People v. Perez, 45 N.Y.2d 204 (1978)
A defendant’s conviction for both robbery and weapons possession is permissible, even when the possession is demonstrated solely through conduct during the robbery, as these constitute distinct, separately punishable offenses.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a weapons possession charge should be dismissed as a lesser included offense when the defendant is also convicted of robbery where a weapon was used. The court held that the weapons possession charge does not automatically merge with the robbery conviction, even if the evidence of possession arises solely from the robbery itself. The court reasoned that robbery and weapons possession constitute distinct offenses, protecting against different harms, and that the legislature intended them to be separately punishable. Further, the court noted that sentencing limitations prevent the imposition of an additional consecutive sentence for the weapons charge in this scenario.
Facts
George Glass was approached by Jesus Perez and another individual. Perez inquired about someone living in Glass’s apartment building. Perez, handed a knife by his accomplice, pushed Glass against a car, held the knife to his back, and demanded money. Despite Glass’s cooperation, Perez stabbed him in the back. Glass attempted to escape, but Perez stabbed him again.
Procedural History
Perez was indicted on multiple counts, including robbery in the first degree, two counts of assault in the second degree, and misdemeanor weapons possession. A jury convicted him on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions without issuing an opinion. Perez then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a conviction for weapons possession, based solely on the defendant’s use of the weapon during a robbery, should be dismissed as a lesser included offense of the robbery conviction.
Holding
No, because robbery and weapons possession are distinct crimes with separate societal harms that the legislature intended to punish separately. While the sentence for the weapons possession charge must run concurrently with the robbery sentence, the conviction itself stands.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished the case from prior decisions where weapons possession charges were dismissed as lesser included offenses. It clarified that while the doctrine of lesser included offense, codified in CPL 1.20(37), prevents multiple convictions for the same conduct, robbery and weapons possession are not the same. "[W]here a defendant uses a weapon unlawfully to commit a crime of violence, such as robbery, that conduct in itself provides the basis for an indictment charging the defendant with both robbery and possession of a weapon with intent to use it against a person unlawfully." The court emphasized that these crimes differ not merely in the mental state but also in the underlying conduct and result. The court stated, "[b]ecause of the serious danger to the public posed by individuals who possess weapons, we believe that, as a matter of policy, the Legislature could not have intended that a weapons possession charge, such as the charge involved in this case, merge with the greater crime of robbery, notwithstanding the absence of evidence of the defendant’s possession of the weapon independent of his conduct during the commission of the robbery." The court also noted that Penal Law § 70.25(2) mandates concurrent sentences for offenses arising from the same act, mitigating any potential unfairness. The court contrasted this with crimes like manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide, which differ only in mental state, or burglary and trespass, where burglary is essentially trespass with aggravating factors, citing People v. Stanfield, 36 N.Y.2d 467 and People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233, respectively.