Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111 (1968)

Public employees and their unions do not have a statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings for violating no-strike provisions, distinguishing them from private sector employees.

Summary

This case addresses whether public employees and their unions are entitled to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings for violating the Taylor Law’s prohibition against strikes. The Court of Appeals held that neither statutory nor constitutional provisions grant this right. The court reasoned that historical precedent and policy considerations justify treating public and private sector employees differently regarding the right to strike and jury trials for related contempt charges. Prompt resolution of public sector strike-related contempt is crucial to prevent severe disruption of essential services.

Facts

The Corporation Counsel of New York City sought an order to punish the defendants (public employees and their unions) for criminal contempt. The claim was that they willfully disobeyed a temporary injunction issued by the Supreme Court restraining them from striking. The defendants demanded a jury trial, arguing they were entitled to it by statute and the Constitution. Special Term rejected their demand, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

Procedural History

1. Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction against the strike.
2. Defendants violated the injunction.
3. Corporation Counsel sought criminal contempt charges.
4. Special Term denied the defendants’ request for a jury trial.
5. Appellate Division affirmed the denial.
6. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether public employees and their unions are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of statutory right under Judiciary Law § 753-a or Labor Law § 808 in criminal contempt proceedings for violating the Taylor Law’s no-strike provisions.
2. Whether denying public employees and their unions a jury trial in such proceedings violates the equal protection clauses of the United States or New York State Constitutions.
3. Whether the Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution mandate a jury trial in these circumstances.

Holding

1. No, because the Taylor Law was not intended to provide jury trials in contempt enforcement proceedings, and the reference to Labor Law § 807 does not create a right to a jury trial under § 808.
2. No, because a legitimate distinction between public and private employment is constitutionally permissible regarding the right to strike and jury trials for violations.
3. No, because the potential penalties for contempt are not “serious” enough to trigger the constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that sections 807 and 808 of the Labor Law, and Judiciary Law, § 753-a, are successors to a provision enacted in the 1930s, New York’s Little Norris-LaGuardia Act and that for decades, these provisions have been held inapplicable to public employees. The court stated that the Legislature would have explicitly granted a right to a jury trial if it had intended to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that statutes which divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.

Regarding the constitutional claims, the court relied on United States v. Mine Workers, stating that a distinction between public and private employment is permissible. The court noted the necessity of prompt determinations in criminal contempt proceedings under the Taylor Law to deter public strikes. The court stated that a reasonable distinction may be drawn between public and private employment. The court cited McGowan v. Maryland, stating, “The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”

Finally, the court addressed the defendants’ argument that the Federal Constitution requires a trial by jury. Citing Bloom v. Illinois, the court stated that the decision is limited in its application to “serious” crimes in contradistinction to “petty” offenses. The court determined that the maximum punishment to which the individual defendants are subject—30 days in jail and a fine of $250—does not constitute a “serious” crime. The determination of whether a crime is serious or petty turns not on the amount of the fine which may be imposed but solely on the length of the prison sentence.