People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 238 (1967)

An indigent criminal defendant seeking post-conviction relief via habeas corpus is entitled to appointed counsel if their petition suggests a possible basis on the merits and isn’t repetitious or specious.

Summary

Rogers, serving consecutive prison terms, sought habeas corpus relief, alleging an illegal search and inadequate preliminary hearing advice. He requested counsel at the habeas corpus hearing, but was denied because the proceeding was deemed civil. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the civil nature of habeas corpus is not determinative. If a defendant’s petition suggests a meritorious basis for relief and isn’t repetitious, the court should exercise its discretion to appoint counsel. The court emphasized fairness and the need for legal assistance in potentially valid post-conviction challenges.

Facts

The relator, Rogers, was incarcerated, serving two consecutive prison terms. Rogers had been convicted in Westchester County Court after pleading guilty to two counts of attempted grand larceny in the second degree in 1962.
In November 1964, Rogers filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition was based on claims of an illegal search due to a search warrant lacking probable cause, a failure to advise him of additional charges at the preliminary hearing, and denial of a proper hearing.

Procedural History

Rogers petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. At the habeas corpus hearing, Rogers’ request for counsel was denied. The trial court dismissed the writ. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an indigent relator in a habeas corpus proceeding to test a criminal detention is entitled to counsel at the hearing if they request it and the court deems it appropriate.
2. Whether the civil nature of habeas corpus proceedings is a sufficient basis to deny counsel to indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief.

Holding

1. Yes, because in a proper case, where a defendant’s papers suggest a possible basis on the merits, and the petition is not repetitious or specious, the hearing court should exercise sound discretion to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, especially upon request.
2. No, because the nature and content of the relief sought and the basis of the error or defect charged should be determinative, not the procedural form of the proceeding.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the formalistic distinction between civil and criminal proceedings should not determine the right to counsel. The court highlighted that post-conviction relief sought through habeas corpus aims to correct errors in criminal proceedings, warranting representation for indigent defendants. Citing People v. Monahan, the court extended the principle of appointed counsel in coram nobis proceedings to habeas corpus when similar post-conviction relief is sought. The court stated, “The nature and content of the relief sought and the basis of the error or defect charged should be determinative, and not the procedural or historical form of the proceeding utilized.”

The court clarified that not all habeas corpus petitions necessitate appointed counsel, particularly baseless or repetitious ones. However, when a defendant’s petition suggests a meritorious basis, even if imperfectly presented due to lack of legal advice, and the petition is not merely a rehash of previously litigated or specious issues, the court should consider appointing counsel. The court also emphasized the historical power of courts in New York to assign counsel to indigent criminal defendants, citing People v. Price.

The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the case to the County Court for a new hearing. The County Court was instructed to exercise its discretion regarding the assignment of counsel to assist Rogers. The court referenced cases from other jurisdictions, noting, “Counsel may, and in a proper case should be appointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant in a habeas proceeding where there is at least a prima facie showing for a need for legal counsel, with the benefit of every reasonable doubt granted to the criminal defendant.”