People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.2d 624 (1974)
Under CPL 30.30, periods of delay are excluded from speedy trial calculations when the defendant’s location is unknown and they are attempting to avoid prosecution, or when delays are at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant for pretrial motions or plea negotiations.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court correctly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of speedy trial rights. The court reasoned that certain periods of delay were excludable under CPL 30.30. Specifically, the period during which the defendant was inadvertently released from jail and his whereabouts were unknown, coupled with indications of an attempt to avoid prosecution, was excludable. Additionally, delays resulting from pre-plea negotiations and motions initiated by the defendant were also properly excluded. Because the prosecution was ready for trial within the statutory timeframe after excluding these periods, the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated.
Facts
The defendant was indicted on October 27, 1972, while incarcerated on a parole violation. On February 28, 1973, he was inadvertently released from jail. A bench warrant was issued on March 6, 1973, when he failed to appear in court. He remained free until his arrest on October 19, 1973. He worked at a parking lot near the county jail after his release. The case was placed on the Trial Calendar on November 30, 1973. After January 4, 1974, there were adjournments for “pre-plea” consideration and to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel. The matter was placed back on the Trial Calendar on February 24, 1974.
Procedural History
The Monroe County Court convicted the defendant of criminal sale of a dangerous drug in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the County Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30.
Holding
No, because the prosecution was ready for trial within the statutory timeframe after excluding periods of delay attributable to the defendant’s absence and attempts to avoid prosecution, as well as delays resulting from pre-plea negotiations and motions initiated by the defendant.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals based its decision on CPL 30.30, which governs speedy trial rights in New York. The court highlighted specific exclusions allowed under the statute. First, the court noted that the period between the defendant’s release and rearrest could be excluded because the defendant’s location was unknown, and evidence suggested he was attempting to avoid prosecution. The court stated, “There was a basis for exclusion, under the ‘six months rule’ computation, of the period of almost seven and one-half months, from release to arrest, when it could be found that defendant’s location was unknown and he was attempting to avoid prosecution (CPL 30.30, subd 4, par [c]).” The fact that the defendant worked near the jail, claiming he was waiting to be rearrested, did not negate the possibility that he was also attempting to avoid prosecution. Second, the court excluded delays that were at the defendant’s request or with his consent, specifically those related to pre-plea considerations and the defendant’s need to obtain new counsel. The court reasoned, “Since it appears that the prosecution was ready for trial on November 30, 1973 (CPL 30.30, subd 1, par [a]) and that the delays occasioned thereafter, more particularly after January 4, 1974, were at the request or with the consent of defendant and for the purpose of pretrial motions, the period from November 30 to February 24, 1974 was properly excluded (CPL 30.30, subd 4, pars [a], [f]).” Because the prosecution was ready for trial on November 30, 1973, and the delays thereafter were attributable to the defendant, the court found no violation of his speedy trial rights. The court therefore affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.