and willingness to render an impartial verdict. The court stated, “The CPL … does not require any particular expurgatory oath or ‘talismanic’ words.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores that trial judges have considerable discretion in assessing a juror’s impartiality. An initial indication of bias doesn’t automatically disqualify a juror. Instead, the critical factor is whether the juror, after further inquiry, can unequivocally assure the court that they will set aside any preconceived notions and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence and the law. Attorneys should be prepared to rehabilitate jurors who express initial concerns but demonstrate their ability to be impartial. This case provides guidance on the types of questions that may be effective in eliciting these assurances. Moreover, this case shows that specific “talismanic” words are not required, it depends on the totality of the context of the juror’s responses.

  • People v. Darnell, 28 N.Y.3d 546 (2017): Admissibility of Subscriber Information as Non-Hearsay Evidence

    People v. Darnell, 28 N.Y.3d 546 (2017)

    Subscriber information in prepaid cell phone records is admissible as non-hearsay evidence if not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted within the records, but rather to establish a connection between a cell phone and the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of subscriber information from prepaid cell phone records in a criminal trial. The defendant was convicted of robbery based partly on the victim’s identification. The prosecution introduced subscriber information from phone records to link a phone used during the crime to the defendant, even though the information itself was not verified by the phone companies. The court held that this information was admissible because it was not offered to prove the truth of the subscriber’s statements but to establish a connection between the phone and the defendant, which could be used to corroborate the victim’s identification. This ruling clarified the application of the business records exception to the hearsay rule, specifically in cases where the information contained within the record is being used for a non-hearsay purpose.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary and robbery following an incident where he and an accomplice entered the victim’s home, robbed, and bound him. During the robbery, the accomplice received a series of phone calls. The victim provided the police with the accomplice’s phone number. Police subpoenaed the phone records, discovering that one of the numbers that called the accomplice’s phone was registered to “Darnell Patterson,” with an address and date of birth matching those of the defendant. The victim subsequently identified the defendant in a lineup. The prosecution sought to introduce the subscriber information, specifically the name, address, and date of birth associated with the phone numbers.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to preclude the subscriber information as hearsay. The trial court admitted the subscriber information, not for its truth, but to show that the subscriber’s information given to the phone company, linked the phone to the defendant. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division exceeded its authority under CPL 470.15 (1).
    2. Whether the subscriber information in the cell phone records was properly admitted as non-hearsay evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division did not rely on a different ground than the trial court in affirming the conviction.
    2. Yes, because the subscriber information was not offered to prove the truth of the information within the records, but for a non-hearsay purpose linking the phone to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by addressing the scope of the Appellate Division’s review, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the appellate court had exceeded its authority. The court determined that both lower courts had based their decisions on the fact that the evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matters asserted in the statement. The court then turned to the merits of the evidentiary ruling. It affirmed that the subscriber information was properly admitted for a non-hearsay purpose, despite the fact that the subscriber was not under a business duty to report the information correctly. The Court relied on the business records exception to the hearsay rule as defined by CPLR 4518 (a). The Court found that the subscriber information was not being offered for its truth (i.e., to prove that “Darnell Patterson” was the user), but rather to show that the account had a connection to the defendant to corroborate the victim’s identification. The court noted that the information was akin to the registration card of a hotel, it was not admitted to prove the truth of the matters asserted but to show a link with the user.

    “‘If the informant was not under a business duty to impart the information, but the entrant was under a business duty to obtain and record the statement, the entry is admissible to establish merely that the statement was made . . . [but] another hearsay exception is necessary in order to receive the statement for its truth.’”

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on the admissibility of business records, particularly when the information within the records is not offered for its truth. Attorneys should carefully consider the purpose for which evidence is being offered and whether it is being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. This case supports the admissibility of evidence that establishes a link between the phone and the defendant. This ruling is significant for attorneys litigating cases involving digital evidence, phone records, and the establishment of identity and can be used to argue for the admissibility of such evidence in court. This case should influence how legal professionals approach the admissibility of digital and circumstantial evidence in trials. The distinction between hearsay and non-hearsay uses of evidence is critical. The case highlights the importance of carefully articulating the purpose for which evidence is offered.

