Green v. Downs, 27 N.Y.2d 205 (1970)

When a specific statute or regulation directly applies to the facts of a negligence case, the trial court must instruct the jury on that specific provision, and a general instruction on reasonable care is insufficient.

Summary

The plaintiff was injured when the defendant’s car backed into her as she waited to cross the street. At trial, the court refused to charge the jury with the specific provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibiting unsafe backing of a vehicle. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the defendant, holding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the specific statute was prejudicial error. The court emphasized that general negligence instructions are inadequate when a specific law details the duty of care. The Court also found error in the admission of hearsay evidence.

Facts

The plaintiff, Mrs. Green, was standing on a New York City street waiting for traffic to clear so she could cross to Pennsylvania Station. She was behind the defendant’s parked car. The defendant, Mr. Downs, suddenly backed his car without warning, striking and injuring the plaintiff. Mr. Downs claimed he did not see Mrs. Green before the accident.

Procedural History

Mrs. Green sued Mr. Downs for negligence. The trial court entered a judgment of no cause of action based on a jury verdict for the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting a new trial.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury with the specific provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibiting the unsafe backing of a vehicle.
2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay and self-serving statements from the defendant’s motor vehicle accident report.

Holding

1. Yes, because when a law specifically details the duty of a reasonably prudent person, general instructions are inadequate.
2. Yes, because the admission of the defendant’s conjecture about the plaintiff’s interpretation of a police officer’s signal, contained within his motor vehicle report, was prejudicial hearsay.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1211(a) was prejudicial error. This statute states, “The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.” The court reasoned that a general instruction on the duty of reasonable care is not a sufficient substitute for a specific statutory provision directly applicable to the facts. Quoting Barnevo v. Munson S.S. Line, 239 N.Y. 486, 492, the court stated, “In cases where the law has detailed the duty resting on a reasonably prudent man, general instructions are inadequate.”

The Court emphasized the need for specificity in jury charges, requiring the court to “incorporate the factual contentions of the parties in respect of the legal principles charged.” The court cited authority stating, “Thus, in negligence actions mere abstract rules applicable to any negligence case, or mere statement of the law of negligence in general terms, even though correct, should not be given unless made applicable to the issues in the case at bar.”

The Court also found error in the admission of the defendant’s motor vehicle report. The report contained the defendant’s conjecture that the plaintiff interpreted a police officer’s signal as permission to cross the street. The court deemed this hearsay and self-serving. The prejudice was exacerbated because the court allowed the defendant to recount the officer’s directions to him, while excluding the plaintiff’s testimony about the officer’s instructions to her.