New York Law Review

Author: The New York Law Review

  • People v. Cerullo, 18 N.Y.2d 838 (1966): Admissibility of Confessions and the Burden of Proof

    18 N.Y.2d 838 (1966)

    When a defendant’s claim of police brutality is corroborated by evidence of physical injuries sustained while in custody and reasonably attributed to the alleged assaults, and those injuries remain unexplained by the prosecution, the confession obtained is inadmissible as a matter of law.

    Summary

    Cerullo and Moccio were convicted based on confessions they claimed were coerced through police brutality. The central issue was whether the confessions were voluntary, given the defendants’ claims and corroborating evidence of physical injuries. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but a dissenting opinion argued that the prosecution failed to adequately explain the defendants’ injuries, thereby not meeting its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. The dissent emphasized that unexplained, corroborated injuries mandate the inadmissibility of a confession.

    Facts

    Defendants Cerullo and Moccio were arrested and interrogated by police. Both defendants claimed that during interrogation, they were subjected to police brutality. Cerullo presented evidence of contusions on his chest, upper abdomen, and head, with a suspected rib fracture, confirmed by the jail physician. Moccio claimed trauma to his lower abdomen, with the jail physician noting his apparent pain. The prosecution did not provide a direct explanation for the injuries, relying on speculation that the defendants either inflicted the injuries themselves or feigned them.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted at trial, where their confessions were admitted as evidence. They appealed, arguing that the confessions were involuntary due to police brutality. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the convictions. A reargument was held, and the court again affirmed the original judgment. The dissent argued for reversal and a new trial, contending that the People did not meet their burden of proving the confessions voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confessions of Cerullo and Moccio were voluntary, considering their claims of police brutality and the corroborating evidence of physical injuries that remained unexplained by the prosecution.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to adequately explain the injuries sustained by the defendants while in custody, which corroborated their claims of police brutality, thus rendering the confessions inadmissible as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting judge argued that the trial court erred in treating the issue of voluntariness as a mere question of fact. Citing People v. Barbato, the dissent emphasized that if a finding of voluntariness would be “clearly against the weight of evidence,” the confession should be deemed inadmissible as a matter of law. The dissent pointed to the “increasingly meticulous” test of voluntariness established by the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly in light of cases like Miranda v. Arizona, which places a heavy burden on the state to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. The dissent drew from People v. Barbato and People v. Valletutti, asserting that unexplained injuries, corroborated by medical evidence, invalidate a confession. The People’s speculative explanations were deemed insufficient to counter the evidence of brutality. The dissent stated that “when a defendant’s claim of police brutality is corroborated by evidence of physical injuries obviously suffered while in custody and reasonably ascribable to the claimed assaults and the injuries are unexplained by the People, the confession is inadmissible.” Factors like incommunicado detention, failure to provide Miranda warnings, and prolonged interrogation further undermine the claim of voluntariness, though the evidence of brutality alone was deemed sufficient to warrant reversal.

  • People v. Granello, 18 N.Y.2d 823 (1966): Duty to Inquire When Defendant Seeks to Withdraw Guilty Plea

    People v. Granello, 18 N.Y.2d 823 (1966)

    When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, alleging it was induced by threats or misunderstandings regarding leniency, the trial court must inquire into the truth of those allegations.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into the defendant’s allegations that his guilty plea was induced by threats of a heavier sentence and a misunderstanding about a promise of leniency. Even though the defendant initially stated no promises were made, this statement was not conclusive. The Court of Appeals remitted the case for a hearing to determine the validity of the defendant’s claims, emphasizing the need to investigate potential coercion or misunderstanding in guilty plea agreements.