  • People v. Flowers, 26 N.Y.3d 537 (2015): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Sentencing after Appeal

    <strong><em>People v. Flowers</em></strong>, 26 N.Y.3d 537 (2015)

    Defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument, such as an argument that a resentencing court improperly considered dismissed charges when imposing the same sentence after appeal.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division vacated the sentence due to the sentencing court’s improper consideration of dismissed charges. On resentencing, the same judge reimposed the original sentence. The defendant argued that the court again improperly considered the dismissed counts, and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s claim was unpreserved and his counsel was not ineffective. The court reasoned that counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument, and that no presumption of vindictiveness arises when a court reimposes an identical sentence after appeal.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    Immanuel Flowers was arrested in connection with a shooting and charged with multiple counts, including attempted murder and assault. The trial court dismissed the attempted murder and assault counts due to insufficient evidence of intent but convicted Flowers of criminal possession of a weapon. Flowers was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender to 20 years to life in prison. On appeal, the Appellate Division vacated the sentence because the sentencing court had improperly considered dismissed charges. At resentencing, the same judge reimposed the original sentence of 20 years to life. Defense counsel argued mitigating factors but did not object to the identical sentence. Flowers appealed again, arguing improper resentencing and ineffective assistance of counsel.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    1. Trial Court: Flowers convicted and sentenced to 20 years to life.

    2. Appellate Division: Sentence vacated and case remitted for resentencing.

    3. Resentencing: Same judge reimposed the original 20-years-to-life sentence.

    4. Appellate Division: Affirmed the resentencing and rejected claims of improper consideration of dismissed charges and ineffective assistance of counsel.

    5. Court of Appeals: Granted leave to appeal, affirmed the Appellate Division decision.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether the resentencing court’s reimposition of the same sentence was improper because it considered dismissed charges, even though the defendant did not preserve the objection?

    2. Whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object to the resentencing?

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. No, because the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

    2. No, because counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the preservation issue, holding that the defendant’s claim was unpreserved because he failed to object to the sentence at resentencing. The Court rejected the argument that the resentencing court’s action constituted a

  • People v. Clark, 28 N.Y.3d 558 (2016): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Client’s Choice of Defense

    28 N.Y.3d 558 (2016)

    An attorney’s decision to pursue a defense strategy at the explicit direction of the client does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the strategy ultimately proves unsuccessful.

    Summary

    In People v. Clark, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of murder and assault. His attorney pursued a misidentification defense at the defendant’s insistence, against the potential alternative of a justification defense. The Court held that counsel was not ineffective because the client explicitly chose the defense strategy. The Court emphasized that counsel must abide by a defendant’s choices regarding fundamental decisions, including the defense strategy, and that in this case, the chosen strategy was not inherently self-destructive. The Court also rejected claims based on courtroom closure during voir dire and the judge’s response to a jury note, holding that counsel’s actions were not ineffective under the circumstances.

    Facts

    Prince Clark was convicted of murder and assault related to the shooting death of Jamel Wisdom and the assault of Gamard Talleyrand. The prosecution presented surveillance video that the defendant claimed showed the shooter in the building’s lobby. During the trial, defense counsel informed the court that the evidence could support an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense, but that the defendant did not want to pursue this defense. The defendant insisted that he was not the person in the video. The defense counsel, in accordance with the defendant’s instructions, pursued a misidentification defense. After the jury inquired about the difference between

  • People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017): Permissible Supplemental Jury Instructions Regarding Unanimity After a Defective Verdict

    People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017)

