People v. Grice, 37 N.Y.2d 975 (1975)
Statements made during the commission of a crime are part of the crime itself and need not be disclosed in a bill of particulars; a purported declaration of mistrial is not effective if immediately rescinded; and pedigree information obtained without pre-interrogation warnings may be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, addressing several claims by the defendant, Grice. The court held that statements made during a crime’s commission are part of the crime itself (corpus delicti) and don’t need to be disclosed in a bill of particulars. It also found that a quickly retracted declaration of mistrial doesn’t trigger double jeopardy protections. Finally, the court permitted the use of pedigree information, obtained without pre-interrogation warnings, to impeach the defendant’s credibility on cross-examination. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the civilian was not a confidential informant, the mistrial was not actually entered, and the impeachment was permissible even if the pedigree information was initially obtained improperly.
Facts
The defendant, Grice, sold narcotics to an undercover police officer in the presence of a civilian. Before trial, the People disclosed the identity, description, and address of this civilian in a bill of particulars. During the criminal transaction, Grice made certain remarks. At trial, a purported declaration of mistrial was made but rescinded almost immediately. The defendant was also interviewed in connection with his possible release on his own recognizance and provided pedigree information without being given pre-interrogation warnings. This information was later used to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the People were obligated to produce the civilian present at the narcotics sale at trial.
2. Whether the defendant’s remarks made during the criminal transaction needed to be disclosed in the bill of particulars.
3. Whether the trial court’s purported declaration of a mistrial barred further proceedings on double jeopardy grounds.
4. Whether the defendant was entitled to pre-interrogation warnings before being asked pedigree information and whether such information, if obtained without warnings, could be used to impeach his credibility.
Holding
1. No, because the civilian was not a confidential informant but a police suspect.
2. No, because the remarks were part of the corpus delicti.
3. No, because the declaration of mistrial was immediately rescinded and no mistrial order was entered.
4. No, because such warnings are not required for pedigree information; even if they were required and not given, the information could be used for impeachment purposes.
Court’s Reasoning
Regarding the civilian witness, the court emphasized he was not a confidential informant but a police suspect, thus relieving the People of the obligation to produce him at trial. As to the defendant’s remarks, the court reasoned that because they were made during the commission of the crime, they constituted part of the crime itself (corpus delicti) and therefore did not require disclosure in the bill of particulars, citing CPL 200.90, subd 3.
Concerning the mistrial, the court stated that the trial court’s declaration was merely a statement of intention, not a completed act, because it was rescinded almost immediately. Therefore, no double jeopardy claim could stand.
Regarding the pre-interrogation warnings, the court cited People v. Rivera, 26 NY2d 304, 309, holding that such warnings aren’t required before obtaining pedigree information. Even if obtaining the information violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, the court relied on People v. Harris, 25 NY2d 175, 177, affd 401 US 222; and People v. Kulis, 18 NY2d 318, 323, to state that its use to impeach the defendant’s credibility on cross-examination was permissible. The court affirmed the principle that illegally obtained evidence can sometimes be used for impeachment purposes.