Matter of Martin v. County Court of Ulster County, 1 N.Y.2d 585 (1956)
Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when a public official acts clearly beyond their jurisdiction, and is not typically granted if the defense of double jeopardy can be raised during trial.
Summary
Martin sought prohibition to prevent his trial on a charge of violating Penal Law § 1053-a, arguing it would constitute double jeopardy after his acquittal on charges under the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition was inappropriate because it is an extreme remedy reserved for cases where an official acts unquestionably beyond jurisdiction. The court reasoned that since a conviction under Penal Law § 1053-a is possible without proving Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, the defense of double jeopardy could be raised at trial if the prosecution relies on the same acts. Thus, prohibition was not warranted.
Facts
Martin was involved in an incident leading to charges under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, for which he was acquitted.
Subsequently, he was indicted under Penal Law § 1053-a, related to the same incident.
Martin then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial on the Penal Law charge, arguing it would constitute double jeopardy.
Procedural History
Martin applied for a writ of prohibition to the County Court of Ulster County to prevent the trial under Penal Law § 1053-a.
The lower court denied the writ.
Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.
Issue(s)
Whether prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a trial where the defendant claims it would constitute double jeopardy.
Holding
No, because prohibition is an extreme remedy reserved for instances where a public official is acting clearly and unquestionably beyond their jurisdiction, and the defense of double jeopardy can be raised during the trial itself.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy reserved for situations where a public official is acting clearly and unquestionably beyond their jurisdiction. The court emphasized the restrictive nature of prohibition, stating it’s “reserved to those situations where a public official is to be restrained from the performance of an act which is clearly and unquestionably beyond his jurisdiction”.
The court noted that a conviction under Penal Law § 1053-a could be obtained without necessarily proving a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, citing People v. Decina, 2 Y 2d 133 and People v. Eckert, 2 Y 2d 126.
The court acknowledged Martin’s right to raise the defense of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel during the trial. If the prosecution relies on the same inseparable acts used in the prior Vehicle and Traffic Law prosecution, double jeopardy would apply, citing People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 Y 2d 259, 264.
Judge Burke, concurring, emphasized that prohibition should only be granted in cases of “extreme necessity.” He stated that the test for double jeopardy is whether the defendant committed inseparable acts punishable by multiple statutes, or separate and distinct acts violating different laws. The court highlights that “in view of the fundamental character of the rule that a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause and the deep roots it throws into the history of the criminal law” (People v. Lo Cicero, 14 Y 2d 374, 378), the indictment must fall if the acts are the same.