20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967)
When a jury is instructed that it can only return one verdict in a case involving both premeditated and felony murder, its silence on the felony murder theory does not constitute an acquittal, and retrial on that theory after a successful appeal does not violate double jeopardy.
Summary
Nathan Jackson was retried and convicted of felony murder after his initial conviction for common-law murder was overturned by the Supreme Court due to a coerced confession. On appeal, Jackson argued that the retrial for felony murder violated double jeopardy, and the trial court erred in its instructions regarding the termination of the underlying felony, along with issues relating to the sentencing hearing and the use of a special jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the original jury’s silence on the felony murder count, coupled with instructions to return only one verdict, did not constitute an acquittal. Thus, retrial on the felony murder charge was permissible.
Facts
Jackson robbed a hotel clerk at gunpoint, taking $56.50. He then escorted the clerk and several guests to a third-floor room, warning them not to follow him. As Jackson exited the hotel, Patrolman Ramos confronted him. A scuffle ensued, and Jackson shot and killed Ramos.
Procedural History
Jackson was initially convicted of first-degree murder. This conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to a coerced confession (Jackson v. Denno). On retrial, Jackson was convicted of felony murder. He appealed, arguing double jeopardy and other errors. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the second conviction.
Issue(s)
1. Whether Jackson’s retrial and conviction for felony murder violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
2. Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in rulings and instructions to the jury concerning when the underlying felony had terminated.
3. Whether the trial judge committed substantial error in the “second stage” penalty hearing by denying defendant the protection against involuntary confessions guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Whether Jackson’s trial before a special jury violated his rights under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding
1. No, because the jury in the first trial was instructed to render only one verdict, their silence on felony murder did not constitute an acquittal.
2. No, because although the instruction was incomplete, the evidence of guilt was so convincing that any error was harmless.
3. No, because the defendant did not properly object and show that the confession used during sentencing was coerced.
4. No, because the use of special juries had been previously upheld as constitutional.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that double jeopardy only applies when a defendant is retried for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction. Here, the jury in the first trial was instructed to return only one verdict, making it impossible to determine whether they had considered and rejected the felony murder charge. The court distinguished this case from those involving retrials on higher degrees of a crime after a successful appeal from a conviction on a lesser degree, where a “grisly choice” is imposed on the defendant’s right to appeal.
Regarding the jury instruction on the termination of a felony, the court acknowledged that the trial judge’s response was uninformative. However, they concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence strongly suggested that the robbery and the shooting were closely connected in time and place, making it highly unlikely that the jury would have found the felony had terminated even with proper instruction.
As to the introduction of confessions during the sentencing phase, the court held that the defendant was required to object to the confession’s use by demonstrating it was involuntary. Since he had only objected based on the lack of a Huntley hearing, he did not properly preserve the issue for appeal. Finally, the court dismissed the challenge to the special jury based on established precedent upholding their constitutionality, citing Fay v. New York.