Matter of Gliedman v. New York City Tr. Auth., 41 N.Y.2d 715 (1977): Corporation Counsel’s Exclusive Authority over City’s Legal Business

Matter of Gliedman v. New York City Tr. Auth., 41 N.Y.2d 715 (1977)

The New York City Charter vests exclusive authority in the Corporation Counsel to handle all legal matters for the city and its agencies, precluding other city officials from independently initiating legal proceedings.

Summary

This case addresses whether the President of the Borough of the Bronx, acting in his official capacity and represented by his own counsel, can independently initiate legal proceedings on behalf of the city. The Court of Appeals held that the Borough President could not, as the New York City Charter grants exclusive authority to the Corporation Counsel to handle all legal business for the city and its agencies. The court emphasized the importance of centralized legal representation to ensure consistent and effective legal strategies for the city.

Facts

The President of the Borough of The Bronx, Gliedman, initiated a legal proceeding. He was represented by an attorney who was counsel to the President of The Bronx. The specific subject matter of the proceeding is not detailed in this brief memorandum opinion, but the crucial fact is that Gliedman acted in his official capacity as Borough President, not as a private individual.

Procedural History

The trial court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the President of the Borough of The Bronx, acting in his official capacity and represented by his own counsel, has the legal authority to initiate a legal proceeding on behalf of the city or its agencies, given the provisions of the New York City Charter.

Holding

No, because subdivision a of section 394 of the New York City Charter vests the “charge and conduct of all the law business of the city and its agencies” exclusively in the Corporation Counsel.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals based its decision squarely on the language of the New York City Charter. Section 394(a) explicitly assigns the responsibility for handling all legal matters of the city and its agencies to the Corporation Counsel. By initiating a legal proceeding with separate counsel, the Borough President acted in direct contravention of this provision. The court reasoned that allowing individual borough presidents to pursue independent legal actions would undermine the centralized legal representation structure established by the charter. Judge Cooke concurred in the result, but solely on the grounds that the Borough President lacked standing as he was not personally aggrieved. Judge Cooke indicated that if the Borough President had proceeded as an individual, the outcome might have been different, suggesting the importance of the capacity in which a party brings a lawsuit. The Court further noted the petition failed to state a cause of action for denial of equal protection of the laws.