People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287 (1979)
A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when unknowingly represented by a person not licensed to practice law, requiring automatic reversal of the conviction regardless of demonstrable prejudice.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed four consolidated cases where criminal defendants were represented by an individual, Albert Silver, who was not a licensed attorney. Silver had been practicing law illegally for approximately 12 years. After Silver’s status was discovered, the defendants sought to vacate their convictions, arguing that representation by an unlicensed individual violated their constitutional right to counsel. The lower courts denied the motions, applying a harmless error analysis. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that representation by an unlicensed person constitutes a per se violation of the right to counsel, requiring automatic reversal without a prejudice inquiry.
Facts
Felder was convicted of robbery and grand larceny after a jury trial where Silver appeared as assigned counsel. Tucker and Wright pleaded guilty to drug sale and rape charges, respectively, based on Silver’s advice and plea negotiations. Davis was convicted of arson after a jury trial, with Silver as assigned counsel. Post-trial, it was discovered that Silver was not a licensed attorney in any jurisdiction and had never completed law school. Each defendant moved to vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Procedural History
The trial courts denied the defendants’ motions to vacate their convictions, finding that Silver’s representation, though erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Felder, Tucker, and Wright’s motions, employing a harmless error analysis. The Appellate Division also affirmed the denial of Davis’s motion without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases.
Issue(s)
Whether representation by a person not licensed to practice law constitutes a per se violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, requiring automatic reversal of the conviction.
Holding
Yes, because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel means the right to representation by a licensed attorney, and representation by an unlicensed individual is equivalent to a complete denial of counsel, which cannot be considered harmless error.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that “counsel,” as used in the Sixth Amendment, unequivocally means a licensed attorney at law. A layperson, regardless of qualifications, cannot substitute for a member of the Bar. The court emphasized that the right to assistance of counsel is fundamental to a fair trial, stating, “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial” quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76. It further held that harmless error analysis is inapplicable when there is a denial of counsel, which invalidates the trial. The court distinguished this situation from mere trial errors, where harmless error analysis might be appropriate. The court stated: “this Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.’ Chapman v. California, supra [386 US], at 23.” quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489. Because the defendants were unknowingly represented by a non-attorney, their convictions were reversed, and new trials were ordered.