Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13 (1977)

A jury may infer actual malice, a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim, from the absence of probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings, especially when the parties were strangers at the time the proceedings began.

Summary

Elizabeth Martin sued the City of Albany and Officer Deso for malicious prosecution after being arrested and acquitted of obstructing justice. The jury awarded her damages, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding no showing of malice. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, holding that a jury could infer malice from the lack of probable cause for the arrest. However, because the Appellate Division also found the verdict against the weight of the evidence, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, respecting the constitutional right to a jury trial.

Facts

Elizabeth Martin, while driving home with her husband, stopped to assist an acquaintance pulled over by police. Officer Deso arrived and, without allowing Mrs. Martin to explain, allegedly pushed her, twisted her arm, and arrested her. Her husband intervened and was also arrested. Both Martins were charged with obstructing justice, based on Officer Deso’s account that Mrs. Martin refused to move to the sidewalk and Mr. Martin blocked the arrest. The Martins were acquitted after a jury trial.

Procedural History

Mrs. Martin sued the City of Albany and Officer Deso for unlawful arrest, assault, and malicious prosecution. A jury found no cause of action on the husband’s claims or the wife’s assault claim, but awarded Mrs. Martin damages for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment against the husband, reduced the damages for unlawful arrest, and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim. Mrs. Martin appealed the dismissal of her malicious prosecution claim to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff was legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict in her favor for malicious prosecution.
2. If the evidence was sufficient, whether the Appellate Division properly dismissed the complaint on the facts.

Holding

1. Yes, because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find a lack of probable cause, from which they could infer malice.
2. No, because when reversing a judgment for the plaintiff based on the facts, the Appellate Division is constitutionally precluded from dismissing the complaint and must order a new trial.

Court’s Reasoning

To establish malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) no probable cause existed for the proceeding; and (4) the proceeding was instituted with actual malice. The court focused on the element of malice, noting it’s rarely proven directly, especially when the parties are strangers. It cited the Restatement of Torts § 669, stating that “[l]ack of probable cause for the initiation of criminal proceedings, in so far as it tends to show that the accuser did not believe in the guilt of the accused, is evidence that he did not initiate the proceedings for a proper purpose.” The court emphasized that a jury may infer malice from the lack of probable cause.

The Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude there was no probable cause to arrest Mrs. Martin, thus permitting an inference of malice. While the Appellate Division can overturn a verdict against the weight of evidence, it cannot dismiss the complaint in a case triable by jury as of right; it must order a new trial. To reinstate the jury verdict would require the Court of Appeals to improperly review the Appellate Division’s factual determination. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial on the malicious prosecution claim.