Saperstein v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass’n, 36 N.Y.2d 80 (1975): Enforceability of Autopsy Clauses in Insurance Policies

Saperstein v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass’n, 36 N.Y.2d 80 (1975)

An insurer’s contractual right to perform an autopsy is not absolute, and a beneficiary’s refusal to allow a post-interment autopsy is justified if the insurer’s demand is deemed unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

Summary

This case addresses whether a beneficiary can be denied insurance benefits for refusing to allow an autopsy when the insurance policy grants the insurer the right to perform one. The insured died in a car accident, and the insurer, suspecting a pre-existing heart condition might have caused the accident, requested an autopsy after interment. The beneficiary refused. The court held that while the insurance policy granted the right to an autopsy, the insurer’s demand had to be reasonable. The reasonableness of the demand, given the timing and the insurer’s justification, was a question of fact for trial, precluding summary judgment. The court balanced the insurer’s contractual rights with the public policy favoring the quiet repose of the dead.

Facts

Ben Saperstein died in a single-car accident in March 1968. The police report indicated that his car skidded on ice, resulting in a broken neck. His wife, the plaintiff, filed a claim under his accident insurance policy with Commercial Travelers. The insurer investigated and found a record of Saperstein’s hospitalization seven years prior for hypertension and precordial pain. Based on this, the insurer requested an autopsy 37 days after interment, suspecting a heart attack may have caused the accident. The beneficiary refused the autopsy request.

Procedural History

The beneficiary sued to recover the death benefit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding the autopsy demand was reasonable and the refusal barred recovery. The Appellate Division reversed, stating a post-interment autopsy requires the beneficiary’s consent unless the insurer has a reasonable belief the death was from a non-covered risk. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

Issue(s)

Whether an insurer’s demand for a post-interment autopsy, pursuant to a clause in an accident insurance policy, was reasonable under the circumstances, and whether the refusal of such a demand bars the beneficiary from recovering under the policy.

Holding

No, because the reasonableness of the insurer’s demand for a post-interment autopsy, based on the facts presented, is a question of fact to be determined at trial. The Appellate Division’s order reversing summary judgment was affirmed.

Court’s Reasoning

The court acknowledged the insurer’s contractual right to an autopsy, as sanctioned by Section 164 of the Insurance Law, and that beneficiaries are generally bound by the insured’s agreement to such provisions. However, the court emphasized that this right is not absolute. The court balanced the contractual right with public policy concerns regarding disturbing the repose of the dead, stating, “[t]he quiet of the grave, the repose of the dead, are not lightly to be disturbed. Good and substantial reasons must be shown before disinterment is to be sanctioned.” The court distinguished cases where the reasonableness of an autopsy request was clear (e.g., conflicting medical reports). Here, the insurer’s justification—a relatively minor heart condition seven years prior—was insufficient to establish reasonableness as a matter of law. The court stated that “remote possibilities will not suffice and ‘fishing expeditions’ shall not be sanctioned once the body has gone to its final resting place.” The court suggested that the legislature consider requiring insurers to state the grounds for the autopsy request to allow beneficiaries to make a more informed decision. The court held that the jury must determine if “there was a significant possibility that the autopsy would reveal such information as to allow the insurer to defend the action in good faith on the ground that death resulted from other than accidental causes.”