    Facts

    The defendant, Granello, entered a guilty plea. Prior to sentencing, Granello moved to withdraw his plea. Granello alleged he was induced to plead guilty because of a threat of a heavier sentence. He also claimed to misunderstand a promise of leniency. During the guilty plea, Granello had stated no promises were made regarding his sentence.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Granello’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant appealed this decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remitted the case to the County Court for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first inquiring into the truth of the defendant’s allegations that the plea was induced by threats of a heavier sentence and a misunderstanding about a promise of leniency.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court had a duty to inquire into the validity of the defendant’s claims that his guilty plea was improperly induced before denying his motion to withdraw the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s allegations constituted an error of law. The court relied on precedent establishing that a trial judge must investigate claims of coercion or misunderstanding when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing. The court acknowledged the defendant’s initial statement denying any promises, but stated that such evidence does not conclusively prove no promises were made. The court emphasized the need for a hearing to ascertain the truth of the defendant’s claims. The court cited cases such as People v. Weldon, People v. Russell, People v. Zilliner, and People v. Picciotti to support its holding. The dissent argued there was no abuse of discretion in denying the defendant’s request, especially since the trial judge had interrogated the defendant before accepting the plea, citing People v. Derrick.

  • People ex rel. Dawson v. Smith, 23 N.Y.2d 33 (1968): Proper Venue for Habeas Corpus When Seeking Resentencing

    People ex rel. Dawson v. Smith, 23 N.Y.2d 33 (1968)

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    When a writ of habeas corpus is directed to the warden of a state prison, seeking resentencing rather than outright discharge, it must be made returnable in the county where the prison is located, absent an available judge there.

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    Summary

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    This case concerns the proper venue for a habeas corpus proceeding initiated by a state prison inmate. Dawson, an inmate at Green Haven State Prison in Dutchess County, sought a writ of habeas corpus in New York County, arguing he was not asked at his 1936 sentencing why judgment should not be pronounced. The District Attorney sought to prohibit the New York County Supreme Court from hearing the writ, arguing it should be heard in Dutchess County where Dawson was incarcerated. The Court of Appeals held that under CPLR 7004(c), the writ must be made returnable in the county of detention, regardless of whether the inmate seeks discharge or resentencing, to avoid imposing undue burdens on prison authorities.

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    Facts

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    The relator, Dawson, was serving a 25-to-40-year sentence at Green Haven State Prison in Dutchess County.r
    His conviction stemmed from felony charges in the Supreme Court, New York County, in 1936.r
    Dawson filed a writ of habeas corpus in New York County, alleging that at his original sentencing in 1936, he was not asked why judgment should not be pronounced against him, as required by Section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.r

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    Procedural History

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    Dawson filed the writ in the Supreme Court, New York County.r
    The District Attorney moved to amend the writ to make it returnable in Dutchess County, where the prison was located; this motion was denied.r
    The District Attorney then initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking prohibition to restrain the New York County Supreme Court from holding a hearing on the writ and to prevent the warden from producing Dawson in New York County.r
    The Appellate Division denied the application for prohibition.r
    The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.r

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    Issue(s)

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    Whether, under CPLR 7004(c), a writ of habeas corpus directed to a state prison warden may be made returnable and heard before a Supreme Court Justice in a county other than where the relator is detained when the relator seeks resentencing rather than outright discharge.r
    Whether prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent a court from hearing a habeas corpus writ in an improper venue.r

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    Holding

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    No, because CPLR 7004(c) requires that writs directed to state prison wardens, whether seeking discharge or resentencing, must be made returnable in the county of detention, unless no judge is available there. r
    Yes, because prohibition is the proper remedy when a court threatens to act without or in excess of its power, including exercising jurisdiction in an improper venue.r

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    Court’s Reasoning

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    The court reasoned that CPLR 7004(c) distinguishes between writs concerning inmates of state institutions and other cases. The phrase “A writ to secure the discharge of a person from a state institution” is a generic description of habeas corpus in terms of its function.r
    The legislative intent behind CPLR 7004(c) was to alleviate the administrative, security, and financial burdens on state prison wardens of having to transport inmates to distant counties for habeas corpus hearings. The court stated, “The Legislature has sought to relieve wardens of State prisons from having to comply with writs of habeas corpus by producing inmates out of the county of detention, under guard, and often at great distances and great expense.”r
    Differentiating between

  • Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 324 (1968): Right of Publicity and Fictionalized Biographies

    Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 324 (1968)

    A public figure has a cause of action under New York Civil Rights Law § 51 when a biography of them is substantially fictionalized and exploited for commercial purposes.

