People v. Gottlieb, 36 N.Y.2d 629 (1975)
An application for a certificate of occupancy is not a “written instrument” within the meaning of Penal Law § 175.35, which prohibits offering a false instrument for filing.
Summary
The defendants were convicted of offering a false instrument for filing after submitting an application for a certificate of occupancy containing false information to the Yonkers Building Department. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the application was not a “written instrument” as the term is used in Penal Law § 175.35. The court reasoned that the statute’s scope is narrower than its predecessor and that the definition of “written instrument” should be narrowly construed, consistent with prior case law and legislative intent. The Court emphasized that a broader definition, such as that used in the context of forgery, would risk turning harmless misstatements into felonies.
Facts
The defendants submitted an “Application For Certificate of Occupancy” to the Building Department of the City of Yonkers for an apartment complex. The prosecution alleged that the application contained false information. The defendants were subsequently convicted of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, in violation of section 175.35 of the Penal Law.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether an application for a certificate of occupancy is a “written instrument” within the meaning of Penal Law § 175.35, which prohibits offering a false instrument for filing.
Holding
No, because the term “written instrument” in Penal Law § 175.35 should be narrowly construed, and an application for a certificate of occupancy does not fall within that narrow definition.
Court’s Reasoning
The court began by examining the legislative intent behind Penal Law § 175.35 and its predecessor, Penal Law § 2051. The court noted that while the older statute was broader, the revised statute was more limited in its application to “false instruments.” Referencing People v. Sansanese, 17 N.Y.2d 302, the court emphasized the narrow construction historically given to the term “instrument.” The court quoted Sansanese, stating that an instrument is typically defined as a “formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or lease.”
The court rejected the argument that the broader definition of “written instrument” found in Penal Law Article 170 (relating to forgery) should apply. The court pointed out that the legislature specifically defined the term broadly for the purposes of Article 170 to expand the scope of forgery crimes, and applying that definition to Article 175 could lead to felony prosecutions for otherwise harmless misstatements. The court stated, “Penal responsibility * * * cannot be extended beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate.”
The court concluded that if the Legislature had intended the broader definition of Article 170 to apply to Article 175, it would have explicitly stated so. Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.