21 N.Y.2d 611 (1968)
Evidence obtained through electronic surveillance with the consent of one party to the conversation is admissible and does not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the other party.
Summary
The Court of Appeals of New York addressed whether the use of a concealed radio device to transmit incriminating conversations between a defendant and a police informant violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court held that such transmission, with the consent of one party to the conversation, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. This decision rested on the principle that the real breach of privacy occurs when a party to a private conversation voluntarily discloses it, regardless of whether they rely on memory, notes, or electronic devices.
Facts
Five separate cases were consolidated on appeal, each involving a conviction for narcotics sales. In each case, a police informant, equipped with a concealed radio device, engaged in conversations with the defendant that were transmitted to and overheard by law enforcement. The defendants argued that the use of this transmitted evidence violated their constitutional rights.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted at trial. They appealed, arguing that the evidence obtained through the electronic transmissions should have been suppressed as a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The appellate division affirmed the convictions, and the cases were subsequently appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the transmission to police by an informant, via a concealed radio device, of incriminating conversations with the defendants constitutes a violation of their constitutional rights, specifically their Fourth Amendment right to privacy?
Holding
No, because the voluntary disclosure of a conversation by one party to it, with or without electronic aids, does not violate the other party’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Court’s Reasoning
The court relied on On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), which established that the use of electronic devices by one party to a conversation to record or transmit it does not violate the constitutional rights of the other party. The court reasoned that the fundamental breach of privacy occurs when a party to a conversation decides to disclose it, and the method of disclosure (memory, notes, or electronic devices) is immaterial. Quoting from Lopez, the court emphasized that the problem is essentially the same whether the informer tells about the conversation based on memory or uses sophisticated devices.
The court distinguished Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that intercepting a private telephone conversation by attaching an electronic device to a public telephone booth violated Fourth Amendment rights. The court reasoned that using a public telephone booth constitutes seeking private telephone service, and the interception is akin to eavesdropping. However, Katz does not apply to a voluntary disclosure by a party to the conversation.
The court also cited Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), which allowed an informer to testify about private conversations even without electronic recording or transmission. The court adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1969), which similarly distinguished Katz. The court stated that the New York statute prohibiting eavesdropping expressly excepts conversations overheard with the consent of a party to the conversation.