People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392 (1965): Duty to Inform Defendant of Right to Assigned Counsel

People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392 (1965)

In courts of special sessions, defendants must be informed of their right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford an attorney; a mere statement of the right to counsel and an offer to send a message to an attorney the defendant names is insufficient.

Summary

Three underage defendants were arrested for stealing apples and brought before a Justice of the Peace without legal representation. After being informed of their right to counsel but not of the possibility of assigned counsel if they could not afford one, they pleaded guilty and were sentenced to imprisonment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants did not effectively waive their right to counsel because they were not informed of their right to assigned counsel. The court emphasized that merely informing defendants of their right to counsel and offering to contact an attorney they name does not constitute a sufficient waiver, especially for indigent defendants. This case highlights the necessity of ensuring that defendants understand their right to assigned counsel, especially in minor criminal cases.

Facts

Three defendants, all under 21, were caught stealing apples from an orchard around 10:30 p.m.
The orchard owner filed an information stating the stolen apples were worth about $2.
Shortly after midnight, the defendants were brought before a Justice of the Peace.
None of the defendants were represented by an attorney.
They pleaded guilty after a brief proceeding.
None of them had prior convictions.
Each was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment and a $25 fine, resulting in 55 days imprisonment due to inability to pay the fine.

Procedural History

The defendants were initially convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court.
They appealed to the County Court, arguing they were deprived of their right to counsel.
The County Court rejected their arguments except for the excessiveness of the sentence.
The County Court modified the judgments, reducing the imprisonment to time already served (about 7 days).
The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the defendants, in the proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, were deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to counsel, particularly given the lack of explicit information about their right to assigned counsel if indigent.

Holding

Yes, because the court failed to adequately inform the defendants of their right to assigned counsel if they could not afford an attorney, rendering their waiver of counsel ineffective. The court’s statement about the right to counsel and sending a message to a lawyer they name did not adequately inform them of the possibility of court-assigned counsel.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized the fundamental right to counsel, particularly for indigent defendants, referencing Gideon v. Wainwright. It stated that simply informing a defendant of their right to counsel and offering to send a message to an attorney they name does not constitute an effective waiver, especially for young, inexperienced defendants. The court highlighted that the Justice of the Peace did not inform the defendants that the court would assign an attorney if they could not afford one. The court cited People v. Marincic, emphasizing that the opportunity to have counsel must be real and reasonable, not a mere “formulistic recital of ‘law language.’” The court also noted the historical basis for the right to assigned counsel in New York, even before statutory codification. The court approved of the ruling in People v. Brantle, which emphasized that the proffer of aid of counsel “should be made in clear and unequivocal terms.” The court rejected the argument that the applicable statute for Courts of Special Sessions (Code Crim. Pro., § 699) does not require informing a defendant of the right to assigned counsel, stating that there is little real difference between § 699 and § 308 (which explicitly requires asking about and assigning counsel on indictment). The court dismissed concerns about the impracticality of assigning counsel in Special Sessions Courts, noting the large number of attorneys in the state. The decision underscored that a waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, which requires informing defendants of their right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford one. The court reasoned that without informing defendants of the right to assigned counsel, any waiver is likely not intelligent, especially when dealing with young, unexperienced defendants in a stressful situation.