    Summary

    Warren Spahn, a famous baseball pitcher, sued Julian Messner, Inc., for publishing an unauthorized and fictionalized biography. The trial court found the book contained numerous falsehoods, distortions, and fanciful passages, exploiting Spahn’s personality for trade purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while public figures are subject to publicity, they are protected from fictionalized accounts of their lives published for commercial gain. The Court distinguished this case from libel actions involving public officials, finding no constitutional barrier to preventing the commercial exploitation of a fictionalized biography.

    Facts

    Warren Spahn was a well-known professional baseball player. Julian Messner, Inc., published a biography of Spahn without his authorization. The biography contained numerous embellishments, invented dialogue, and factual inaccuracies about Spahn’s childhood, war record, and personal life. The book was commercially successful.

    Procedural History

    Spahn sued Julian Messner, Inc., under New York Civil Rights Law § 51, seeking an injunction and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Spahn, finding the biography was substantially false and for commercial purposes. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the publication of a fictionalized biography of a public figure constitutes a violation of New York Civil Rights Law § 51, which prohibits the use of a person’s name or picture for advertising or trade purposes without written consent.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendants’ publication of a fictitious biography of the plaintiff constitutes an unauthorized exploitation of his personality for purposes of trade and that it is proscribed by section 51 of the Civil Rights Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while public figures are newsworthy and their factual biographies generally fall outside the protection of the Civil Rights Law, the publication of a substantially fictionalized biography for commercial gain is not protected. The Court distinguished this case from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which involved libel actions by public officials. The Court emphasized that the First Amendment protections afforded to speech concerning public issues and officials do not extend to the commercial exploitation of a person’s fictionalized life story. The court noted the trial court’s finding of “dramatization, imagined dialogue, manipulated chronologies, and fictionalization of events”. It quoted the trial judge: “the record unequivocally establishes that the book publicizes areas of Warren Spahn’s personal and private life, albeit inaccurate and distorted, and consists of a host, a preponderant percentage, of factual errors, distortions and fanciful passages”. The Court concluded that no public interest is served by protecting the dissemination of a fictitious biography. The Court explicitly stated that the plaintiff “seeks only to restrain the publication of that which purports to be his biography.”

  • People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175 (1969): Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Statements for Impeachment

    People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175 (1969)

    An illegally obtained statement, inadmissible as evidence in the prosecution’s direct case, may be admissible to impeach a defendant’s credibility if the defendant testifies in their own defense and the statement contradicts that testimony.

    Summary

    Harris was convicted of manslaughter. Prior to arrest, he made incriminating statements to police during a general inquiry. After arrest, he requested a lawyer, but police took a statement before counsel arrived. This statement was not used in the prosecution’s direct case but was used to impeach Harris’s credibility when he testified. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the statement was inadmissible in the direct case due to the violation of Harris’s right to counsel, it was permissible to impeach his credibility because a defendant cannot use illegally obtained evidence as a shield against contradiction of their untruths.

    Facts

    1. The victim’s body was found in a house.
    2. Police conducted a general inquiry, asking residents about facts related to the crime.
    3. Before arrest, Harris made admissions and displayed physical evidence in his apartment that linked him to the crime.
    4. After arrest, Harris requested an attorney.
    5. Before Harris’s attorney arrived, an assistant district attorney took a statement from him.
    6. This statement was not used in the prosecution’s direct case.
    7. Harris testified in his own defense.
    8. The prosecution used the statement to impeach Harris’s credibility after he testified inconsistently with it.

