Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354 (1969)
A party in a civil suit does not waive their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by making prior statements unless those statements constitute an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, and the assertion of the privilege does not unfairly prejudice the opposing party.
Summary
Steinbrecher sued Wapnick, alleging Wapnick fraudulently sold him stolen cars. During pre-trial examination, Wapnick invoked his Fifth Amendment right, refusing to answer questions about his involvement. Steinbrecher moved to strike Wapnick’s answer and sought a default judgment, arguing Wapnick had waived his privilege through prior affidavits denying the allegations to vacate an order of arrest. The trial court granted Steinbrecher’s motion. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wapnick’s prior general denials did not constitute a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights, especially since the assertion of the privilege did not prejudice Steinbrecher.
Facts
Steinbrecher, a used car dealer, sued Wapnick, claiming Wapnick and others fraudulently sold him 17 stolen cars.
Steinbrecher obtained an order for Wapnick’s arrest at the start of the suit.
Wapnick served a verified answer denying the allegations.
Wapnick moved to vacate the arrest order and submitted affidavits denying knowledge of the fraudulent transactions.
During a pre-trial examination, Wapnick refused to answer 42 questions, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination due to pending indictments against him.
Procedural History
The trial court granted Steinbrecher’s motion to strike Wapnick’s answer and entered a default judgment against Wapnick.
The Appellate Division affirmed.
Wapnick appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether Wapnick waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by previously submitting affidavits containing general denials of wrongdoing when moving to vacate an order of arrest in the same civil case.
Holding
No, because Wapnick’s prior general denials, made to vacate an order of arrest, did not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and because Steinbrecher was not unfairly prejudiced by Wapnick’s assertion of the privilege.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished between the privilege against self-incrimination accorded to an accused in a criminal case and that accorded to an ordinary witness or a party in a civil case. A criminal defendant waives the privilege by testifying at trial, but an ordinary witness does not waive the privilege merely by testifying.
The court stated, “where the previous disclosure by an ordinary witness is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, he is not deprived of the privilege of stopping short in his testimony whenever it may fairly tend to incriminate him.”
The court found that Wapnick’s prior statements were general denials made in a defensive posture to vacate an ex parte order of arrest. They were not a voluntary, knowing relinquishment of his Fifth Amendment rights.
The court emphasized that the privilege cannot be used as a weapon to unfairly prejudice an adversary. Here, Wapnick’s assertion of the privilege did not deprive Steinbrecher of information necessary to his case or give Wapnick an unfair advantage.
The court noted that allowing the default judgment to stand would amount to a civil forfeiture for the good-faith exercise of a constitutional right.
The court reinstated Wapnick’s answer and permitted Steinbrecher to examine Wapnick before trial, given that the criminal indictments against him had been resolved.