Matter of the Arbitration Between the Council of Supervisory Assns. v. Board of Education, 41 N.Y.2d 319 (1977): Arbitrator’s Authority to Interpret Collective Bargaining Agreements

Matter of the Arbitration Between the Council of Supervisory Associations, 41 N.Y.2d 319 (1977)

An arbitrator, empowered to interpret a collective bargaining agreement, may rely on established practices and written policies incorporated by reference within the agreement, and is not guilty of misconduct for refusing to compel a witness to breach a rule of confidentiality mandated by those incorporated policies.

Summary

The Council of Supervisory Associations sought to vacate an arbitration award that rejected a college teacher’s grievance of sex discrimination in promotion denial. The arbitrator had refused to compel a faculty member to disclose confidential discussions from a personnel committee, citing a board policy (Max-Kahn memorandum) incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. The union argued this refusal constituted misconduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed the confirmation of the award, holding that the arbitrator acted within his authority to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, which included the board’s confidentiality policy. The court emphasized that arbitrators’ interpretations of agreements are generally not reviewable for errors of law or fact.

Facts

Professor Irene Deitch, an assistant professor, was denied promotion to associate professor with tenure. She lacked a doctorate, a requirement for the promotion. The faculty union filed a grievance alleging unlawful sex discrimination in the denial of promotion. During arbitration, the union sought testimony from Professor Mortimer Schiff, a member of the college-wide personnel committee, regarding committee discussions. The Board objected, citing a confidentiality policy (Max-Kahn memorandum) incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator refused to compel Professor Schiff to testify about the personnel committee discussions.

Procedural History

The faculty union demanded arbitration after the grievance was unresolved. The arbitrator denied the grievance after refusing to compel testimony regarding personnel committee discussions. The Board moved to confirm the award, and the union moved to vacate it. Special Term confirmed the award. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term decision. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether an arbitrator, empowered to interpret a collective bargaining agreement, commits misconduct by refusing to compel a witness to disclose confidential discussions from a personnel committee when a board policy incorporated into the agreement mandates confidentiality.

Holding

No, because the arbitrator was interpreting the collective bargaining agreement, which incorporated the board’s policy mandating confidentiality of personnel committee discussions. The arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement is not subject to judicial review for errors of law or fact.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while an arbitrator generally may not exclude pertinent evidence, parties can broaden or narrow the scope of arbitration by agreement. The collective bargaining agreement incorporated the Board’s bylaws and written policies, including the Max-Kahn memorandum, which established the confidentiality of personnel committee meetings. The arbitrator determined that the Max-Kahn memorandum was a written policy of the board and, therefore, an integral part of the collective agreement. Thus, the arbitrator was not excluding pertinent evidence but rather adhering to the terms of the agreement itself. The court emphasized that an arbitrator’s resolution of questions of substantive law or fact is not judicially reviewable. The court stated, “[I]t would be professional misconduct for a member of a P & B committee to disclose the substance or even the nature of the discussion at the P & B meeting.” The court also noted the potential paradox of submitting unlawful discrimination claims to arbitration, where procedural and substantive rules are more flexible, but clarified that the issue of waiving unwaivable substantive rights was not directly before them.