People v. Court, 43 N.Y.2d 817 (1977)
In bribery cases, the testimony of an accomplice (e.g., the person paying the bribe) must be corroborated by independent evidence to sustain an indictment.
Summary
This case concerns an indictment of a police officer, Court, for bribery. The primary evidence against Court was the testimony of Tripodi, an admitted policy operator who claimed to have been paying Court for police protection. The key issue was whether Tripodi was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The Court of Appeals held that Tripodi was an accomplice because the payments constituted bribery, not extortion, and his testimony lacked the necessary corroboration. Thus, the indictment against Court should have been dismissed. The dissent argued that the prosecution failed to demonstrate extortion, thus requiring corroboration of Tripodi’s testimony, which was absent.
Facts
Tripodi, a policy operator, testified before a Grand Jury that he had been paying police officers, including Court, for protection since the 1950s. The payments were made to prevent police enforcement of the law against his illegal gambling operation. Tripodi’s testimony regarding Court only concerned an isolated incident between May 1968 and June 1971 related to a failure to pay an alleged bet made by Court, not the broader protection payments. No evidence of threats was presented regarding Court.
Procedural History
The Grand Jury indicted Court based on Tripodi’s testimony. The lower courts upheld the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine if the indictment was proper given the nature of the testimony against the defendant.
Issue(s)
Whether Tripodi’s testimony should be considered accomplice testimony requiring corroboration to sustain the bribery indictment against Court.
Holding
No, because Tripodi was an accomplice, and his testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, the indictment should be dismissed.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that Tripodi’s payments constituted bribery, not extortion, because there was no evidence of threats made by Court to Tripodi. The court emphasized that while fear of law enforcement is inherent in bribery, extortion requires a specific threat of adverse action if payment is not made. Since Tripodi was a willing participant in the bribery scheme, he was an accomplice under CPL 60.22, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The court cited People v. Mullens, 292 NY 408, 414 to support this principle. Because Tripodi’s testimony was not corroborated by independent evidence, the indictment against Court was deemed unsustainable.