In re Todd H., 49 N.Y.2d 1024 (1980)

Family Courts possess inherent authority to expunge their own records, but their power to order external agencies to expunge records related to juvenile delinquency proceedings is limited to the specific circumstances outlined in statutory law.

Summary

This case addresses the extent of a Family Court’s authority to order the expunction of juvenile delinquency records maintained by external agencies, like police departments. The Court of Appeals held that while Family Courts have inherent power to expunge their own records, their authority over external agencies’ records is strictly limited to statutory grants. The majority found that Section 753-b of the Family Court Act, related to fingerprinting and photographing, provided the statutory basis to compel the expungement. The dissent argued that the statute was narrowly tailored and didn’t grant broad authority to expunge all records. The case highlights the balance between protecting juvenile privacy and maintaining law enforcement records.

Facts

Two separate cases were consolidated for appeal. In Matter of Todd H., a 15-year-old was charged with an act that would constitute a Class B felony if committed by an adult. The Family Court ordered the destruction of fingerprints, palmprints, photographs, and related records. In Matter of Anthony P., the juvenile was charged with a Class E felony and a Class A misdemeanor; the Family Court also ordered expunction of records.

Procedural History

In both cases, the Family Court ordered the expunction of records. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order in Matter of Todd H. Both cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Family Court has the authority to order the expunction of records maintained by external agencies (e.g., police departments, Division of Criminal Justice Services) pertaining to juvenile delinquency proceedings when the charges are not sustained.
2. Whether Section 753-b of the Family Court Act provides statutory authority for such expunction, and if so, what are the limits of that authority.

Holding

1. Yes, in limited circumstances. Family Court’s power to expunge records of external agencies is constrained by statutory grants, not inherent authority.
2. Yes, but only with respect to fingerprints, palmprints, and photographs taken pursuant to Section 724-a of the Family Court Act, and only in the circumstances specified in Section 753-b because the legislature carefully drafted the statute to address specific situations.

Court’s Reasoning

The majority affirmed the orders, finding implicit legislative intent for Family Courts to expunge records under specific circumstances. The dissent, authored by Judge Jones, argued that Section 753-b is narrowly tailored, mandating destruction only of fingerprints, palmprints, and photographs taken pursuant to Section 724-a in specific situations. The dissent emphasized that the statute provides detailed specifications, and inferring a general authority to expunge all records would obliterate those specifications, constituting judicial legislation. Judge Jones stated, “Rather than manifesting any general intention that when charges of alleged juvenile delinquency are withdrawn or dismissed Family Court should be authorized to order destruction of all records in connection therewith however obtained and wherever maintained, the statute mandates destruction but only of records obtained pursuant to the provisions of section 724-a and then only in the circumstances specified in the statute.” The dissent differentiated between the Family Court’s inherent power over its own records and its limited power over external agencies. The court distinguishes this case from Matter of Wade v. Department of Mental Hygiene, where the court found no statutory authorization for the Supreme Court to order expunction of the Department’s records, because here the majority found implied authority. The dissent would have modified the order in Matter of Todd H. to exclude the destruction of the arrest report because it did not fall within the statutory grant. The dissent would have reversed the order in Matter of Anthony P. because the charges against the juvenile did not fall within the scope of Section 724-a, thus precluding the application of Section 753-b.