    A trial court’s supplemental instruction to a jury after it returns a non-unanimous verdict, directing the jury to resume deliberations, is permissible as long as it does not coerce the jury to reach a specific verdict.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a supplemental instruction, given by the trial court after the jury announced a verdict that was not unanimous, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court held that the trial judge’s instruction, which informed the jury that their verdict must be unanimous and directed them to resume deliberations, was appropriate. The Court reasoned that the instruction did not pressure the jury to reach a specific verdict and that, because the jury deliberated for a full day after the instruction, it was not unduly coercive. The court also addressed the issue of the trial court’s refusal to read back the defense counsel’s summation, finding the issue unpreserved.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder and other crimes. During deliberations, the jury indicated that it was deadlocked. After further instruction, the jury announced it had reached a verdict: guilty on some counts, not guilty on others. However, the subsequent polling of the jurors revealed that the verdict was not unanimous. The trial court then instructed the jurors to resume deliberations to reach a unanimous verdict. The jury deliberated for another day and ultimately returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on some counts. The defendant argued that the supplemental instruction was coercive and deprived him of a fair trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the initial non-unanimous verdict and gave a supplemental instruction. The defendant was convicted and appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding the supplemental instruction was appropriate. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s supplemental instruction, after the jury returned a non-unanimous verdict, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the jury’s request to rehear defense counsel’s summation during deliberations.

    Holding

    1. No, because the instruction was not coercive and did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. No, because the issue was not properly preserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Criminal Procedure Law § 310.80, which mandates that if the jury’s verdict is not unanimous, the court must direct the jury to resume deliberations. The court cited People v. Aponte and People v. Pagan to distinguish between permissible and impermissible supplemental jury instructions. The court held that the trial court’s instruction in this case was proper because it did not pressure the jury to reach a particular verdict and it left open the possibility of principled disagreement among the jurors. The court noted that the instruction was not coercive, because it did not overemphasize the need to return a verdict, nor did it suggest the jury was failing in its duty. The absence of “cautionary language” was not considered fatal to the supplemental charge because such language had already been given to the jury two hours earlier.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on the permissible scope of supplemental instructions when a jury returns a non-unanimous verdict. Attorneys must be aware of the fine line between encouraging a jury to reach a verdict and coercing them. The court’s holding underscores that a supplemental instruction is permissible if it simply reminds the jury of the unanimity requirement and directs them to continue deliberations. The case also suggests that the content of prior instructions can be considered when evaluating the propriety of supplemental instructions. Moreover, the fact that the jury deliberated for a significant period after the instruction suggests that the court can avoid claims of coercion if the jury deliberates for a substantial amount of time after the instruction is given. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances when assessing the impact of supplemental instructions on the jury’s deliberations.

  • People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016): Suggestiveness of Lineups When Defendant Possesses a Distinctive Feature

    People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016)

    A lineup is unduly suggestive if the defendant has a distinctive feature, such as dreadlocks, that makes him stand out, even if that feature was not mentioned in the witness’s prior description of the perpetrator.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the suggestiveness of a lineup where the defendant was the only participant with dreadlocks, a distinctive feature. The court held that the lineup was unduly suggestive, regardless of whether the witness mentioned the defendant’s dreadlocks in their initial description to the police. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances must be considered when assessing the suggestiveness of a lineup. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the lower court erred in determining that a lineup was not unduly suggestive just because the witness had not mentioned the distinctive feature in their initial description. This case highlights the importance of conducting fair lineups to avoid suggestive identification procedures that could lead to misidentification.

