Drogheo v. Drogheo, 22 N.Y.2d 182 (1968)
The New York State Legislature has the constitutional authority to confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court to enforce and modify alimony and support provisions of foreign divorce decrees, as this constitutes a new class of action or proceeding within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7, of the New York Constitution.
Summary
Evelyn Drogheo sought to enforce the support provisions of a Mexican divorce decree against her former husband, Joseph Drogheo, in New York Family Court. The Family Court granted her petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce or modify foreign divorce decrees. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the legislature had the authority to grant such jurisdiction to the Family Court because enforcing or modifying foreign divorce decrees constituted a new class of action, not previously recognized at common law.
Facts
Evelyn and Joseph Drogheo entered into a separation agreement in October 1964, which was incorporated into their subsequent Mexican divorce decree. The agreement stipulated that Joseph would pay Evelyn $23 per week for support.
By May 25, 1966, Joseph was $376 in arrears on these payments.
Evelyn petitioned the Family Court to enforce the support provision of the Mexican decree, pursuant to Section 466(c) of the Family Court Act.
Procedural History
The Family Court denied Joseph’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and his cross-application for downward modification of the support provision; the Family Court granted Evelyn’s petition, determining Joseph to be $445 in arrears and ordering him to pay $23 weekly plus $5 weekly on the arrears (June 16, 1966).
Another Family Court order fixed total arrears at $652 and required Joseph to post a $250 cash bond or serve 30 days in the workhouse; payments were to be held by the Support Bureau pending appeal (August 29, 1966).
The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s orders, dismissing Evelyn’s application (date not specified).
The New York Court of Appeals granted Evelyn leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the right to commence a proceeding to enforce or modify the provisions of a foreign divorce decree in New York courts constitutes a new class of action or proceeding within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7, of the New York Constitution, thereby allowing the Legislature to confer jurisdiction to the Family Court.
Holding
Yes, because at common law, New York courts had no jurisdiction over matrimonial matters, and the power of the Supreme Court over such matters is derived solely from statutory grants of authority. The enforcement and modification of foreign decrees, irrespective of the grounds for the divorce, constitutes a new class of action.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the legislature has the power to create new classes of actions and proceedings, concurrent with the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court, absent statutory authorization, would lack jurisdiction.
The Court noted that at common law, New York courts lacked jurisdiction over matrimonial matters, with the Supreme Court’s power in such matters derived solely from statute. Before the enactment of Section 466, New York courts could not enforce or modify foreign matrimonial decrees unless the grounds for the decree were recognized in New York.
The Court emphasized that Section 466(c) empowered the Family Court to enforce and modify foreign decrees regardless of the grounds upon which they were granted.
Because the right to commence such proceedings was not recognized at common law, it could be considered a new class of proceeding, allowing the Legislature to grant jurisdiction to the Family Court.
The court quoted Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166 (1967): “Once the Legislature create[s’] the [new] cause of action, jurisdiction to entertain it automatically vest[s] in the Supreme Court by virtue of article VI of the Constitution.” This means that even if Section 466 did not explicitly grant concurrent jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, such jurisdiction would arise automatically.
Furthermore, the Court stated that judicial policy requires construing legislative enactments to preserve their constitutionality and continuing vitality. Therefore, Section 466 should be interpreted to provide the Supreme Court with concurrent jurisdiction.