People v. Bishop, 16 N.Y.2d 523 (1965)
A defendant who successfully vacates a prior conviction, which formed the basis for a subsequent felony charge, is not placed in double jeopardy when the vacated conviction is later reinstated and the defendant is re-indicted on the felony charge.
Summary
Bishop was initially convicted in 1937. Based on this conviction, he was later indicted in 1960 for a felony. Bishop successfully vacated the 1937 conviction, eliminating the basis for the 1960 felony charge. Consequently, the trial judge dismissed the felony charge. However, the order vacating the 1937 conviction was later reversed, reinstating the original conviction. Bishop argued that a subsequent indictment for the same felony constituted double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Bishop himself had the initial conviction vacated, and it was later reinstated, prosecuting him on a superseding indictment did not violate double jeopardy principles.
Facts
1. In 1937, Bishop was convicted of a crime.
2. In 1960, he was indicted for carnal abuse as a felony, the felony charge predicated on the 1937 conviction.
3. Bishop successfully sought and obtained an order vacating the 1937 judgment of conviction.
4. Due to the vacated 1937 conviction, the trial court dismissed the felony charge against Bishop.
5. The appellate division reversed the vacatur of the 1937 conviction, thereby reinstating the original conviction.
6. Trials on the 1960 indictment resulted in disagreement and mistrials.
Procedural History
1. 1937: Bishop convicted.
2. 1960: Bishop indicted for carnal abuse as a felony based on the 1937 conviction.
3. Trial court: Vacated the 1937 conviction; dismissed the 1960 felony charge.
4. Appellate Division: Reversed the order vacating the 1937 conviction; reinstated the conviction (People v. Bishop, 14 A D 2d 376, affd. 11 Y 2d 854).
5. The People sought to proceed against Bishop on a superseding indictment.
Issue(s)
Whether prosecuting Bishop on a superseding indictment charging him with carnal abuse as a felony, after he successfully vacated the prior conviction upon which the felony charge was based, but which was later reinstated, constitutes double jeopardy.
Holding
No, because Bishop was never placed in jeopardy of conviction for the crime of carnal abuse as a felony due to his successful vacatur of the predicate conviction, and the reinstatement of that conviction allows the People to proceed on the superseding indictment without violating double jeopardy principles.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that when Bishop successfully vacated the 1937 judgment of conviction, he eliminated any danger of being convicted of the felony based on that conviction. The court stated, “In other words, by procuring the vacatur of the earlier judgment, the respondent rendered his conviction of the felony impossible as a matter of law.” The trial judge’s dismissal of the felony charge merely reflected this situation, it was not a dismissal on the merits. When the order vacating the 1937 judgment was reversed and the conviction reinstated, the People were then free to proceed against Bishop on a superseding indictment. The court emphasized that the crucial factor was that Bishop, by his own action, created the situation where the felony charge was initially unsustainable. Therefore, the subsequent prosecution did not constitute double jeopardy. The court’s decision rested on the principle that a defendant should not be able to benefit from an error he himself induced.