    Facts

    After being identified as a suspect, the defendant was placed in photo arrays and lineups. In the relevant lineups, the defendant was the only participant with long dreadlocks. Four robbery victims identified the defendant in the lineups. Two of the victims had described the perpetrator as having dreadlocks, while the other two had not. The Supreme Court suppressed the lineup identifications for the two victims who had mentioned dreadlocks and not for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed, focusing on whether the distinctive feature was part of the complainants’ descriptions. All four victims identified the defendant in court, but the defendant was acquitted of the robbery counts with respect to two of the victims and convicted of the counts with respect to the others.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the lineup identifications for two victims but denied it for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a lineup is unduly suggestive when the defendant possesses a distinctive feature, even if the witness did not mention that feature in their prior description of the perpetrator?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a lineup’s suggestiveness should be determined by considering all circumstances to determine whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a bright-line rule that a distinctive feature only renders a lineup unduly suggestive if it was mentioned in the witness’s prior description would be unworkable and unwise. Instead, the court emphasized that the focus should be on whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The court found the lineup was unduly suggestive as the defendant was the only person with long dreadlocks. The court referenced its prior decision in People v. Chipp, stating that it must consider all circumstances to determine suggestiveness. The court held that there was no record support for the lower courts’ conclusion. The court held that, as a matter of law, a witness’s failure to mention a distinctive feature in his or her initial description is not necessarily the determinative factor in assessing a lineup’s suggestivity. The Court reversed the Appellate Division, ordered that both lineups should have been suppressed, and remanded to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the standard for determining the suggestiveness of a lineup in New York. Law enforcement must be cautious when conducting lineups and ensure that distinctive features do not make the defendant stand out. Prosecutors must be prepared to establish an independent basis for in-court identifications if a lineup is found to be unduly suggestive. Defense attorneys should challenge lineups where the defendant is the only participant with a distinctive feature, regardless of whether the witness mentioned that feature in their initial description. This case emphasizes that a totality of the circumstances test must be applied. Post-Perkins, courts must consider all factors when assessing the reliability of an identification procedure and not rely solely on the witness’s prior description.

  • People v. Canady, People v. Brown, People v. Young, 31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018): Speedy Trial and the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Exception

    31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018)

    When the prosecution declares readiness for trial and later becomes unready, the time between declarations is chargeable against the prosecution under CPL 30.30 unless the unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’ with due diligence by the prosecution.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the application of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30, the speedy trial statute. The court considered how to calculate the time chargeable to the prosecution when it initially declares readiness for trial but later indicates it is not ready. The court held that time is chargeable unless the prosecution’s unreadiness stems from an exceptional fact or circumstance, as defined in the statute, and the prosecution exercised due diligence. The case clarifies the burden of proof and the standard for determining when delays are attributable to the prosecution, and also reinforces the significance of prosecutorial readiness.

    Facts

    The cases involved defendants who moved to dismiss indictments based on violations of CPL 30.30. The prosecutions had initially declared readiness for trial but subsequently indicated they were not ready. The specific facts regarding the reasons for the prosecution’s change in readiness varied across the cases.

    Procedural History

    The cases originated in trial courts, with defendants filing motions to dismiss due to speedy trial violations. The trial courts reached different conclusions on whether to grant the motions. Some cases proceeded to the appellate level, with the Appellate Term reversing or affirming lower court decisions. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases to resolve the legal questions regarding CPL 30.30 and the speedy trial calculations.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the time between the prosecution’s declaration of readiness for trial and a subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.

    2. If the time is chargeable, what standard should courts apply to determine whether the prosecution’s unreadiness is excused due to exceptional circumstances?

    Holding

    1. Yes, the time between the declaration of readiness and the subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution.

    2. The prosecution’s unreadiness is excused if it is due to ‘some exceptional fact or circumstance,’ provided the prosecution exercised due diligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court examined CPL 30.30 and its purpose: to ensure a speedy trial. The court emphasized that the prosecution must be ready for trial. The court referenced earlier cases establishing that a declaration of readiness must reflect present readiness and not merely future expectation. The court referenced CPL 30.30(3)(b), which provides an exception if the present unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’.

    The majority held that, after a declaration of readiness, the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate that the time should be excluded, because their present unreadiness is due to “some exceptional fact or circumstance” and that the prosecution exercised due diligence. The court acknowledged the legislative intent behind CPL 30.30 to reduce delays and ensure the prompt resolution of criminal cases. The court also emphasized the importance of maintaining the burden on the defendant to establish the initial speedy trial violation.

    Dissenting Judge Rivera argued that the majority’s interpretation would undermine the intent of CPL 30.30. The dissenting judge stated that the court should adopt the view that the People must demonstrate that “some exceptional fact or circumstance arose after their declaration of readiness so as to render them presently not ready for trial.”

    Practical Implications

    This ruling requires prosecutors to maintain a good faith readiness for trial. Prosecutors must be prepared to explain why they are not ready if they change their position. This case reinforces that prosecutors must act with diligence to secure evidence or prepare for trial. When evaluating a speedy trial claim, the court must determine the extent of any delay. The decision clarifies that the period between a statement of readiness and a subsequent statement of unreadiness must be charged against the prosecution unless there is a valid justification, such as the exceptional circumstances that were beyond the control of the prosecution.