    Procedural History

    1. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree.
    2. Defendant appealed the conviction, arguing the statement taken after he requested counsel was improperly admitted.
    3. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a statement obtained in violation of a defendant’s right to counsel, and therefore inadmissible in the prosecution’s direct case, is admissible to impeach the defendant’s credibility when the defendant testifies in their own defense.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant cannot use the illegality of how the government obtained evidence to provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while illegally obtained evidence cannot be used to secure a conviction in the prosecution’s direct case, it can be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility if the defendant takes the stand and testifies inconsistently with the prior statement. The court relied on Walder v. United States, quoting Justice Frankfurter, stating the prosecution cannot “use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction” but “ [i]t is quite another [thing] to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the G-overnment’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine [Weeks v. United States] would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.” The court distinguished between using illegally obtained evidence to prove guilt and using it to prevent the defendant from committing perjury. By taking the stand, the defendant puts his credibility at issue, and the prosecution is entitled to challenge that credibility with otherwise inadmissible evidence. The court emphasized that allowing a defendant to benefit from the illegality by presenting a false narrative would distort the principles of the Fourth Amendment and create an unfair advantage.

  • People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 342 (1966): Retroactive Application of Miranda Rights

    People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 342 (1966)

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona does not apply retroactively to trials that commenced before the Miranda decision was announced, unless the issue of voluntariness of the confession is properly raised.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona should be applied retroactively to a trial that commenced before the Miranda ruling. McQueen was convicted of murder in 1964, and on appeal, she argued that her pre-arraignment confessions should have been excluded because she was not given Miranda warnings. The court held that Miranda did not apply retroactively to trials commenced before the Miranda decision, unless the issue of the voluntariness of the confession was raised at trial. Since McQueen did not properly raise the issue of voluntariness, her conviction was affirmed.

    Facts

    Following an altercation at a bar, McQueen stabbed the victim outside the bar. The incident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on November 20, 1960. The victim’s body was discovered shortly after. McQueen resided near the bar. Upon returning to her apartment, McQueen told a roommate that she had committed the homicide. The following morning she told her daughter that she had “cut a man” because he kicked her. McQueen was taken to the police station about three hours after the discovery of the body. Within minutes, she confessed to the crime. She then accompanied the police to her apartment and showed them the knife she used. She re-enacted the crime at the scene of the homicide.

    Procedural History

    McQueen was tried and convicted of second-degree murder in a trial that commenced on November 9, 1964. She appealed, arguing that her pre-arraignment confessions and re-enactment of the crime should have been excluded because she was not given Miranda warnings. The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction. McQueen then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, which requires that suspects be informed of their rights before custodial interrogation, applies retroactively to trials that commenced before the Miranda decision was announced.

    Holding

    No, because the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey held that the Miranda decision applies only to trials that began after the date of the Miranda decision, June 13, 1966, unless the issue of voluntariness of the confession was properly raised at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey determined that Miranda should only apply to trials that began after the decision was announced. The court acknowledged that state courts could apply a greater measure of retroactivity than the Supreme Court required. However, the court declined to do so in this case, noting that law enforcement agencies had fairly relied on prior decisions in obtaining incriminating statements before Escobedo and Miranda. The court stated: “these decisions should apply only to trials begun after the decisions were announced * * * even though the cases may still be on direct appeal” (384 U. S. 732-733). The Court noted that the defense counsel did not object to the admission of the confessions on the grounds that they were involuntarily made. The Court noted that the motions to suppress the statements were based on the Escobedo decision and on failure to give warnings afterwards held necessary in Miranda. The court found there was no indication of involuntariness in McQueen’s confession. Although a detective told McQueen she might as well admit what she did, mere deception is not enough to render a confession involuntary. The court noted that McQueen’s intoxication and mental state were considered by the jury as bearing upon the truth of her statements, but not the voluntariness, which was not at issue. Therefore, the court held that Miranda did not apply retroactively in this case, and affirmed McQueen’s conviction.

  • Matter of Schaefer, 18 N.Y.2d 314 (1966): Effect of Release in Surrogate’s Decree on After-Acquired Assets

    Matter of Schaefer, 18 N.Y.2d 314 (1966)

    A release contained in a Surrogate’s Court decree, which explicitly states that it is in full satisfaction of a claim representing the decedent’s liability, releases the estate from all liability on that claim, precluding the creditor from asserting further claims against after-acquired assets of the estate.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a bank’s acceptance of assets from an estate, as stipulated in a Surrogate’s Court decree, acted as a full release of the estate’s liability on a promissory note, or merely a release of claims against the specific assets listed in the accounting. The Court of Appeals held that the decree’s language, indicating “full satisfaction” of the claim representing the decedent’s liability, constituted a complete release. Consequently, the bank was estopped from claiming additional funds from the estate that became available later. This decision highlights the importance of clear and unambiguous language in releases and the conclusive nature of Surrogate’s Court decrees.

