Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 27 N.Y.2d 9 (1970)
The fair report privilege, which protects the publication of fair and true reports of judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings, extends to reports of non-public judicial proceedings.
Summary
This case concerns a libel action against a newspaper for publishing information from a sealed matrimonial file. The court addressed whether the fair report privilege under Section 337 of the Civil Practice Act (now Civil Rights Law § 74) applied to non-public judicial proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the privilege does apply, reversing the lower court’s decision. The court relied on the legislative history of the 1956 amendment to Section 337, which removed the word “public,” indicating an intent to extend the privilege to reports of proceedings not open to the public. This decision grants newspapers broad protection for reporting on judicial matters, even those shielded from public view, as long as the reports are fair and true.
Facts
The plaintiff, Shiles, sued News Syndicate Co. for libel based on an article published in the New York Daily News. The article contained information derived from the plaintiff’s sealed matrimonial file. The defendant argued that the publication was privileged under Section 337 of the Civil Practice Act, which provides immunity for fair and true reports of judicial proceedings. The matrimonial file was sealed pursuant to then existing rules governing such proceedings.
Procedural History
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the fair report privilege did not apply to non-public judicial proceedings. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the privilege does extend to non-public proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether the fair report privilege under Section 337 of the Civil Practice Act (now Civil Rights Law § 74) extends to reports of judicial proceedings that are not open to the public.
Holding
Yes, the fair report privilege extends to reports of non-public judicial proceedings because the legislative history of the 1956 amendment to Section 337 demonstrates a clear intent to remove the requirement that the proceeding be “public” to qualify for the privilege.
Court’s Reasoning
The court’s reasoning centered on the legislative intent behind the 1956 amendment to Section 337 of the Civil Practice Act. The amendment removed the word “public” from the statute, which previously limited the fair report privilege to reports of public judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings. The court examined the legislative history, including Governor Harriman’s approval memorandum, which, despite acknowledging concerns about the secrecy of certain proceedings, ultimately supported the bill to avoid “undue restrictions upon the freedom of the press.”
The court contrasted this with Governor Dewey’s veto of an identical bill in 1952, where Dewey argued against granting a “right of freedom to report falsehood, without liability or responsibility, when the falsehood is uttered in a proceeding from which the public is barred.” However, the court emphasized that the Legislature subsequently enacted the bill into law in 1956, signaling a clear intent to overrule prior case law that had limited the privilege to public proceedings, specifically citing Danziger v. Hearst Corp. and Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co.
The dissenting opinion argued that the legislative history demonstrated a clear intent to overrule the Danziger and Stevenson cases, thus granting newspapers absolute immunity for publishing fair and true reports of judicial proceedings, even if not public. The dissent quoted the Attorney-General: “This bill amends Section 337 of the Civil Practice Act. Its obvious purpose is to overcome the decision of Stevenson v. News Syndicate”. The dissent concluded that while the result might be unfortunate, it was the legislative command that the court must follow.
The decision effectively broadened the scope of the fair report privilege in New York, providing greater protection to news organizations reporting on judicial proceedings, regardless of whether those proceedings are open to the public. The key practical implication is that publishers are shielded from liability for defamation as long as their reports are fair and accurate, even if they involve information that the public is otherwise barred from accessing.