    This case highlights that the prosecutors must be able to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence and that their unreadiness resulted from an exceptional fact or circumstance. This decision should influence how courts analyze similar cases. It clarifies the burden-shifting framework and emphasizes the importance of prosecutorial accountability in ensuring speedy trials.

  • Stonehill Capital Management, LLC v. Bank of the West, 28 N.Y.3d 439 (2016): Auction Acceptance Creates Binding Contract Despite Contingencies

    Stonehill Capital Management, LLC v. Bank of the West, 28 N.Y.3d 439 (2016)

    In an auction setting, a seller’s acceptance of a bid forms a binding contract, even if the contract is subject to the fulfillment of certain post-agreement conditions, unless the seller explicitly reserves the right to withdraw before a written agreement is executed.

    Summary

    Stonehill Capital Management won an auction to purchase a syndicated loan from Bank of the West (BOTW). BOTW accepted the bid but later refused to proceed, claiming no binding contract existed because a written agreement was not signed, and a deposit was not submitted. The New York Court of Appeals held that a binding contract was formed when BOTW accepted Stonehill’s bid, even though the parties anticipated a future written agreement and deposit. The court found that these were conditions for completing the transaction, not preconditions to the contract’s formation, and BOTW’s acceptance of the bid, combined with the parties’ conduct, demonstrated intent to be bound. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s ruling, reinstating the trial court’s decision in favor of Stonehill for breach of contract.

    Facts

    BOTW, through its agent, Mission Capital Advisors, conducted an online auction for a portfolio of loans, including the Goett Loan. The Offering Memorandum outlined the bid process, stating that acceptance of a bid required execution of a pre-negotiated asset sale agreement and a 10% deposit. Stonehill submitted a bid, and BOTW accepted it. Correspondence confirmed the sale price, loan details, and closing procedures, including wiring instructions for the deposit. Despite this, BOTW later refused to proceed with the sale, claiming no binding agreement, due to the lack of a signed contract and deposit. Stonehill had worked with the agent, and the agent had sent confirmation that the bid was accepted by BOTW.

    Procedural History

    Stonehill sued BOTW for breach of contract in the Supreme Court, which granted Stonehill summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding no valid acceptance occurred. The Court of Appeals granted Stonehill leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether BOTW’s acceptance of Stonehill’s bid created a binding contract, even though a formal written agreement and deposit were not yet provided.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because BOTW’s acceptance of Stonehill’s bid, along with the parties’ communications and conduct, demonstrated their intent to be bound by an agreement to sell the loan, despite the anticipation of a future written agreement and deposit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the general rule that, in auctions, a seller’s acceptance of a bid forms a binding contract unless the bid is contingent on future conduct. The court analyzed the parties’ communications and conduct, emphasizing the Offering Memorandum’s terms, which set the conditions for sale. It focused on the absence of clear language indicating that BOTW could withdraw from the transaction at any time before a formal agreement was signed. The court distinguished between conditions precedent to contract formation and those to performance. The court determined that the signing of a written agreement and the deposit were conditions precedent to performance rather than preconditions for the contract’s formation, and concluded that the “subject to” language used by BOTW did not unequivocally signal an intent not to be bound absent a written contract. Furthermore, the court pointed out that Stonehill had worked through the process to satisfy the post-agreement requirements.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of clear language in auction terms and communications to avoid ambiguity about contract formation. Auctioneers and sellers should explicitly reserve the right to withdraw bids before a formal agreement to ensure no binding agreement arises before the execution of a definitive contract. Legal practitioners should analyze the totality of the parties’ actions and communications to determine their intent. The decision reinforces that simply including terms such as “subject to” in correspondence does not automatically negate the formation of a contract, especially where the context of the auction and the parties’ conduct suggest otherwise. This ruling has practical implications for lenders and loan purchasers as it underscores that acceptance of an offer can create a binding contract and that the terms of the auction are essential to understand the conditions of sale.