    Facts

    In 1932, Federal Concrete Co. executed a promissory note to Liberty National Bank, endorsed by Walter Jones, Philip Schaefer, and two others. Schaefer died shortly after, and a claim was filed against his estate for the unpaid note. The estate made payments on the note for many years. A decree in 1960 awarded the remaining estate assets to the bank

  • In re Estate of Hollister, 18 N.Y.2d 281 (1966): Separation Agreement as Will Revocation

    In re Estate of Hollister, 18 N.Y.2d 281 (1966)

    A separation agreement in which spouses waive rights to each other’s estates can operate as a revocation of a prior will’s provisions if the agreement’s terms are wholly inconsistent with the will’s terms.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a separation agreement, incorporated into a subsequent Alabama divorce decree, revoked a prior will that bequeathed the entire estate to the now ex-husband. The court held that the separation agreement, wherein both parties waived rights to each other’s estates, effectively revoked the will’s provisions benefiting the husband. The court reasoned that the agreement’s terms were wholly inconsistent with the prior testamentary gifts, thus triggering a revocation under New York law. This decision clarifies how separation agreements interact with existing wills and highlights the importance of updating estate plans after separation or divorce.

    Facts

    The testatrix executed a will in 1945, leaving her entire estate to her husband. In 1954, the testatrix and her husband entered into a separation agreement, waiving rights to each other’s estates. The separation agreement included a specific waiver by the husband of any right to take against her will. In 1955, the testatrix obtained an Alabama divorce, with the divorce decree incorporating the separation agreement. The testatrix died in 1962 without creating a new will.

    Procedural History

    The husband offered the 1945 will for probate. The testatrix’s mother challenged the husband’s status and sought to construe the will in light of the separation agreement, cross-petitioning for letters c.t.a. The mother moved for summary judgment. The Surrogate Court held that the separation agreement revoked the bequest and devise to the husband, and revoked his appointment as executor. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a separation agreement, where spouses waive rights to each other’s estates, operates as a revocation of a prior will’s provisions that benefited the other spouse, under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the separation agreement’s terms were wholly inconsistent with the testamentary gifts to the husband, thus resulting in a revocation under New York law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, relying on New York law, specifically Section 40 of the Decedent Estate Law (now EPTL 5-1.4), and case law such as Titus v. Bassi, 182 App. Div. 387 (1918). The court clarified that while Section 34 of the Decedent Estate Law (now EPTL 3-4.1) prescribes specific methods for revoking wills, Section 40 modifies Section 34 to the extent that bequests are revoked by provisions in a separation agreement when those provisions

  • Raymond Corp. v. State, 14 N.Y.2d 303 (1964): Recovery for Change of Street Grade Despite Alternate Access

    Raymond Corp. v. State, 14 N.Y.2d 303 (1964)

    An abutting landowner can recover damages for a change in street grade under a statute authorizing such payment, even if the property retains suitable access via another street.

    Summary

    Raymond Corp. sought damages from the State for a change in the grade of Chicago Street in Buffalo. The State lowered the street to its original grade after demolishing a viaduct that had provided access to the second story of Raymond’s warehouse. The State argued that because the property retained access via Scott Street, no damages were owed. The Court of Appeals held that the existence of alternate access does not preclude recovery for damages caused by a change in grade when a statute authorizes such payment. The Court distinguished cases involving street closures, where alternate access may bar recovery, and emphasized that statutes providing for change-of-grade damages reflect a policy decision to compensate landowners for actual losses sustained.

