People v. Conyers, 35 N.Y.2d 339 (1974)
A defendant’s prior silence, inconsistent with their trial testimony and under circumstances where one would naturally speak, is admissible for impeachment purposes on cross-examination, even if that silence occurred after arrest.
Summary
Conyers, a police officer, was convicted of grand larceny and attempted grand larceny by extortion. At trial, he claimed the victim was attempting to bribe him, and he was setting the victim up for bribery charges. The prosecution cross-examined Conyers about whether he had reported the alleged bribery attempt to his superiors before or after his arrest. He had not. The New York Court of Appeals held that this cross-examination about his silence was permissible for impeachment purposes because it was inconsistent with his defense and a law enforcement officer would naturally report such a bribe attempt.
Facts
Defendant Conyers, a narcotics officer, and other officers entered Geraldine Williams’ apartment with a search warrant. They threatened to arrest her and take away her children unless she called William Mathis, Sr. (Mathis) to arrange for him to come to the apartment. Upon Mathis’s arrival, Conyers demanded $6,000 from him, threatening to arrest Williams if he did not comply. Mathis paid the money, and Conyers left.
Later, Conyers contacted Mathis again, claiming to need to locate Mathis’s son for a narcotics investigation. Conyers offered to “smooth this thing over” for $12,000. Mathis reported these events to the police, who instructed him to meet with Conyers and agree to pay the money in installments. At the arranged meeting, Mathis gave Conyers $280 in marked bills. Officers then entered and arrested Conyers.
Procedural History
Conyers was convicted of grand larceny and attempted grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine if the prosecutor improperly questioned Conyers regarding his post-arrest silence.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecution could properly cross-examine the defendant, a police officer, about his failure to report the alleged bribery attempt by the victim to his superiors, both before and after his arrest, when the defendant claimed at trial that he was setting up the victim for bribery.
Holding
Yes, because the defendant’s silence was patently inconsistent with the defense he asserted at trial, and as a law enforcement officer, he had a duty to report the alleged bribery attempt, thus making the silence probative of his credibility.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished this case from the general rule that a defendant’s silence after arrest cannot be used against them, citing People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. The court reasoned that the purpose of the Miranda rule is to protect against prosecutorial attacks using admissions obtained when one is not under a duty to speak. However, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, established that Miranda cannot be used as a license to commit perjury. Here, the inquiry occurred on cross-examination after the defendant testified he was setting up the victim for bribery.
The court emphasized the inconsistency between Conyers’s silence and his defense. “The natural consequences of his status as a law enforcement officer would require him to promptly report any bribe or attempted bribe to his superiors, and certainly protest and reveal such an alleged scheme after his arrest to them, and to his fellow officers as well.” The court found that Conyers’s testimony was diametrically opposed to the prosecution’s evidence, making his credibility the central issue. His silence was, therefore, a proper subject for cross-examination to assess his credibility. The court specifically noted, “[T]he silence of a defendant, after arrest, cannot be used against him” unless it is patently inconsistent with a defense asserted.
The court concluded that the defendant’s silence was a proper subject of cross-examination because of the inherent inconsistency with his defense. The court weighed the probative value of the silence against the potential prejudice to the defendant, finding that the probative value outweighed the prejudice in this particular fact pattern.