People v. Sasso, 43 N.Y.2d 292 (1977)

A trial court is not required to submit a lesser included offense to the jury unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater; in coercion cases involving threats of physical injury, the lesser charge is reserved for the unusual situation where the threat lacks a heinous quality.

Summary

Sasso was convicted of attempted coercion in the first degree for threatening a hospital director to drop charges against Sasso’s uncle. He argued the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted coercion in the second degree. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court was not required to submit the lesser charge because the evidence did not support a finding that the threat lacked the “heinous quality” necessary to distinguish first-degree coercion from second-degree coercion. The threat to kill or have the victim killed established the heinous nature of the crime.

Facts

Garrido, an administrator at Bronx Children’s Hospital, stole employee payroll checks, implicating Joseph Sasso, the defendant’s uncle. While indictments were pending, the defendant, Sasso, called Dr. E. Richard Feinberg, the hospital director. Sasso urged Feinberg to use his influence to have the indictments dismissed. When Feinberg refused, Sasso threatened to kill him or have him killed. Sasso was subsequently indicted for attempted coercion in the first degree based on these threats.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of attempted coercion in the first degree after a trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the lesser included offense of attempted coercion in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted coercion in the second degree, given that the defendant was charged with attempted coercion in the first degree based on threats of physical injury.

Holding

No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense of attempted coercion in the second degree but not the greater offense of attempted coercion in the first degree. Specifically, the threat did not lack the “heinous quality” necessary to warrant a charge on the lesser offense.

Court’s Reasoning

The court acknowledged that the statutory language defining coercion in the first and second degrees is nearly identical when the coercion involves threats of physical injury. However, the court cited People v. Eboli, 34 N.Y.2d 281, explaining that first-degree coercion should be charged when the method of coercion involves instilling fear of injury to a person, whereas the misdemeanor offense is a “safety-valve” for unusual factual situations where the threat of personal injury lacks the “heinous quality” associated with such threats.

The court emphasized that a lesser included offense should be charged if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher crime but guilty of the lower one. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.

However, the court clarified that the trial court is not required to submit the lesser degree “in every case.” Drawing from the Eboli analysis, the court stated that it would be an “exceptional case” where the method of coercion is by threat of personal or property injury while the “heinous quality” is lacking. While acknowledging that a vivid imagination may conjure a situation where a threat is not truly fearsome, it would be rare.

Applying these principles, the court found that the threat to kill or have the victim killed clearly established the heinous nature of the threat, and there was no basis for the jury to find that the threat lacked the requisite heinousness. The court reasoned that submitting the lesser charge would force the jury “to resort to sheer speculation.” The requested charge was “manifestly unwarranted and properly denied.” The court also noted that reduction of the sentence was within the purview of the Appellate Division, not the Court of Appeals.