Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780 (1979)

In cases involving latent injuries from harmful substances, the statute of limitations may begin to run when the injury manifests itself, not necessarily when the exposure occurred, particularly if the harmful effects are delayed or unknowable.

Summary

This case addresses when the statute of limitations begins to run in a case of latent injury. Susan Thornton was injected with Thorotrast in 1954 for a diagnostic examination. She later developed cancer in 1972 or 1973, allegedly due to the Thorotrast. The defendants argued the statute of limitations began in 1954. The plaintiff argued it began when the cancer developed. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the injection. A dissenting opinion argued that the statute should run from when the injury manifested, recognizing the delayed nature of harm from certain products.

Facts

1. Susan Thornton was injected with Thorotrast, a radioactive contrast agent, in 1954 at Roosevelt Hospital for a sinus examination.
2. The patient was not informed of the potential for Thorotrast to cause cancer.
3. Thornton did not experience any immediate adverse effects from the injection.
4. In 1972 or 1973, Thornton was diagnosed with undifferentiated squamous cell carcinoma, allegedly caused by the Thorotrast.

Procedural History

1. Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Roosevelt Hospital and the manufacturer of Thorotrast.
2. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the statute of limitations had expired.
3. Special Term granted leave to replead in strict liability but dismissed causes premised on negligence. The orders were affirmed in part.
4. The Appellate Division struck portions of the orders that granted leave to replead in strict liability and affirmed the dismissal of negligence claims. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the statute of limitations for a cause of action based on latent injuries caused by a radioactive substance begins to run from the date of exposure or from the date the injury manifests itself.

Holding

1. No, because the court held that the statute of limitations began to run from the time of the injection.

Court’s Reasoning

The dissenting judge, Fuchsberg, argued that the court should consider the unique nature of latent injuries. He emphasized that for drugs with a latent or slowly evolving potential for harm, the injury may not manifest until long after exposure. He criticized the reliance on Schmidt v Merchants Desp. Transp. Co. and Schwartz v Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., arguing they reflected an outdated view of products liability law that did not adequately account for the temporal gap between consumption and injury. Fuchsberg stated, “There can be no doubt that a cause of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury.” He cited Urie v Thompson, where the Supreme Court recognized that for injuries resulting from prolonged exposure, the afflicted employee is “injured” only when the accumulated effects manifest themselves. The dissent also noted that a growing number of courts across the country recognize that the injured user should not be foreclosed from having their day in court before knowledge of any injury or before any injury has occurred. He argued that the policy should be akin to that governing infants’ cases. To the extent that there very well may be some awareness in the case of the infant, but none in the case of an adult in circumstances like those now before us, there may be even more reason for the law to extend its protection to the adult.