35 N.Y.2d 283 (1974)
A party may introduce an adverse party’s deposition as evidence in chief without being bound by the deponent’s statements and without making the deponent the party’s own witness.
Summary
The plaintiff, a bicyclist struck by the defendant’s truck, introduced the truck driver’s deposition at trial. The trial court instructed the jury that by doing so, the plaintiff made the driver his own witness and was bound by the driver’s version of the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under CPLR 3117, a party can use an adverse party’s deposition as evidence in chief without being bound by it. The court emphasized that no party is limited by the witnesses they produce in establishing the facts at issue and clarified the distinction between being bound by testimony and the rules of impeachment.
Facts
On August 8, 1969, plaintiff Robert Spampinato, an 18-year-old, was riding his bicycle on Flatbush Avenue when he was struck by a truck owned by defendant A. B. C. Consolidated Corp. and driven by defendant Harold Stark. At trial, the plaintiff introduced Stark’s deposition, which presented conflicting versions of the accident’s cause. The plaintiff’s theory was that Stark was inattentive; the defendant’s theory was that the plaintiff suddenly moved into the truck’s path.
Procedural History
The trial court instructed the jury that by introducing Stark’s deposition, the plaintiff made Stark his own witness and was bound by Stark’s version of the accident. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.
Issue(s)
Whether a party, by introducing the deposition of an adverse party as evidence in chief, makes the deponent the party’s own witness and is bound by the deponent’s version of the facts.
Holding
No, because CPLR 3117(a)(2) explicitly allows a party to use the deposition of an adverse party “for any purpose,” including as evidence in chief, without being bound by it or making the deponent the party’s own witness.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on CPLR 3117, which governs the use of depositions at trial. The court emphasized that CPLR 3117(a)(2) specifically allows a party to use the deposition of an adverse party for any purpose. The court stated the trial court’s charge was erroneous because the plaintiff was entitled to use the driver’s deposition as evidence in chief under CPLR 3117(a)(2). The Court explained that while calling a witness to testify does make that person the party’s witness, this does not mean the party is bound by the witness’s version of the facts. Quoting Becker v. Koch, 104 N.Y. 394, the court noted that no party is limited by the witnesses they produce from establishing the facts at issue. The court clarified the distinction between the concept of being “bound” by a witness’s testimony and the rules regarding impeachment of a witness. Chief Judge Breitel concurred, emphasizing that CPLR 3117(a)(2) permits the “unqualified use of the adverse party’s deposition for any purpose.” He further explained the distinction between being “bound” by a witness’s testimony and the permissible scope of impeachment, noting that the trial court has discretion to control the scope of cross-examination to conserve trial time and prevent abusive tactics. He stated that limitations on impeachment usually do not apply to adverse parties.