Scornavacca v. Leary, 38 N.Y.2d 583 (1976)
Under the Administrative Code of the City of New York, a suspended police officer is only entitled to back pay if they are not convicted of departmental charges; a delay in determining the charges does not affect this entitlement.
Summary
Two New York City patrolmen, Scornavacca and Stein, were suspended without pay pending the determination of departmental charges against them. Scornavacca faced criminal charges and was suspended in 1968, with the charges dismissed in 1969. Stein was indicted and suspended in 1970, acquitted in 1971. Both were later found guilty on departmental charges, disciplined, and returned to duty. They filed Article 78 proceedings claiming entitlement to back pay due to the delay in resolving the charges. The Court of Appeals held that because both officers were convicted of departmental charges, they were not entitled to back pay, and the delay in reaching the determination did not alter this outcome as governed by the Administrative Code, not the Civil Service Law.
Facts
Scornavacca was suspended on August 30, 1968, after being criminally charged with assault. The criminal charges were dismissed on January 22, 1969, and a disciplinary proceeding commenced the following day. He was found guilty in October 1969.
Stein was indicted and suspended on February 25, 1970. He was acquitted of the criminal charges on January 28, 1971. A police department hearing was held in June 1971, and he was found guilty on several specifications in August 1971.
Procedural History
Both Scornavacca and Stein were disciplined and returned to duty after being found guilty on departmental charges. They then initiated Article 78 proceedings, claiming back pay for their suspension periods due to delays in resolving the charges. The lower courts directed a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the delay. The Court of Appeals reversed the orders of the Appellate Division and dismissed the petitions.
Issue(s)
Whether a suspended New York City patrolman, convicted of departmental charges, is entitled to back pay for the period of suspension, either in whole or in part, due to delays in the departmental proceedings.
Holding
No, because under Section 434a-20.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, a suspended officer is only entitled to back pay if they are not convicted of the departmental charges; the delay in determining the charges is irrelevant to this entitlement.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police commissioner’s power to suspend a patrolman and the entitlement to back pay are governed by Section 434a-20.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, not by Section 75 of the Civil Service Law. The court cited Brenner v. City of New York, 9 NY2d 447, emphasizing that entitlement to back pay hinges on whether the officer is convicted of the departmental charges. Since both petitioners were convicted, they are not entitled to back pay regardless of any delay in the proceedings. The court also referenced Matter of O’Keefe v. Murphy, 38 NY2d 563, regarding the effect of delays in finally determining the charges. The court held the lower courts erred in directing hearings to determine the reasonableness of the delay, as such delay had no bearing on the officers’ right to back pay under the applicable statute. The key legal rule applied was the specific provision of the Administrative Code governing back pay for suspended police officers in New York City, which superseded any general principles regarding the timeliness of administrative proceedings. This ruling provides a clear standard for determining back pay eligibility for suspended NYPD officers, focusing on the outcome of the departmental charges rather than the duration of the suspension. This interpretation ensures administrative efficiency and avoids potential windfalls for officers ultimately found guilty of misconduct.