People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justification for Police Stops Based on Reasonable Suspicion

People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

A police officer may stop a motor vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying an investigative check of the operator’s license and registration.

Summary

This case addresses the permissible grounds for a police officer to stop a motor vehicle. Officers stopped a vehicle matching the description of one seen earlier that evening with different license plates. The Court of Appeals held that the stop was justified because the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, supporting an investigative check. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a fourth adjournment to secure a witness.

Facts

On September 24, 1971, Officers Santiago and Braga, assigned to a taxi and truck surveillance unit, stopped a blue Buick Riviera with Queens license plates. Later that evening, the officers observed a similar Buick Riviera near the Triborough Bridge, but this one had Brooklyn license plates and multiple occupants. The officers stopped the second vehicle because it appeared identical to the first but had different plates. During the stop, officers discovered that the driver was not the registered owner, and a visible envelope containing what appeared to be cocaine was found in plain view. The occupants, including the defendant, were arrested.

Procedural History

The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a dangerous drug. The trial court denied the defendant’s suppression motion. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a police officer’s suspicion of criminal activity justifies stopping a motor vehicle for an investigative check.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an adjournment to secure the presence of a witness.

Holding

1. Yes, because the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, warranting the stop for an investigative check of the driver’s license and registration.
2. No, because the trial court had already granted multiple adjournments, and the defendant’s own actions contributed to the witness’s unavailability.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police action in stopping the vehicle was permissible because it was based on the officer’s observation of two apparently identical cars with different license plates within a short time frame. This observation created a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, thus justifying the stop for an investigative check. The court distinguished this situation from routine or arbitrary stops, which are prohibited under People v. Ingle. The court emphasized that “it [is] enough if the stop is based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion’ (Terry v Ohio, 393 US 1, 21, supra).”

Regarding the adjournment, the court found no abuse of discretion. The trial court had granted multiple adjournments, and the defendant had contributed to the witness’s unavailability by previously absconding from the jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from People v. Foy, where the trial court denied even a brief adjournment. Here, the court had been cooperative and accommodating. The court also noted that there was doubt about the needfulness of the potential witness’s testimony since the defense attorney admitted to not knowing whether the testimony would help or hurt the defendant.

The court held that a trial court’s discretion in granting adjournments should not be manipulated to avoid due process, especially when the defendant’s actions contributed to the situation. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the additional adjournment denial was within the trial court’s discretion.