People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543 (1979)

A defendant’s right to confront witnesses does not automatically outweigh the state’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of police personnel records; a factual predicate is required to justify access to such records.

Summary

Vida Gissendanner was convicted of selling cocaine. She appealed, arguing the trial court erred by denying her request for subpoenas duces tecum to obtain the personnel records of two police officer witnesses and by allowing in-court identifications without proper pretrial notice. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Gissendanner failed to establish a sufficient factual basis to justify accessing the confidential police records. The Court also found that the in-court identifications were permissible because the officers’ prior encounters with the defendant negated concerns about suggestive identification procedures.

Facts

Ronald Eisenhauer, an undercover investigator, testified that Gissendanner sold him cocaine at her home. Investigator David Grassi, part of the surveillance team, corroborated that he saw Eisenhauer enter Gissendanner’s home. Detective Craig Corey, also part of the team, observed Eisenhauer approach the house, but his view was partially obstructed. Gissendanner testified that she knew Eisenhauer but denied selling him drugs, stating she saw him on her porch the night of the alleged sale.

Procedural History

Gissendanner was convicted of criminal sale of cocaine in a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Gissendanner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the denial of her subpoena requests and the admissibility of in-court identifications.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to issue subpoenas duces tecum for the personnel records of the police officer witnesses.

2. Whether the in-court identifications by the police officers should have been excluded due to the prosecution’s failure to provide pretrial notice as required by CPL 710.30(1)(b).

Holding

1. No, because Gissendanner failed to establish a sufficient factual predicate to justify access to the confidential police personnel records.

2. No, because the in-court identifications did not stem from suggestive pretrial identification procedures warranting pretrial notice under CPL 710.30(1)(b).

Court’s Reasoning

Regarding the subpoena issue, the Court acknowledged the tension between a defendant’s right to confrontation and the state’s interest in police confidentiality. The Court stated, “[A]ccess must be afforded to otherwise confidential data relevant and material to the determination of guilt or innocence, as, for example, when a request for access is directed toward revealing specific ‘biases, prejudices or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand’.” However, the Court emphasized that a mere desire to impeach a witness’s general credibility is insufficient. The Court distinguished this case from cases like Davis v. Alaska, where a specific motive to falsify was shown. The Court held that Gissendanner’s request amounted to a “fishing expedition” without a sufficient factual basis. “What they do call for is the putting forth in good faith of some factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a desperate grasping at a straw. Here there was no such demonstration.” The Court also rejected Gissendanner’s Brady v. Maryland argument because she failed to show that the records contained any exculpatory material. The Court also cited Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which codifies the standard for disclosure of police personnel records, requiring a “clear showing of facts sufficient to warrant the judge to request records for review.” Regarding the in-court identification, the Court reasoned that CPL 710.30 was designed to address suggestive pretrial identification procedures, like lineups, which were not present here. The officers’ prior familiarity with Gissendanner eliminated concerns about suggestiveness, rendering the notice requirement inapplicable. As the Court stated, “In cases in which the defendant’s identity is not in issue, or those in which the protagonists are known to one another, ‘suggestiveness’ is not a concern and, hence, the statute does not come into play”.