New York Law Review

People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167 (1965): Improper Judicial Comment on Defendant’s Failure to Testify

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People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167 (1965)

A trial court’s unsolicited remarks drawing attention to a defendant’s failure to testify, even when coupled with a later instruction that no unfavorable inference should be drawn, constitutes reversible error because it violates the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.

Summary

McLucas was convicted of burglary in the third degree. During the trial, a police officer testified about arresting McLucas and a conversation where McLucas denied the crime but admitted to avoiding home because he knew the police were looking for him. During jury instructions, the judge emphasized that McLucas’s out-of-court denial did not substitute for sworn testimony, improperly highlighting his failure to testify. Despite later instructing the jury not to draw negative inferences from McLucas’s silence, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the initial remarks violated McLucas’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, and no formal exception was needed to preserve the issue for appeal.

Facts

  • McLucas was arrested approximately five months after an alleged burglary.
  • A police officer testified that McLucas admitted he knew the police were looking for him and that he had been staying in New Jersey and Connecticut.
  • McLucas denied committing the burglary during the same conversation.

Procedural History

  • McLucas was convicted of burglary in the third degree.
  • The conviction was unanimously affirmed without opinion by a lower court.
  • The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

Issue(s)

  • Whether a trial court’s comments during jury instructions, highlighting a defendant’s failure to testify, violate the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination, even if the court later instructs the jury not to draw negative inferences from the defendant’s silence.
  • Whether the failure to expressly note an exception to the charge, as required by Section 420-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, precludes appellate review of a constitutional violation.

Holding

  • Yes, because the court’s remarks improperly drew attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, thereby violating his Fifth Amendment rights as applied to the states.
  • No, because a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right is reviewable on appeal, even in the absence of an explicit exception to the charge.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the trial judge’s repeated emphasis on the fact that the defendant’s out-of-court statement was not “sworn testimony from this witness chair” directly and improperly highlighted the defendant’s failure to testify. This violated the defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination. The court cited prior cases like People v. Minkowitz, People v. Leavitt, and People v. Hetenyi, which established that any statement from a trial judge that undermines the protection afforded by the statute regarding a defendant’s choice not to testify constitutes reversible error. The court emphasized, “In the trial of a criminal case it can never be necessary to add anything to the plain and simple language of the statute.” The later corrective instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudice created by the initial improper remarks. Furthermore, the court relied on Malloy v. Hogan, which extended the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment, and held that the absence of a formal exception did not preclude appellate review of a fundamental constitutional violation. The dissent is not mentioned because it did not provide substantive reasoning.

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