New York Law Review

Gunning v. Codd, 49 N.Y.2d 495 (1980): Defines ‘Conviction’ for Public Officer Vacancy

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Gunning v. Codd, 49 N.Y.2d 495 (1980)

Under New York law, specifically Public Officers Law § 30, a public office becomes vacant upon a verdict of guilty for a felony, not just upon sentencing; the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) defines ‘conviction’ as occurring at the guilty verdict stage.

Summary

Gunning, a police officer, was found guilty of official misconduct and bribe receiving. Prior to sentencing, he applied for retirement. The police commissioner dismissed him based on Public Officers Law § 30, which dictates that a public office becomes vacant upon felony conviction. Gunning argued that a ‘conviction’ requires a judgment of conviction after sentencing. The New York Court of Appeals held that under the CPL, a ‘conviction’ occurs upon a guilty verdict, thus his office was vacated upon the jury’s verdict, preventing his retirement.

Facts

  • Gunning, a police officer, was found guilty of official misconduct (misdemeanor) and bribe receiving (felony) on April 27, 1977.
  • He applied for retirement benefits the next day, intending to retire before his sentencing date.
  • On May 24, 1977, the police commissioner dismissed Gunning, citing Public Officers Law § 30, effective from the date of the jury verdict.
  • Gunning’s retirement application was not processed due to the dismissal.

Procedural History

  • Gunning initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing that a ‘conviction’ requires a judgment of conviction.
  • Special Term dismissed the petition.
  • The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.
  • The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

  1. Whether, under Public Officers Law § 30, a ‘conviction’ triggering vacancy of public office occurs upon a jury verdict of guilty or only upon the entry of a judgment of conviction after sentencing?

Holding

  1. Yes, because the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) defines a ‘conviction’ as occurring upon the entry of a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty, and this definition applies to Public Officers Law § 30.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) definitively states that a conviction occurs upon a guilty verdict (CPL 1.20, subd. 13). Prior to the CPL, the definition of ‘conviction’ was inconsistent. The court emphasized that the CPL applies to “all matters of criminal procedure” (CPL 1.10, subd 1, par [b]), and defining “conviction” is intrinsically linked to criminal procedure. Since Public Officers Law § 30 is triggered by a criminal adjudication, the definition of conviction must be determined by criminal law. The court stated, “To await vacatur of a public office until judgment is entered, moreover, would unconscionably reward those who, despite having breached the public trust, may purposefully delay sentencing and thwart public policy.” Permitting an officer to remain in office until sentencing could allow them to obtain a pension, circumventing the purpose of Public Officers Law § 30. The court cited Matter of Toro v. Malcolm, stating that a subsequent reversal of the conviction on appeal does not negate the initial vacatur. Judges Wachtler and Fuchsberg dissented, referencing the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division, which argued for a judgment of conviction being required for vacatur, citing Matter of Cunningham v. Nadjari.

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