    Facts

    Raymond Corp. owned a warehouse at the intersection of Chicago and Scott Streets in Buffalo. Chicago Street’s level had been raised by a viaduct, level with the warehouse’s second story, providing access via an aerial ramp. The State demolished the viaduct as part of Thruway construction, lowering Chicago Street to its original grade, which afforded access only to the warehouse’s first floor. Before the viaduct removal, the only truck access to the second floor was via doors on Chicago Street. Post-removal, the only means to transport goods to the second floor was a single elevator, substantially impairing the second floor’s utility for warehousing.

    Procedural History

    Raymond Corp. filed a claim against the State in the Court of Claims, which dismissed the claim. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the claimant had suffered damages. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a property owner, whose property abuts intersecting streets, can recover damages for a change of grade to one street when access to the property remains via the other street, under a statute directing payment of damages for such grade changes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the common-law rule precluding recovery when suitable access remains via another street does not apply to changes of grade where a statute authorizes payment of damages. The statute prevents the preclusion of damages from change of grade by the common-law rule.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from those involving street closures, where alternate access might preclude recovery. The Court emphasized that, at common law, there was no liability for damages due to a change of grade (“Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27”). However, many statutes have been enacted providing for damages for change of grade due to perceived injustice of the common-law rule. The Court analyzed several cases where awards were upheld despite alternate access, including Matter of Grade Crossing Comrs. of City of Buffalo (Michigan St.), 154 N.Y. 550, where the grade of Michigan Street was changed but access remained at the same grade via Exchange Street, and the award was affirmed. The court stated that it disagreed with the dissent in Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State of New York, 16 Y 2d 1005, stating that Baldwin-Hall was about entirely preventing access to one street, and that the majority decided that “Such damage as claimant suffered was due to circuity of access and as held in Selig there is no provision in law for recovery thereof.” The Court found that “the legally authorized street elevation based upon the actual grading work performed by city authorities is the established grade” (Lawrence Constr. Corp. v. State of New York, 293 N. Y. 634) and that this technical oversight of the City Engineer could hardly be held to exonerate the city or the State for payment of damages to the abutting property owner.

  • People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966): Availability of Habeas Corpus for Constitutional Violations

    People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966)

    Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test a claim that a relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution.

    Summary

    Keitt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his imprisonment was illegal because the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior conviction before the jury, violating his due process rights and privilege against self-incrimination. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy. The court held that habeas corpus is available to test claims of imprisonment following deprivation of fundamental constitutional or statutory rights. However, the court affirmed the denial of the writ on the merits, finding that Keitt had not been deprived of any constitutional right due to his own conduct at trial.

    Facts

    Keitt was indicted for robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of Keitt’s prior conviction for attempted robbery after Keitt stood mute on the matter. This was done pursuant to Section 275-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Keitt’s counsel objected. Keitt had previously stated he would testify in his defense, and he later did, admitting the prior conviction and other crimes. Keitt appealed his conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. His petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was also denied.

    Procedural History

    Keitt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court, Clinton County. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. Keitt appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test a claim that the introduction of certain evidence violated both due process and the privilege against self-incrimination, thereby depriving the relator of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right.

    Holding

    Yes, because habeas corpus is an appropriate proceeding to test a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged a subtle shift from its narrow view of habeas corpus relief, which traditionally required only that the convicting court have jurisdiction over the person, the crime, and the power to impose the sentence. Citing precedent such as People ex rel. Colan v. La Vallee, the court recognized that the use of “jurisdiction” and “void judgments” in prior cases was more about historical respect for habeas corpus than a true limitation on its scope.

    The court clarified that habeas corpus is available when a prisoner claims a deprivation of a substantial constitutional right on the face of the record. However, the court cautioned that habeas corpus is not the only or preferred means of vindicating such rights, and it is not a substitute for appeal to review mere trial errors. Departure from traditional appellate processes should only occur when dictated by practicality and necessity.

    Regarding the merits of Keitt’s claim, the court found that in view of Keitt’s conduct at trial, specifically his initial silence followed by his decision to testify and admit to the prior conviction, he had not been deprived of any constitutional right. The court recognized the flexibility of the writ, noting that the legislature did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available.

    Judge Van Voorhis concurred, arguing the relator was not aggrieved without reaching the constitutional questions.