People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978): Limits on Vehicle Stops Based on Suspicion

People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978)

A vehicle stop is unlawful unless based on a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the occupants have been, are, or are about to be engaged in criminal activity.

Summary

Sobotker was convicted of felony weapon possession after a gun was found in his car following a traffic stop. Police stopped the car because the occupants glanced at two bars while driving slowly. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was an unlawful seizure. The court emphasized that a vehicle stop requires more than a mere hunch; it requires reasonable suspicion rooted in specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity. The act of glancing at a bar, even in a high-crime area, is insufficient to justify a stop.

Facts

Two plainclothes police officers were stationed in an unmarked car in a well-lit shopping and entertainment area in Wantagh, Long Island, due to recent burglaries. They observed a Buick driving slowly (approximately five miles per hour) towards an intersection. The car paused briefly opposite a bar (“J.T.’s”), during which the three occupants turned their heads towards the bar. The car stopped at a stop sign at the next intersection, where the occupants “glanced” towards a second bar. The police then activated their siren and lights, forcing the car to stop.

Procedural History

Sobotker was convicted of possession of a weapon as a felony in the trial court. His motion to suppress the weapon was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the investigative stop of the vehicle Sobotker was driving violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New York State and United States Constitutions.

Holding

Yes, because the police lacked reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, to believe that the occupants of the vehicle had been, were, or were about to be engaged in criminal activity.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Ingle, which established that vehicle stops require either a non-arbitrary traffic procedure or reasonable suspicion of a law violation. The court distinguished this case from a common-law right to inquire, stating that such a right does not include the right to unlawful seizure. The court emphasized that absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, stopping a car is an impermissible seizure. Reasonable suspicion requires “the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that criminal activity is at hand.” This standard requires more than a subjective “hunch” or “gut reaction”; it must have demonstrable roots in objective evidence.
In this case, the court found no objective evidence of criminal activity at the time of the stop. The occupants’ act of glancing at a bar, even in a “high crime neighborhood,” did not reasonably indicate criminal conduct. The court noted that the officers’ hunch might have been correct, but a search cannot be justified solely by its results. Allowing hindsight to justify searches would erode constitutional safeguards. The court noted, “almost any series of indiscriminate seizures is bound to produce some instances of criminality that might otherwise have gone undetected or unprevented. But were hindsight alone to furnish the governing criteria, a vital constitutional safeguard of our personal security would soon be gone.” The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, the judgment vacated, and the indictment dismissed.