People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63 (1973)
In cases of alleged child abuse or homicide, evidence of a defendant’s prior conduct toward the child is admissible to negate claims of accident or mistake, particularly when the crime occurred in the privacy of the home and the facts are not easily unraveled.
Summary
Charles and Marlene Henson were convicted of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of their four-year-old son, Kip, who died from acute bronchial pneumonia exacerbated by numerous untreated injuries. The prosecution presented evidence that the Hensons failed to seek timely medical care and had previously abused Kip. The Hensons claimed Kip’s injuries were accidental, but the prosecution introduced evidence of prior injuries and neglect. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that evidence of prior conduct was admissible to refute the accident defense and that the mention of the “battered child syndrome” did not prejudice the jury.
Facts
Kip Henson died on August 23, 1970. He was four years old. First responders found Kip unresponsive with signs of prior injuries. An autopsy revealed acute bronchial pneumonia and numerous bruises. Marlene Henson exclaimed, “Oh God, what will they do to us now.” The Hensons admitted awareness of Kip’s illness but left him with a babysitter after tying him to his bed. They did not seek medical attention until shortly before his death. The mother admitted to disciplining Kip with physical force, including slapping and hitting him with objects.
Procedural History
The Hensons were indicted on charges including manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, endangering the welfare of a child, and assault. A jury convicted them of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of a child; Marlene Henson was also convicted of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove criminally negligent homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the admission of evidence regarding the defendants’ prior conduct toward Kip constituted reversible error.
3. Whether the mere mention of the ‘battered child syndrome’ prejudiced the jury against the defendants.
Holding
1. Yes, because the evidence demonstrated the defendants’ failure to provide prompt medical care for their son reflected “a culpable failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death.
2. No, because the evidence of prior conduct was admissible to refute the defense of accident and to demonstrate a pattern of abuse.
3. No, because the questions regarding the battered child syndrome were not answered and, even if they had been, the testimony would have been admissible.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of the Hensons’ guilt. The court referenced Penal Law § 125.10, which defines criminally negligent homicide as causing the death of another person with criminal negligence, which is defined in Penal Law § 15.05(4) as failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. The court highlighted the testimony of the babysitter, Dolores Klochaney, who described Kip’s severe condition and the parents’ indifference. The Court reasoned that the prior injuries were admissible under the exception to the rule excluding evidence of collateral conduct. The Court stated, “It is a well-recognized exception to the general rule, excluding evidence of collateral conduct, that such evidence is admissible if, among other things, it tends to negative the defense of ‘accident’ or mistake.” The court further noted that the credibility of the accident explanation diminishes as the instances of similar alleged “accidental” injury increase. Regarding the battered child syndrome, the court emphasized that the trial court prevented the expert from answering the questions, and even if answered, the testimony would have been relevant to show the injuries were not accidental, stating “A finding * * * of the ‘battered child syndrome’…simply indicates that a child of tender years found with a certain type of injury…has not suffered those injuries by accidental means.”