People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240 (1978)
A perjury conviction based on grand jury testimony is valid if the false testimony concerns a matter material to the grand jury’s investigation and the questioning was not solely aimed at trapping the witness into committing perjury.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of a perjury indictment against Pomerantz, a supplier of paper goods to nursing homes. Pomerantz was convicted of perjury for falsely denying knowledge of kickback schemes during his grand jury testimony. The investigation stemmed from a meeting arranged by the Special Prosecutor, where Pomerantz discussed fraudulent practices with an undercover agent. The Court of Appeals held that the out-of-state meeting was material to the New York nursing home corruption investigation, and the prosecutor’s questioning was a legitimate attempt to uncover the truth, not merely to induce perjury. This case highlights the permissible scope of prosecutorial investigation before a grand jury.
Facts
Pomerantz, president of Pomerantz Paper Corp., supplied paper goods to nursing homes, including some in New Jersey. As part of an investigation into nursing home fraud, the Special Prosecutor arranged for Ira Feinberg, a nursing home owner acting as an undercover agent, to meet with Pomerantz in New Jersey. During the meeting, Pomerantz discussed kickback schemes and inflated billing practices. Later, before a Kings County Grand Jury investigating nursing home corruption, Pomerantz denied ever meeting Feinberg or soliciting business from Feinberg’s nursing homes. He also denied any knowledge of, or participation in, kickback schemes.
Procedural History
Pomerantz was indicted on three counts of perjury in the first degree. He was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to concurrent terms of three years on each count. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment. The Special Prosecutor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a perjury prosecution is defective solely because the false testimony concerns an out-of-state meeting arranged by the Special Prosecutor with an out-of-state undercover agent?
2. Whether the prosecutor’s questioning before the grand jury was aimed solely or substantially at trapping the defendant into giving false testimony?
Holding
1. No, because the out-of-state meeting was material to the authorized substantive investigation of the Grand Jury into corruption in the New York nursing home industry.
2. No, because the prosecutor’s questioning was a legitimate attempt to uncover the truth about kickback schemes and not solely aimed at inducing perjury.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the New Jersey meeting was directly relevant to the Grand Jury’s investigation of corruption in New York nursing homes. The court emphasized that the meeting revealed Pomerantz’s familiarity with fraudulent practices, including inflated billing and kickback schemes, which were not explicitly limited to New Jersey and affected New York businesses. The court distinguished this case from People v. Tyler, where the questioning was focused on peripheral details with no demonstrated significance to the investigation. Here, the prosecutor’s questions were aimed at uncovering Pomerantz’s knowledge of specific corrupt practices, not merely to elicit a false statement. The court noted that the prosecutor repeatedly questioned Pomerantz about his knowledge of kickbacks and his meeting with Feinberg, providing ample opportunity for him to recall the details. The court stated, “If indeed a trap was set, it was aimed not at perjury, but at flushing out the truth.” The court also noted the importance of the prosecutor’s intent: “An investigatory examination which may seem to parallel what is approved in this case would not stand if on the record it were demonstrable that what was ultimately involved was a sophisticated facade to trap the defendant into a new crime of perjury or contempt, and not to establish evidence of antecedent crime. The court is concerned with substance, not form.”