People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)
Once a suspect in custody requests counsel, any subsequent consent to a warrantless search obtained in the absence of counsel is invalid, even if the consent appears voluntary.
Summary
Knapp was arrested for grand larceny, and after being read his Miranda rights, stated he would get a lawyer. The police ceased questioning about the crime but asked Knapp if they could look around his property. Knapp agreed and signed a consent form. The search revealed stolen materials. The New York Court of Appeals held that Knapp’s consent was invalid because it was obtained after he requested counsel but before he had the opportunity to consult with an attorney. The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The evidence obtained during the search was therefore suppressed.
Facts
Deputy Sheriff Price arrested Knapp for grand larceny based on information about ongoing thefts.
Price advised Knapp of his Miranda rights, and Knapp indicated he understood them.
Another officer testified that Knapp stated, “You’re damn right, I’m going to have a lawyer.”
Sergeant Fikar arrived and, after confirming Knapp was advised of his rights, asked about building materials on the property.
Knapp stated he wanted to speak to his attorney before making any statement.
Fikar then asked if Knapp minded if he looked around, and Knapp said “no” and signed a consent to search form after being told he had the right to refuse.
A search of the property revealed stolen building materials.
After the initial search, Knapp again requested his attorney and was allowed to call him. The attorney arrived but did not object to the search.
Procedural History
The County Court denied Knapp’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the consent was voluntary based on People v. Gonzalez.
Knapp pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the second degree.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether a consent to a warrantless search is valid when obtained after a suspect in custody has requested counsel but before counsel is provided.
Holding
No, because once a suspect requests counsel, the police cannot seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures until the suspect has been permitted access to counsel, and any consent obtained before then is legally ineffectual.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found no basis to distinguish between obtaining a statement and obtaining consent to a search after a defendant’s request for an attorney. Quoting Miranda v. Arizona, the court emphasized that “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”
The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a relinquishment of the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The court found that the police did not “scrupulously honor” Knapp’s request for counsel. Instead, they merely shifted their focus from obtaining oral statements to eliciting consent to search. Because the defendant had requested counsel twice, the police were constitutionally prohibited from seeking his consent to the search before he had access to counsel.
The court rejected the argument that the attorney’s later arrival and failure to object validated the search, stating the attorney “could not then undo what had already been accomplished”. The court reasoned that there was no evidence to support the claim that the defendant, on advice of counsel, retroactively validated the earlier unconstitutional search.
The court cited People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366 and People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33 in support of their holding.