People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 360 (1980)

A defendant can be convicted of conspiracy under New York’s unilateral theory of conspiracy even if the alleged co-conspirator is acquitted, and collateral estoppel does not bar the prosecution of one conspirator following the acquittal of the alleged co-conspirator.

Summary

Ronald Berkowitz was convicted of conspiracy for a drug sale involving Diane Alvarez. Alvarez was later acquitted of conspiracy but convicted of criminal sale. Berkowitz argued that Alvarez’s acquittal barred his conspiracy conviction. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York’s adoption of a unilateral theory of conspiracy allows a defendant to be convicted even if the co-conspirator is acquitted. The court also held that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case because the parties are not the same, and the People deserve a full and fair opportunity to litigate each defendant’s guilt.

Facts

Detective Wainen, an undercover agent, planned to purchase cocaine from Berkowitz. Jason Stark, an informant, arranged a meeting. Berkowitz called Stark’s apartment, delaying the meeting. Eventually, Diane Alvarez met Wainen and Stark, leading them to an apartment she shared with Berkowitz. Alvarez sold cocaine to Wainen. Later, Wainen contacted Berkowitz to arrange another sale. Berkowitz stated he needed to consult Alvarez, his source. Alvarez told Wainen that she was the connection and Berkowitz handled street sales. Berkowitz and Alvarez were arrested and tried separately.

Procedural History

Berkowitz was convicted of conspiracy in the first degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence of conspiracy. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating Berkowitz’s conviction, but remitted for a hearing on speedy trial grounds.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the People made out a prima facie case of conspiracy sufficient to justify the use of a co-conspirator’s remarks against the defendant.
2. Whether the prior acquittal of the alleged sole co-conspirator precludes the conviction of the defendant.
3. Whether the Supreme Court was justified in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds without a hearing.

Holding

1. Yes, because the defendant’s involvement was evidenced by connections to the transaction, including calling to postpone the meeting and the tape-recorded conversation.
2. No, because New York has adopted the unilateral theory of conspiracy and because collateral estoppel does not apply when the parties are different.
3. No, because calendar notations alone do not suffice to prove that periods marked “excluded” from speedy trial calculations are, in fact, excludable; a hearing is required to determine the reasons for adjournments.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the People presented a prima facie case of conspiracy based on Berkowitz’s actions and statements, justifying the admission of Alvarez’s statements as evidence against him. The court emphasized New York’s adoption of the