Matter of Silberman, 23 N.Y.2d 98 (1968)
In the absence of an explicit expression in a will to exclude adopted children, a presumption arises that the testator intended to include them as beneficiaries, even when the will uses terms like “grandchildren” or establishes a class closing mechanism.
Summary
This case concerns the construction of a will to determine whether adopted children should be included as beneficiaries under two trust provisions. The testatrix, Dorothy Silberman, created trusts benefiting her sons and their children. Her son, Samuel, adopted two sets of children from his wives’ prior marriages. The Surrogate’s Court held that the adopted children were excluded from both trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that absent a clear exclusionary intent in the will, adopted children should be included, according to established New York policy. The Court found no such explicit intent, particularly given the broad “parent-child relationship” language used in the will.
Facts
Dorothy Silberman executed her will in 1950 and died in 1951, survived by two sons and three natural grandchildren. Her will established two trusts: Article Twenty-Sixth, a trust for her son Samuel, with the principal to be divided among his children upon his death, and Article Twenty-Seventh, a trust benefiting her sons’ “lawful children” until the youngest reached 21, at which point the class would close. Samuel had two children, Douglas and Rita Frates, from his first wife’s prior marriage, whom he adopted in 1956. After divorcing his first wife, Samuel remarried and adopted his second wife’s two children, Allen and Jane Herskovitz, in 1965.
Procedural History
The trustees of Dorothy Silberman’s will initially construed the will to benefit only natural grandchildren. Following the precedent set in Matter of Park, a supplemental petition was filed to determine the rights of the adopted children. The Surrogate’s Court, New York County, held that the adopted children were excluded from the trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the adopted children of Samuel J. Silberman are entitled to share in the principal and income of the trusts created under Articles Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh of Dorothy Silberman’s will, considering the will’s language and New York’s public policy regarding adopted children.
Holding
1. Yes, because, absent an explicit purpose stated in the will to exclude adopted children, they are presumed to be included as beneficiaries, as per the established New York policy.
2. No, the Herskovits children could not benefit under Article Twenty-Seventh because they were adopted after the class of beneficiaries had closed.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decision in Matter of Park, which established a strong presumption in favor of including adopted children in testamentary gifts unless the will contains an explicit expression to the contrary. The Court rejected the Surrogate’s reasoning that the use of the term “grandchildren” in Article Twenty-Seventh, combined with the provision for closing the class of beneficiaries when the youngest grandchild reached 21, demonstrated an intent to exclude adopted children.
The court reasoned that the term “lawful children” also appeared and would encompass adopted children. Furthermore, the Court noted that the presumption in Park applied regardless of whether the will used the word “heir,” “child,” “issue,” or any other generic term expressing the parent-child relationship. The court directly quoted Park, emphasizing that “[i]n the absence of an explicit purpose stated in the will or a trust instrument to exclude such a child, he must be deemed included.”
The Court dismissed the argument that the class-closing provision evidenced an intent to exclude adopted children, stating that “the possibility of an inequity, especially one so remote…should not cause such provision to be read as an expression of an explicit purpose to exclude adopted children from such class.”
The court also held that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible because there was no ambiguity within the four corners of the will. The court distinguished Matter of Ricks, where extrinsic evidence was admitted to explain an ambiguity created by alterations on the face of the will itself.
Finally, the Court held that the Herskovits children, who were adopted after the class closed under Article Twenty-Seventh, were not entitled to benefit under that article. The Court reasoned that the legal effect of adoption is to make the adopted child a natural child from the time of adoption, but not retroactively. The court stated, “The mere happenstance that a child who is adopted after January 8, 1964 may have been born before that date cannot bring such child within the class of beneficiaries of the trust under article Twenty-Seventh.”