People v. Gordon, 32 N.Y.2d 62 (1973)
r
To be convicted of criminal facilitation, the defendant must believe he is aiding someone who *intends* to commit a crime, and that person must subsequently commit that crime.
r
Summary
r
The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for criminal facilitation, holding that the defendant could not be convicted for providing information to an undercover officer that led to a drug sale by a third party. The court reasoned that the third party (the drug seller) did not *intend* to commit the crime of selling drugs to the officer at the time the defendant provided the information, because the seller was unaware of the officer’s existence. The statute requires the facilitator to believe he is aiding someone who *intends* to commit a crime, and this element was missing.
r
Facts
r
An undercover state trooper, Cryan, was investigating drug sales in Batavia, New York. He met Larry Hicks, an informant, who introduced him to several men, including the defendant, Gordon. Gordon told Cryan that Craig Newlon at 110 Bank Street “deals quite heavily in narcotics” and suggested Cryan go there to buy marijuana. Gordon provided directions. Cryan went to Newlon’s apartment and purchased marijuana.
r
Procedural History
r
Gordon was indicted for criminal facilitation for allegedly aiding Newlon in selling marijuana to Cryan. He was convicted after a jury trial, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.
r
Issue(s)
r
Whether a defendant can be convicted of criminal facilitation for providing information to a buyer that leads to a drug sale when the seller did not *intend* to sell to that specific buyer at the time the information was provided?
r
Holding
r
No, because the criminal facilitation statute requires that the defendant believe he is aiding someone who *intends* to commit a crime. Here, Newlon (the seller) had no intention of selling drugs to Cryan (the buyer) at the time Gordon provided Cryan with Newlon’s information. Therefore, Gordon could not have believed he was aiding Newlon’s *intent* to commit a crime at that time.
r
Court’s Reasoning
r
The court emphasized the plain language of Penal Law § 115.00, which requires proof that the defendant believed it “probable” that he was rendering aid to a person who then “intends” to commit a crime. The court stated that the statute contemplates a situation where the defendant assists someone who, at the time of the assistance, intends to commit a crime and subsequently does commit it.
r
The court distinguished examples in the Practice Commentary, such as selling a gun to someone known to intend to kill their wife, where the principal actor already has the intent to commit a crime. In contrast, Newlon could not have intended to sell drugs to Cryan at the time Gordon spoke with Cryan, because Newlon was unaware of Cryan’s existence. The court reasoned:
r
“In this case, it is indisputable that, at the time the defendant had his conversation with Cryan, Newlon, who had never even heard of that individual, could not possibly have ‘intended’ to commit the crime of selling marijuana to him. And it follows, therefore, that the defendant could not possibly have ‘believed’ it probable that Newlon intended to commit that crime. Thus, as is manifest, one of the basic elements required by the statute, namely, the element of intent, was missing.”
r
The court warned against stretching the offense of criminal facilitation beyond its intended scope, stating it might lead to further abuse in its construction and application. The court explicitly declined to address the defendant’s argument about whether